Murder, Mayhem and Mexican Mafia Stalk the Bakken Oil Fields

By Georgianne Nienaber

James Henrikson: poisoned by free-for-all capitalist values.

James Henrikson: poisoned by free-for-all “business” values.

The Bakken oil patch is slowly turning into a killing field winding through 9,000 temporary housing projects called “man camps.” Fueled by drugs, alcohol and desperation, the innocent homeless and the guilty desperate dregs of humanity are forced to sleep in cars and under bridges as the workforce explodes, infrastructure implodes, and social mores collapse.

 

Shortly before Spokane businessman Doug Carlisle was found murdered in the kitchen of his three story home he told his son, “If I disappear or wake up with bullets in my back, promise me you will let everyone know that James Henrikson did it.” Spokane police detectives pinned the actual hit on small time burglar Timothy Suckow, but affidavits filed in the incident cite evidence that North Dakota businessman James Hendrickson may have ordered the hit over ownership of oil rich lands in the Bakken oil fields, and that Henrickson had also ordered “muscle” to intimidate tribal chairman Tex Hall of the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation in North Dakota.

Investigations showed Carlisle, an owner in trucking company Kingdom Dynamics Enterprises, was trying to buy Henrikson out of his share of 640 acres of North Dakota land they owned with plans to drill for oil.

On December 15 Carlisle and his wife returned home to find a gunman in the home. His wife fled upstairs and hid in a closet while the killer shot her husband at point blank range and then fled in a white van. Police found several weapons belonging to the alleged shooter, Suckow, including a .45 caliber handgun matching the description of the weapon used to kill Carlisle, according to investigators.

A leather glove dropped in the backyard subjected to DNA testing also matched Suckow, according to published reports.

James Henrikson was arrested on unrelated federal firearms charges this week by agents from Homeland Security Investigations and the Bismarck/Mandan Metro Area Narcotics Task Force. His phone number was found in Suckow’s contact list. As a convicted felon with a long and colorful rap sheet, Henrikson is being charged with the illegal possession of firearms, but so far has not been charged with the Carlisle murder, despite Carlisle’s predictions.

The Bakken oil patch is slowly turning into a killing field winding through 9,000 temporary housing projects called “man camps.” Fueled by drugs, alcohol and desperation, the innocent homeless and the guilty desperate dregs of humanity are forced to sleep in cars and under bridges as the workforce explodes, infrastructure implodes, and social mores collapse. In May 2013, police found 58-year-old Jack Sjol in a shallow grave about six miles southeast of his ranch in Williston, ND. 33-year-old Ryan Stensaker, who has a history of drug related convictions was arrested and charged with his murder.

In a case related to the Carlisle investigation, Kristopher “KC” Clarke, 29, disappeared from the Williston area over a year ago in 2012. Originally from Washington State, Clarke worked for Henrikson as an operations manager and newspaper reports indicate Henrikson is a person of interest in his disappearance. Clarke, AKA “Gimpdaddy,” was a long-term friend of Henrikson and employed at Henrikson’s firm, Blackstone Trucking. Friends say Clarke was owed $600,000 by Henrikson and was last seen in an argument with him in Mandaree North Dakota before disappearing. The case is still under investigation and anyone with information is urged to contact Special Agent Steve Gutknecht, of the North Dakota Bureau of Investigations, at 701-774-4310.

The North Dakota Bakken Oil patch straddles the rich shale oil formation known as the Williston Basin. Once mining interests learned how to release the shale-embedded oil in a process known as fracking, an oil boom was born. Since 2008, according to tribal records, more than $500 million in oil revenue leasing rights and royalties has flowed into Fort Berthold Reservation coffers.

Statements and affidavits filed by investigating officers in Spokane show that Tex Hall, the elected tribal chief of the MHA Affiliated Tribes at Fort Berthold, controls Moheshu Energy, an oil company operating on the reservation. James Henrikson worked for Hall and is currently under federal investigation for defrauding Moheshu Energy out of millions of dollars.

Eric Guerrero, who works for Henrikson, bragged to an unidentified informant that he had been in prison for murder and the informant, whose name has been blacked out in documents, claims that Guerrero has the words “Mexican Mafia” (a nationwide Hispanic prison gang) tattooed on the back of his head. The witness told a detective working on the case that Guerrero told him that he (Guerrero) was approached by Henrikson to ask if he knew anyone who would kill tribal chairman Tex Hall.

Guerrero admitted to authorities that he worked for Henrikson driving truck, and had the Mafia tattoo, but refused to cooperate after he denied that he was asked to kill Hall.

Fort Berthold Tribal Elder, Marilyn Hudson, who recently spoke to the Minneapolis Star Tribune about the necessity to take a stand to protect sacred lands from oil development wonders why the disappearance of “Gimpdaddy” Clarke did not resonate with people in the Fort Berthold area.

“The first I heard about it (K.C. Clark) was when a flyer was distributed in the area warning people about Henrikson and Creveling (his wife Sarah Creveling) about a year ago. No law enforcement people had ever mentioned this missing person or made any attempt to find him,” Hudson said in an email.

“The detective in Spokane in less than a month found and arrested the a killer; interviewed a lot of people and took affidavits; uncovered a chain of people who had extensive criminal records; and traced them all over at least four states — North Dakota, Texas, Montana, and Washington,” Hudson wrote.

She feels the Fort Berthold people are vulnerable, and added that it appears an established criminal network operated with impunity until Spokane investigators discovered the Tex Hall murder plot and “possibly even solved the murder of KC Clarke.”

Hudson also wonders how Henrikson and Carlisle were able to acquire oil leases on 640 acres of Indian lands. “Did the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) approve it?” Since Blackstone Trucking did business with Moheshu Energy on Indian lands, where did the profits come from and were tribal lease holders paid?

In another mystery, authorities are also looking for 30-year-old Bismarck resident Eric Haider, who lived in Bismarck and worked in Dickinson, just over a hundred miles from Williston. Haider was last seen on May 24, 2012, at his job site.

Anyone with information on the whereabouts of Kristopher “KC” Clarke is being urged to call the Williston Police Department at 701-577-1212. For tips or information related to the disappearance of Eric Haider, the public is urged to contact the Dickinson Police Department at 701-456-7762.

For more information and updates see social media sites People For Fort Berthold Environmental Awareness, Find kcgimpdaddy, and This Is Mandaree.

Cross-posted in Huffington Post

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Georgianne Nienaber is an investigative environmental and political writer. She lives in rural northern Minnesota, New Orleans and South Florida. Her articles have appeared in The Society of Professional Journalists’ Online Quill Magazine, The Ugandan Independent, Rwanda’s New Times, India’s TerraGreen, COA News, ZNET, OpEdNews, Glide Magazine, The Journal of the International Primate Protection League, Africa Front, The United Nations Publication, A Civil Society Observer, Bitch Magazine, and Zimbabwe’s The Daily Mirror. Her fiction expos- of insurance fraud in the horse industry, Horse Sense, was re-released in early 2006. Gorilla Dreams: The Legacy of Dian Fossey was also released in 2006. Nienaber spent much of 2007 doing research in South Africa, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. She was in DRC as a MONUC-accredited journalist, and has been living Southern Louisiana investigating hurricane reconstruction and getting to know the people there since late 2007. Nienaber is currently developing a documentary on the Gulf of Mexico Dead Zone, and continuing “to explore the magic of the Deep South.” She is a member of the Memphis Chapter of the National Academy of Recording Arts and Sciences.




Must Oligarchy and Technological Unemployment Continue to Decimate the Middle Class?

By Richard Clark
usWorkers

entire incomeOnce the oligarchy takes power, the distribution of goods & money becomes ever more unrelated to any idea of merit or deservedness. Example: Banksters, being some of the best-paid people in the world, have recently destroyed far more wealth in the US than they’ve earned, and yet they are still paid billions in bonuses each year. They receive the money they do because they’ve been allowed to take power over our gov’t.

In 1930, when the world was “suffering from a bad attack of economic pessimism,” John Maynard Keynes wrote a broadly optimistic essay, “Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren.”   It imagined a middle way between revolution and stagnation that would leave the said grandchildren a great deal richer than their grandparents.   But the path was not without dangers.

One of the worries Keynes admitted was a “new disease”: “technological unemployment” due to our discovery of means of economizing the use of labor that would outrun the pace at which we can find new uses for labor.”   His readers might not have heard of the problem, he suggested–but they were certain to hear a lot more about it in the years to come.

For the most part, however, they did not hear about it.   And nowadays, the majority of economists confidently wave such worries away.   By raising productivity, they argue, any automation which economizes on the use of labor will increase incomes.   That will generate demand for new products and services, which will in turn create new jobs for displaced workers.   To think otherwise was a career killer, for it meant being tarred as a Luddite–the name taken by 19th-century textile workers who smashed the machines they thought were taking their jobs.

For much of the 20th century, those arguing that technology brought ever more jobs and prosperity seemed to have the better of the debate.   Real incomes in Britain and the US tripled from 1570 to 1875.   And they more than tripled from 1875 to 1975.   Industrialization did not end up eliminating the need for human workers.   On the contrary, it created employment opportunities sufficient to soak up the 20th century’s exploding population.   Keynes’s vision of everyone in the 2030s being a lot richer was largely achieved.   However, his belief that they would work just 15 hours or so a week has not come to pass.   Why not?

In America the median wage (corrected for inflation and measured in constant dollars) is stagnant and has hardly budged over the past four decades.   Even in places like Britain and Germany, where employment is touching new highs, wages have been flat for a decade.   Recent research suggests that this is because substituting capital (i.e. automation) for labor is increasingly attractive in the business world;   and, as a result, owners of capital have captured ever more of the world’s income since the 1980s, while the share going to labor has fallen — until now when we have 85 people who have managed to accumulate a body of wealth so large that it is equal in amount to that gathered by fully half the world’s population.

At the same time, even in relatively egalitarian places like Sweden, inequality among the employed has risen sharply, with the share going to the highest earners soaring.   For those not in the elite, argues David Graeber, an anthropologist at the London School of Economics, much of modern labor consists of stultifying “bullshit jobs” — low- and mid-level computer-screen-sitting that serves mostly to just occupy workers for whom the economy no longer has much need.   Keeping them employed, and shopping, Mr Graeber argues, is not an economic choice;   it is a political one, i.e. it is something the ruling class does mostly just to keep control over the lives of these millions, who, if too many of them were to become well educated and well informed, and then well-organized politically (instead of falling prey to shopaholism and workaholism), could easily become a major threat to the ruling class, politically.   As John Maynard Keynes could have pointed out, they could all be working 15-hour weeks (or 3-month years) were it not for their devotion to the fanciest new consumer items that rule most of their lives, and the devotion to warfare and war spending that results from the perverse needs of our military-industrial complex.

Be that as it may, drudgery may soon enough give way to ever more stark amounts of unemployment.   There is already a long-term trend towards lower levels of employment in some rich countries.   The proportion of American adults participating in the labor force recently hit its lowest level since 1978, and although some of that is due to the effects of aging, some is not.   In a recent speech that was modeled in part on Keynes’s “Possibilities,” Larry Summers, a former American treasury secretary, looked at employment trends among American men between 25 and 54.   In the 1960s only one in 20 of those men was not working.   According to Mr. Summers’s extrapolations, in ten years that number could well be one in 7.

This is one indication, Mr. Summers says, that technical change is increasingly taking the form of “capital that effectively substitutes for labor”.  And there may be a lot more for such capital to do in the near future.   To wit:   A 2013 paper by Carl Benedikt Frey and Michael Osborne, of the University of Oxford, argued that jobs are at high risk of being automated in 47% of the occupational categories into which work is customarily sorted.   That includes accountancy, legal work, technical writing and a lot of other white-collar occupations.

Answering the question of whether such automation could lead to prolonged pain for workers means taking a close look at past experience, theory and technological trends.   The picture suggested by this evidence is a complex one.   It is also more worrying than many economists and politicians have been prepared to admit.

Be sure to read the rest of the foregoing article in the latest issue of The Economist, an edited version of the beginning of which article you’ve just read.

As Robert Reich recently pointed out, the oligarchic concentration of power at the top — which flows largely from the concentration of income and wealth there — has prevented Washington from dealing much with the problems of the poor and the middle class.   To the contrary, as wealth has accumulated at the top, Washington has:   a) reduced taxes on the wealthy, b) expanded tax loopholes that disproportionately benefit the rich, c) deregulated Wall Street, andd) provided ever larger subsidies, bailouts, and tax breaks for large corporations — all at the expense of the poor and our shrinking middle class!   The only things that have trickled down to the middle class and the poor, besides ever fewer good jobs and smaller paychecks, are public services that are increasingly inadequate because of being starved for money.

Unequal political power is the most noxious and nefarious consequence of widening inequality, . . and is also the most fundamental threat to our democracy.   With Citizens United, big money has now all but engulfed Washington and many state capitals — drowning out the voices of average Americans, filling the campaign chests of the candidates who will (of course) do the bidding of their “providers,’ as those providers finance attacks on organized labor, and bankroll a vast empire of right-wing think-tanks and publicists who, along with bought-off university professors and high paid “journalists,’ fill the airwaves and lecture halls with the lies, half-truths and distortions that maintain the interests of their “providers.’   Problem is, our Republican friends “don’t see or acknowledge any of this, which is a sign of how far the right has moved, away from the increasingly frustrating and even painful reality that many if not most Americans live in every day.

When almost all the gains from growth go to the top, as they have for the last 30 years (as the new oligarchy has taken control), the middle class no longer has the purchasing power necessary for the economy’s buoyant growth.   Therefore, not enough jobs can be created to provide adequately paid work for anywhere near the number who need it.   Three people now look for every job that pays above minimum wage.

Once the middle class exhausted all its coping mechanisms — e.g. wives and mothers surging into paid work (as they did in the 1970s and 1980s), longer working hours (which characterized the 1990s), and deep indebtedness (2002 to 2008) — the inevitable result of that exhaustion was fewer jobs and slower growth, just as we have continued to experience.   Then, when the middle class became stressed, it became harder for them to be generous to those most in need.   The “interrelated social problems” of the poor require money to solve, but the fiscal cupboard is bare.   And because the middle class is so financially insecure, it doesn’t want to (nor does it feel it can afford to) pay more in taxes, as would be required.

America’s shrinking middle class also hobbles upward mobility, which now trails that of crusty old Great Britain.   Not only is there ever less money for good schools, job training, and social services, in the USA, but “the poor” (which now includes a huge number of former members of the middle class) now face an ever more difficult challenge moving upward because the income ladder is far more extended than it used to be, and, as Reich also points out, its middle rungs have disappeared.   Meanwhile, legions of young black males are branded with felonies for either possessing or selling small amounts of a drug that should long ago have been decriminalized, as it recently has been in Colorado.   And as further punishment for their ‘crimes,’ these young black males will never be allowed to work at any job above the most menial — the dire social consequences of which stupidity are incalculable.

Once oligarchy takes over, the possibilities for economic democracy and/or free markets are dead

After the takeover, if collectively we can’t cost the oligarchic rich any significant amount of money (by way of enormous mass protests that are sufficiently large and frequent), why should they let us have any of the surplus of society beyond the bare minimum we need to remain useful to them?   As the savage cutback in food stamps in the US recently showed us, the survival of all of us is not a priority for the oligarchy.   Yes, highly talented professionals will continue to be paid well, to ensure their co-optation, and loyalty (to the oligarchy), but by far the largest part of America’s great middle class will continue to slip into powerlessness and poverty.   Why, exactly, will that hapapen?   Because once the oligarchy takes power (as it already has in the USA), the distribution of goods and money in the economy becomes ever more unrelated to any idea of merit or deservedness.   Example:   Banksters, being some of the best-compensated people in the world, have recently destroyed far more wealth in the US than they’ve earned, and yet they are still paid billions of dollars in bonuses every year.   They receive the money they do because they’ve been allowed to take power over our government.   What power, for example?   The power to make the government make them whole after they recklessly gambled and lost spectacularly.   And then they acquired the power to make the government make them richer still.

How can this be, you ask.   The answer is that they control a bundle of invaluable rights that are granted by the government — a government which they now indirectly own and control.     I refer of course to their right to borrow at the prime rate (very low), the right to huge leverage (i.e. “borrowing’ huge sums of other people’s money to use for investment and very high-stakes gambling, e.g. derivatives); and the right to lend billions (and charge staggering amounts of interest).   These then are the methods by which ever more, if not most, American money is actually “earned” these days.   In reality these folks — who “earn’ billions in the stock market and by way of bonds, various scams, and derivatives — are like a colony of parasites feeding on an ever weakening host.

Parasitism is why they’re rich — not because they produce net value.   In fact they destroy net value.   They’re rich because they have the power to:   a) make the government do what they want it to do, b) make it not prosecute them when they break the laws, and c) change the laws so they can take even more money from the system (of which they are by now the clear masters).

The distribution of income and wealth in an economy is therefore based, virtually entirely, on political power.   With such an arrangement, some groups can (if they play their cards right over a long-enough period of time) receive goods and money because they find ways to cleverly force others to release it to them, often without many of these others even understanding the details of the arrangements whereby they are being systematically robbed.

The libertarian fantasy of free markets and free choice is exactly that, a fantasy.   Free markets don’t exist today, they have rarely existed in the past.   And to the extent they have existed, they have owed their existence entirely to a   government . . which must take steps to make sure that said free markets continue to exist!   However, as soon as any group or class gains enough power to take control of the government, such a group, if not stopped by the larger body politic, will do precisely that (i.e. take control), and free markets will then cease to exist.  These groups make the government give them special rights, whether those are rights to create money out of nothing, borrow low and lend high, “borrow’ other people’s savings with which to gamble on derivatives, or thrive on the basis of so-called intellectual property rights, which let them continue to profit obscenely from ideas and inventions created many years ago, often with thanks to government funded research.  Link
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Several years after receiving my M.A. in social science (interdisciplinary studies) I was an instructor at S.F. State University for a year, but then went back to designing automated machinery, and then tech writing, in Silicon Valley. I’ve always been more interested in political economics and what’s going on behind the scenes in politics, than in mechanical engineering, and because of that I’ve rarely worked more than 8 months a year, devoting much of the rest of the year to reading and writing about that which interests me most.

Submitters Website: http://www.TechEditingServices.com




The English Diggers Today

Winstanley’s Ecology
REPOSTED BY READER REQUEST

Plaque commemorating three Levellers shot by Cromwell, who represented the bourgeois middle class component of the English Civil War and feared radicals.

Plaque commemorating three Levellers shot by Cromwell, who represented the bourgeois middle class component of the English Civil War and feared radicals.

, Monthly Review

[dropcap]D[/dropcap]aniel Johnson is a historian and assistant professor in the Department of American Culture and Literature at Bilkent University in Ankara, Turkey.

Beginning in 2011 a festival in honor of the seventeenth-century radical Gerrard Winstanley has been held annually in the town of Wigan, in northwestern England. Through poetry, music, film, and other activities, the celebration commemorates the life and ideas of Wigan-born Winstanley, leader of the Digger, or True Leveller, movement of the English Revolution (1640–1660).


It is now forgotten that the great Cromwell, leader of the middle class (merchant/capitalist) revolution against the king also repressed the Levellers, as too radical for his taste. Any similarities with the American and French revolutions in this regard are not coincidental. 


 

Largely forgotten for much of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, the communist thought of Winstanley was rediscovered by German and Russian Marxists in the late nineteenth century, leading to Winstanley’s inclusion in the list of revolutionary thinkers Lenin had inscribed on the obelisk in Moscow’s Alexander Garden. Led by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Winstanley’s name is eighth on the list of nineteen revolutionaries. From the socialists of the late nineteenth century to participants in the Wigan Festival in the early 2000s, Winstanley and the Diggers have provided inspiration for radical leftists for more than a hundred years. In the twenty-first century, True Leveller thought and practice has had a particularly notable influence on environmental and anti-consumerist activists like guerilla gardeners, freegans, urban allotment advocates, and squatters, among others.1

Levellers_declaration_and_standard

Woodcut from a Diggers document by William Everard (WIKIPEDIA)

What accounts for the lasting popularity of a relatively marginal social movement and its main theorist in the middle of seventeenth-century England? More importantly for present purposes, why have Winstanley and the Diggers held a prominent place for modern activists concerned with environmental issues and consumerism? The True Levellers have appealed to anarchists as well as socialists, and the Digger legacy has been claimed by both traditions.2 The Diggers rejected traditional forms of authority, viewing the state and organized religion as instruments of domination created to subdue and exploit common people. Winstanley’s development of this idea therefore provides a crucial analysis of the social function of religion and the state in ways that prefigured later Marxist as well as anarchist theories. Lying at the root of state and clerical power was property, and in Winstanley’s theory of history the initial privatization and division of land led to the rise of government, state-sponsored religion, and law in the interest of monopolizing rulers. Though never fully systematized (unlike other famous thinkers of the time like John Milton, Thomas Hobbes, or James Harrington, Winstanley wrote his Digger tracts while experiencing severe repression), the True Leveller’s philosophy was consistently anti-authoritarian and egalitarian, evolving from a pre-Digger radical millennialism to a revolutionary materialism over the course of his brief writing career.


THE CROMWELL MOMENT,  A HISTORICAL  SNAPSHOT.  CLICK ON THE BAR BELOW

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[learn_more caption=”Revolutionary winds sweep over England”] The Diggers were a group of Protestant English agrarian socialists,[1][2] begun by Gerrard Winstanley as True Levellers in 1649, who became known as Diggers, because of their attempts to farm on common land.

real property) to reform the existing social order with an agrarian lifestyle based on their ideas for the creation of small egalitarianrural communities. They were one of a number of nonconformist dissenting groups that emerged around this time.

John_LilburneOne of the greatest and bravest men of that turbulent age was John Lilburne (1614 – 29 August 1657), also known as Freeborn John. He was an English political Leveller before, during and after the English Civil Wars 1642–1650. He coined the term “freeborn rights“, defining them as rights with which every human being is born, as opposed to rights bestowed by government or human law.[1] In his early life he was a Puritan, though towards the end of his life he became a Quaker. His works have been cited in opinions by the United States Supreme Court. Why Hollywood has never found it in its collective imagination to make a film about a real life hero like Lilburne says, preferring comic book heroes or John Wayne type fantasies, says plenty about that industry’s self-imposed propaganda limits.

[/learn_more]


 

Though the Digger tradition has been celebrated by environmental activists in England, surprisingly little has been written about Winstanley’s ecology outside his native country.3Readers of Monthly Review will be familiar with the growing field of ecological Marxism, and the work of writers who argue for the fundamental incompatibility between a capitalist economic system and an environmentally sustainable human future.4 Winstanley and the Diggers also saw such an incompatibility, though from a distinctly rural and pre-industrial perspective during the development of agrarian capitalism in England. At a time when the enclosure of common lands threw vast numbers of peasants off the land and into wage labor and grinding poverty, Winstanley developed a radical philosophy that associated private ownership of land and wage labor with the exploitation and degradation of people and the earth.

Winstanley and the Diggers were unique among political groups in the English Revolution in their advocacy for the interests of the impoverished rural working classes; integral to this support was a unique concern with land use and the environment. In their constant emphasis on common access to resources for use over wasteful private consumption, True Leveller philosophy had, to use Derek Wall’s term, a “built-in ecological principle.”5 Ultimately, for Winstanley and the Diggers economic inequality and exploitation, state violence, and the destruction of the earth were deeply interrelated processes; a radical transformation in social relations—the abolition of private property and the establishment of a “free Commonwealth” based on reason and secular education—was required.

Inseparable from Winstanley’s communist philosophy, and what also helps to explain the Diggers’ continuing relevance and influence, was the group’s commitment to a specific form of praxis. The Digger communities that by the winter of 1650 had emerged throughout England were attempts to create autonomous agricultural communities for the landless poor, and their mission to reclaim the commons for the working classes has been likened to European squatter movements, the occupation of factories in Argentina and Italy, and the Brazilian MST (Landless Workers’ Movement).6 Though in some respects the experiments prefigure the utopian socialist movements of the nineteenth century in their emphasis on nonviolent social change, Winstanley’s call for a general strike in The True Levellers’ Standard Advanced (1649) and other works, and his blueprint for a communist commonwealth in The Law of Freedom (1652), demonstrate a Digger commitment to revolutionary action and transformation. Of the many radical groups that flourished during the English Revolution (including Ranters, Seekers, Anabaptists, Antinomians, Fifth Monarchists, and others), only Winstanley and the True Levellers theorized and attempted to put into practice an alternative social system not rooted in millenarian religious belief. As Winstanley put it in the summer of 1649: “Then I was made to write a little book called, The new Law of righteousnesse, and therein I declared it; yet my mind was not at rest, because nothing was acted, and thoughts run in me that words and writing were all nothing and must die, for action is the life of all, and if thou dost not act, thou dost nothing.”7

Despite their ultimate defeat, a brief exploration of the Digger movement can demonstrate how some working-class English men and women responded to the ravages of early modern agrarian capitalism, and how organic intellectuals like Winstanley rooted a critique of existing social relations in a radical plebeian ecology. In so doing the True Levellers can contribute to the growing historical literature on ecosocialism, and at the same time provide inspiration and ideas to new generations of activists. At a time when the appropriation of the earth and indigenous knowledge for private profit is accelerating, and the global working classes are struggling to construct viable socialist alternatives, it is worth revisiting the theory and practice of what was the first organized anti-capitalist movement in history.

Origins and the English Revolution

In the spring of 1607, thousands of people in the Midlands of England rose to prevent the enclosure of their common lands. Participants (mainly rural laborers, artisans, and small farmers) referred to themselves collectively as “diggers” and “levellers”—up to that time terms of elite derision and contempt.8 Anti-enclosure riots were not, however, new to the early seventeenth century. Large-scale popular opposition to enclosing (the privatization of common lands) and engrossing (the amalgamation of two or more farms into one) dated to the fifteenth century. The conversion of arable to pasture land with the expansion of the cloth industry, a rapidly growing population, and changing class relations in the sixteenth century signaled the rise of agrarian capitalism in the English countryside.9 It is often forgotten that Thomas More’s Utopia (1516) was in large part a work of social criticism aimed at landholders who enclosed the commons for the production of woolens. The idle English nobility and gentry enclosed all land possible, leaving nothing for food production. Former tenants whose labor was no longer needed in the fields were forced to wander, beg, or steal for their survival, and many found themselves unemployed in “hideous poverty.”10 Though More himself was no revolutionary, popular rebellions were a constant feature of Tudor society, as a new class of capitalist yeomen emerged at the expense of the traditional nobility and peasantry.11 The revolts of 1607 were part of a long tradition of peasant protest in England; four decades later the Diggers would take this tradition in a dramatically new direction.

The English Revolution was a complicated affair. Most traditional accounts emphasize the political and religious conflict between Parliament and King Charles I, with the execution of the king in 1649 followed by a period of political instability that ended with the restoration of the monarchy in 1660. Yet the century preceding the outbreak of war witnessed dramatic economic and religious change in England. King Henry VIII’s establishment of the Anglican Church in 1536 was accompanied by the dissolution of the monasteries, which led to the systematic transferal of property that benefitted large landowners and the royal state.

Between 1580 and 1620 the enclosure movement resulted in a massive upward redistribution of wealth, while the 1590s and 1630s were decades of severe subsistence crises. The years 1646–1650—the period that witnessed the creation of the Digger movement—saw the worst run of bad harvests of the seventeenth century, as well as the lowest real wages for working people; starvation was reported in the north of England.12 Sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England saw the unprecedented creation of nationwide laws that legislated wages, apprenticeship, and poor relief; over the same period numerous petty crimes against property were made punishable by death.13 By the middle decades of the seventeenth-century England’s social, economic, legal, and religious landscape had been profoundly transformed.

The first Diggers’ colony appeared on St. George’s Hill near Cobham, Surrey at the beginning of April 1649, seven years after the outbreak of civil war and two months after the beheading of Charles I. Though initially just five Diggers began to plant “parsenipps, and carretts, and beanes” on the admittedly barren commons, their numbers grew thereafter. From such modest beginnings it was envisioned would emerge a revolutionary movement, for the ultimate goal of the Diggers on St. George’s Hill was no less than to make the earth a “Common Treasury” for all, through shared agricultural labor on commonly held land. The Diggers would thus till the commons and wastes of England collectively; withdrawing their labor from commercial society they would decommodify social relations and establish the True Levellers’ relationship with the earth. Once the common people saw the success of the Digger experiment, they would refuse to labor for wages any longer, and would work to create free associations of communist commonwealths in England and throughout the world. By “labouring in the Earth in rightousnesse together,” the True Levellers intended to “lift up the Creation from that bondage of Civill Propriety, which it groans under.”14

Officials and writers were unsure what to make of the small group of radicals digging on St. George’s Hill. The Royalist newsbook Mercurius Pragmaticus made fun of “Prophet Everet’s”—a reference to William Everard, an early leader of the Diggers—intention to convert “Oatlands Park into a Wildernesse, and preach Liberty to the oppressed Deer,” while implicitly acknowledging the group’s potential threat to social order.15 Though officials of England’s New Model Army concluded the Diggers were not at that time a serious threat, some local residents commenced attacking the group almost immediately. Local lords like Francis Drake and freeholders organized gangs to attack the commune, and Winstanley responded in writings addressing the persecution and specious arrests for trespassing leveled against the Diggers. Despite incarcerations, the pulling down of houses, and the destruction of their spades and hoes, Digger numbers continued to grow. Yet finding local courts on the side of their oppressors, the group was forced to abandon St. George’s Hill in August of 1649, just five months after the digging commenced.16

The Diggers then moved to nearby Little Heath in Cobham, where they cultivated several acres of land, a number of houses were built, and new pamphlets were composed. Local hostility at Little Heath was less marked than at St. George’s Hill, as a number of Diggers had ties to the community and the parish of Cobham, and a history of local social tensions may have contributed to popular sympathy for the True Leveller colony. Yet official repression was more pronounced in Cobham than at St. George’s Hill; in October the community was harassed by local officials, and in the following month Digger houses were again pulled down by soldiers and organized thugs. Though local gentry, supported by justices of the peace, the county sheriff, and detachments of soldiers led a highly organized campaign against the group, they were unable to mobilize local commoners against the colony. As Digger communities in other parts of England sprouted into existence, the Little Heath group began to thrive—despite repression and a particularly brutal winter in 1649–1650. Yet their financial resources were dwindling, and in March 1650, as the Commonwealth government became increasingly concerned over the revolutionary social experiments being conducted by Diggers, the Council of State sent a military detachment to disband the community at Cobham, while other True Leveller colonies were also suppressed. In the midst of numerous legal actions against the Little Heath Diggers—including indictments for riot, trespass, illegal assembly, and the illegal erection of cottages—the radicals at Cobham disbanded in the summer of 1650.17

Winstanley’s most important works were composed under substantial duress over the short period of 1649–1650. Despite severe persecution, the True Levellers paradoxically sought a restoration of humankind’s natural equality by engaging in a dramatically new social experiment. As Winstanley formulated his unique vision, Diggers attempted to establish autonomous agricultural communities on the commons of England, to sustain themselves free of market relations, and to demonstrate to the laboring classes throughout the world that the power to emancipate themselves from slavery existed in this world. Whatever the practical limitations of the communities (and there were many—not least their mistaken belief that the ruling class could be persuaded voluntarily to relinquish its dominion), the Digger colonies show how common people could, through direct action and cooperation, formulate a radical alternative to existing social relations.

Winstanley’s Ecology

Though the Digger experiments were in large part a response to profound socio-political and religious crises, Winstanley’s ideas were formulated during a period of unprecedented cultural and intellectual ferment. As official censorship of the press in England lapsed in 1640 (only to return with the monarchy in 1660), common people for the first time were able to publish criticisms of the state and the official Anglican church, while interpreting religious doctrine in new, more egalitarian, ways. Although critics like the Puritan supporter of Parliament Thomas Edwards denounced the “Ecclesiasticall Anarchy” resulting from “all sorts of illiterate mechanick Preachers, yeah of Women and Boy Preachers,” what were traditionally subterranean anti-clerical beliefs among the common people were nonetheless expressed openly for the first time during the 1640s.18 In addition to the anti-hierarchical religious views of groups like Anabaptists and Seekers, anonymous early Digger petitions like Light Shining in Buckinghamshire (1648) would influence the development of Winstanley’s thought—particularly the notion that “inclosers” had historically monopolized the earth’s natural bounty, creating inequality and class oppression among humankind.19 Winstanley, however, diverged from other radicals of the revolution in his novel interpretation of the relationship between the environment, property, social relations, and how to remedy the injustices that pervaded the world.

The idea that God had given mankind dominion over the earth and its creatures, and that the fall of man destroyed the natural equality of Eden,20 were truisms for most people in early modern Christian Europe. Though Winstanley, like many radical Protestants of the time, drew on these beliefs, his religious views were highly unorthodox, and would have been punished as heretical in earlier periods. His use of the Bible was often allegorical, and his allegories were filled with natural imagery; the Garden of Eden, for example, was the inward spirit of humanity which had been filled with weeds—pride, envy, covetousness, and hypocrisy.21 From his earliest pre-Digger writings Winstanley also displayed a tendency towards a pantheism that would significantly shape his ecological outlook in later writings. These initial leanings were influenced by the belief in some radical circles (notably among Seekers, whose beliefs foreshadowed those of the Quakers) that God—or Reason, Winstanley’s substitute for God—dwelled within all human beings and throughout the natural world. In the pre-Digger work The Breaking of the Day of God (1648), Winstanley stressed that humankind was part of “one flesh, or one earth,” and that heaven was not to be sought in the skies as the histories had written. Rather, heaven could be found wherever God dwelled—which was to say, in every part of the material world.22 Early in 1649, prior to the establishment of the Digger colony on St. George’s Hill, Winstanley wrote that before the existence of private property and hierarchy “every creature walked evenly with man, and delighted in man, and was ruled by him; there was no opposition between him and beast, fowls, fishes, or any creature in the earth.”23

Winstanley’s Digger writings nonetheless diverged in important ways from his early works. Most importantly, his increasingly materialist orientation brought about a rethinking of humans’ relationship with each other and the earth—which necessarily led to the idea that liberation must come in this world. The foundation of these ideas were laid in the first Digger manifesto in 1649, The True Levellers’ Standard Advanced. Here it is revealed that in the beginning of time the “great creator Reason” made the earth to be “a common Treasury of relief for all, both Beasts and Man.” With the invention of private property, classes were created, establishing societies in which the majority labored in servitude and slavery for a minority that monopolized the land and goods it produced. Utilizing biblical evidence and symbolism, and dividing history into seemingly millenarian epochs (with great emphasis on the Norman conquest of England in 1066), Diggers declared their intention to liberate both humankind and the earth from the oppression of the ruling order: “we have now begun to declare it by action in digging up the common land, & casting in seed that we may eat our bread together in righteousnesse.” The figurative way in which Winstanley used the Bible, and the extent to which ecology informed Digger belief, was demonstrated in the Standard’s injunction to honor thy father and mother.24 Father here symbolized the “Spirit of Community,” while Mother was “the Earth, that brought us all forth.”25 Religion was by this time useful largely as an educative device; community and the earth had taken primacy in Winstanley’s now thoroughly materialist philosophy.

Traditional religious belief also stressed that with the Fall and the expulsion from the Garden of Eden the curse of labor was inflicted on humankind by a vengeful God.26 Though a popular belief in the dignity and virtue of honest labor had existed for millennia, Winstanley turned many traditional Judeo-Christian beliefs regarding labor on their head. For the Diggers the physical act of labor was no longer a painful reminder of humankind’s sinful fall from grace. On the contrary, “labouring the Earth in righteousnesse” collectively, without wages, would liberate humans and the earth from oppression and the bondage of individual ownership. More radical still, the Standard recognized labor’s contribution to wealth/value, stressing that “the poor by their labour lifts up tyrants to rule over them,” as riches were transferred from producers to the thieves of labor’s produce. Winstanley therefore called on all those who labored for wages to refuse to work any longer, in effect demanding self-emancipation of the laboring classes through a general withdrawal of their labor (i.e., a general strike).27 At the root of this critique and call to action was the materialist notion that as Mother Earth brought forth all creatures, so all, “according to the Reason that rules in the Creation,” had an equal right to the fruits of the land. The True Levellers were self-consciously attempting to put into practice a program of liberation based on challenging deprecatory traditional beliefs regarding the “curse” of labor. Laboring in common for subsistence and comradeship was in fact “righteous,” and was associated with “universall Liberty and Freedome,” rather than with human sin and punishment.28

Winstanley continued to develop the ideas first expressed in the The True Levellers’ Standard Advanced over the following year, despite the severe repression experienced by the Diggers on St. George’s Hill and at Little Heath.29 The most complete expression of Winstanley’s evolving materialist philosophy was published in 1652, however, after the successful elimination of the Digger communities. The Law of Freedom was a blueprint for what Winstanley termed a “free Commonwealth,” in contrast to the “Kingly Government” that still prevailed in England, despite the execution of Charles I in 1649. Many Digger themes were evident in the work: the rich had obtained their wealth through the oppression of the laboring classes, after the appropriation of the earth had led to the establishment of class society and legalized domination. Official religion and ideas about heaven and hell were the creation of a national ministry designed to keep the people in ignorance and fear. The communist commonwealth would restore true freedom, and this freedom was rooted in Digger earth ecology: “True Freedom lies where a man receives his nourishment and preservation, and that is in the use of the Earth.”30 Since private property had created oppression and exploitation, as one part of an interrelated ecological system the liberation of human society required the deliverance of the earth from the bondage of individual ownership. And, though his treatise was famously dedicated to Oliver Cromwell, Lord Protector of England, Winstanley stressed that with the abolition of private property the people would be sovereign; the Commonwealth’s leader (at the time of the Rump Parliament) was vividly reminded that “The Earth wherein your Gourd grows is the Commoners of England.”31

The originality of the Law of Freedom lay in its program for a secular society characterized by equality, democracy, and a spirit of free inquiry. The work is also a complex mixture of hope and despair—the Digger communities had been destroyed, and Winstanley stressed to Cromwell that now “I have no power.” Though scholars have pointed to the patriarchal and harsh disciplinary measures evident in the work, it should be kept in mind these were rational, if severe, responses to anticipated criticisms from a dominant culture obsessed with “idleness” and social order.

In contrast to social convention, in the free Commonwealth women would marry whom they desired, and throughout his writings Winstanley, like the Quakers after him, was far more radical than most contemporaries in arguing for woman’s natural equality with man.32Although in the free Commonwealth those unwilling to labor would be forced to work, the “idle” from the popular perspective were not the poor and unemployed; they were traditionally the “rich men” who lived at ease, “feeding and clothing themselves by the labors of other men.” Production in the free Commonwealth would be organized along uniquely democratic lines. Regulators of crafts and agriculture would oversee a system of apprenticeship, and these overseers would be annually elected by the workers themselves, “to prevent the creeping in of Lordly Oppression.”33 If an earlier Digger call for working-class self-emancipation was necessarily absent, Winstanley’s consistent hostility to class society and exploitation were expressed in a new blueprint for a society based on equality and democracy.

Similarly revolutionary was the Law of Freedom’s educational system, which was rooted in experimental science, human reason, harmony with nature, and the widespread dissemination of knowledge. Private property and the exploitation of natural resources were in fact linked to the historical suppression of knowledge. If “the Earth were set free from Kingly Bondage,” and all were guaranteed a livelihood, the wonders of nature “would be made publike” instead of being monopolized by professors; with the establishment of the free Commonwealth knowledge will “cover the Earth, as the waters cover the Seas.” In keeping with Winstanley’s uncompromising anti-authoritarianism, a class of educated professionals was anathema, for the gatekeeper of information was “he who puts out the eyes of man’s knowledge, and tells him he must believe what others have writ or spoke, and must not trust to his own experience.” “Ministers” (like the overseers of trades and agriculture) would be elected annually; they would deliver secular lectures on history, law, and the sciences—though all would be free to address topics involving knowledge of the earth and movement of the stars and planets. Understanding of the material world was fundamental, for in nature “all true knowledge is wrapped up.”34 Winstanley’s plan for a communist commonwealth combined an absence of private property and exploitation, respect for the natural world, and an educational system whose focus was rational scientific inquiry rather than superstitious speculation. Rooted in his radical ecological vision, the True Leveller’s last published work sought to lay out a vision based on substantive social and environmental justice.

The Diggers’ Contemporary Relevance

In 2010 the World Peoples’ Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth adopted the “Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth,” and submitted it to the United Nations for consideration.35 Though the English Revolution occurred prior to the emergence of eighteenth-century Enlightenment discourses regarding natural rights, many of the issues emphasized in the Declaration resemble in fundamental ways ideas articulated by Winstanley and the Diggers in the late 1640s. The interrelatedness and interdependency of all living things, and the fundamental incompatibility of capitalist social relations with a sustainable and peaceful future for humankind emphasized in the Declaration’s preamble, would not have sounded strange to True Levellers. In contrast to a dominant view in early modern Christian Europe regarding human’s dominion over the earth and its resources, the Diggers, like the People’s Conference, recognized that “Mother Earth is the source of life, nourishment and learning and provides everything we need to live well.” Diggers’ call for the recognition of the earth as a common treasury, and for the “Birthright” of “universall Liberty and Freedome” among all peoples, presaged modern rights ideas in ways worth revisiting.36

C.B. Macpherson wrote that what distinguished Winstanley and the True Levellers or Diggers from the Levellers was “Winstanley’s utopian insight that freedom lay in free common access to the land. For Winstanley that was the key to freedom, for that was the only way to assure freedom from exploitation of man by man. The only natural right of the individual that Winstanley recognized was the natural right of men to labour together and live together, governing themselves according to a natural law of self preservation.”37

The Digger experiments and the ideas of Winstanley are also relevant in their call for self-organization among the working classes, and for emphasizing the intelligence and dignity of commoners often portrayed by elites as needing guidance and discipline. Liberation, as Winstanley frequently claimed in his Digger writings, would only come when working people throughout the world (not just in revolutionary England) withdrew their labor from market society, and set up a social system in which exploitation and poverty no longer existed. Winstanley frequently responded to elite criticisms regarding the emergence of “mechanick preachers” during the 1640s by noting that the biblical scriptures were written by “the experimentall hand” of shepherds, farmers, fishermen, and others of the laboring classes.38With the Law of Freedom, Winstanley made clear the radical democratic elements of his philosophy in his call for a secular education for all citizens of the commonwealth. In their revolutionary ideology, rooted in a radical ecological vision and centered on the self-emancipation of the oppressed through “righteous” collective labor and the sharing of knowledge, the Diggers have much to offer modern ecosocialist theory and practice.

Notes

  1. The scholar whose work is most associated with the Diggers is the great British Marxist historian Christopher Hill, though in recent years John Gurney has done much important research. For the anarchistic elements of Winstanley’s philosophy see George Woodcock, Anarchism: A History of Libertarian Ideas and Movements (Cleveland: Meridian, 1962).
  2. Diggers’ influence on environmental activists in England is summarized in Ariel Hessayon, “Restoring the Garden of Eden in England’s Green and Pleasant Land: The Diggers and the Fruits of the Earth,” Journal for the Study of Radicalism 2, no. 2 (2008): 9–10, though despite its title this article fails to seriously engage with Winstanley’s ecology.
  3. The work of John Bellamy Foster, Brett Clark, Richard York, Fred Magdoff, Paul Burkett, and Chris Williams is essential.
  4. Wall, The Rise of the Green Left: Inside the Worldwide Ecosocialist Movement (London: Pluto Press, 2010), 58.
  5. Paul Chatterton and Stuart Hodkinson, “Why We Need Autonomous Space in the Fight Against Capitalism,” http://trapese.clearerchannel.org.
  6. Gerrard Winstanley, The Complete Works of Gerrard Winstanley, 2 vols., edited by Thomas N. Corns, Ann Hughes, and David Lowenstein (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 2: 80.
  7. Thomas More, Utopia, in Stephen Greenblatt, et. al., eds., Norton Anthology of English Literature, 9th revised edition, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2012), 531-32.
  8. Christopher Hill, Liberty Against the Law: Some Seventeenth-Century Controversies (New York: Penguin, 1996).
  9. Winstanley, Complete Works, 2: 10, 13–14.
  10. Quoted in Gurney, Brave Community, 122.
  11. Gurney, Brave Community, 166–96.
  12. Thomas Edwards, Gangraene (1646), preface, http://archive.org.
  13. Light Shining in Buckinghamshire (1648), http://marxists.org.
  14. Genesis 1:26, and Genesis 3:1–24.
  15. Winstanley, Complete Works, 2: 172.
  16. Ibid, 1: 118, 177, 421.
  17. Ibid, 1: 478, 489, 92.
  18.  Exodus 20:12.
  19. Though Winstanley was clearly the author of The True Levellers’ Standard, Advanced it was signed by fourteen other Diggers, suggesting possible collaboration in the project. Winstanley,Complete Works, 2: 1, 4–5, 15, 18.
  20.  Genesis 3:17–19.
  21. Winstanley, Complete Works, 2: 9, 10, 13.
  22. Winstanley, Complete Works, 2: 295.
  23. Ibid, 2: 280.
  24. Ibid., 2: 288–89, 302–3, 325–27.
  25. Ibid., 2: 340–44.
  26. For the entire text of the “Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth” in English, see http://climateandcapitalism.com.
  27.  C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), 157.
  28.  



The Labor Share Question in China :: Monthly Review

By Hao Qi }  MONTHLY REVIEW
chineseWorkers

In the past two decades, China’s economic growth has been increasingly dependent on investment.1 To maintain the growth of investment, China must sustain a fairly high rate of profit, and the fall in labor’s share has been seen as a crucial factor to sustain profitability.2 Using a raw measure of labor’s share—the compensation of employees as a percent of GDP—as shown by the bottom solid line in Chart 1, labor’s share has experienced a major decline from 51.4 percent in 1995 to 42.4 percent in 2007.

If we use different denominators to replace GDP in order to exclude the impact of depreciation and taxes—as shown by the top two lines in Chart 1, the general trend does not change much. After the outbreak of the global crisis in 2007, China’s growth slowed down and workers’ struggles against poor living and working conditions were surging—the strike at the Tonghua Steel Company is a telling example.3 As a result, labor’s share returned to 45.6 percent in 2012.

Chart 1. Raw Measurements of Labor’s Share, 1978–2012

Chart 1. Raw Measurements of Labor’s Share, 1978–2012

4 In this story, the decline of labor’s share is caused by sectoral changes, mainly the decrease of agriculture and the increase of industry and services as a percent of GDP in the reform era (from 1978 to present), which these economists superficially understand as economic modernization.5Moreover, owing to the fact that China’s agricultural production is mainly organized by rural households, profits and wages are not distinguishable in statistics and thus labor’s share in agriculture is much higher than that in other sectors. So, as the mainstream story claims, sectoral changes automatically cause labor’s share of the whole economy to fall; also, since sectoral changes are labeled as “modernization,” the decline of labor’s share should be seen as an inevitable result.

Does the decline of labor’s share result from sectoral changes? This question needs to be addressed with a class analysis, which is entirely omitted by the mainstream story. In what follows it will be argued that the decline of labor’s share resulted from the loss in the power of the working class during the transition to capitalism. Sectoral changes have disguised the class conflicts in this historical process.

Debunking the Mainstream Story

The mainstream story has been accepted by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In the Report to the Eighteenth National Congress of the CCP in 2012, raising labor’s share of the national income was set as a goal for the reform of income distribution; however, policies later proposed for this goal were merely focused on enhancing the skills of workers (derived from the neoclassical human capital theory) and creating more jobs for workers by promoting the development of the service sector and labor-intensive, small-scale enterprises. No policy was proposed to strengthen the power of the working class.6

Mainstream economists and policy makers believe that there is a U-shape curve relating labor’s share to the composition of the various sectors. In their view, once the economic structure is fully “modernized,” once the share of agriculture stops shrinking and the service sector takes an increasingly large share of the economy, labor’s share would begin to rise; hence the only effective way to raise labor’s share is to promote change in relative size of the sectors. However, the mainstream story is based on nothing but a definition of labor’s share that has nothing to do with the causal relations or the distribution of income within the working population.

Sectoral changes are not equivalent to economic modernization as a process of economic development. Sectoral changes involve the redistribution of labor power from agricultural to non-agricultural sectors and from industry to the service sector. In China, the influx of the migrant workers into the urban areas cannot be reduced to the rational response of peasants to the urban-rural income gap and the loosening of the restrictions on migration, since the urban enterprises must have prepared certain social and economic conditions for the absorption of migrant workers. One such condition was the class power relation: if the urban working class in the state-owned sector was sufficiently powerful, all the employment opportunities in that sector would be provided to the urban working class instead of migrant workers. In fact, the children of the urban workers were the main source for the new employment in the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) before the massive layoffs took place in the mid–1990s. Only when the power of the urban working class was undermined could the SOEs absorb migrant workers.

One telling example is the labor outsourcing at the Tonghua Steel Company. From 1996 to 2000, there were over eight thousand layoffs, as the company claimed it had hired “too many” workers. During the same period, the company began outsourcing work—mostly to migrant workers from the rural areas, as their wages averaged only half what the company paid its own workers. The company thus weakened workers’ power through layoffs.7

Another example is Liuye, a construction company founded in 1963 in Luoyang, Henan Province. Since the early 1990s, most of the production workers were laid off, and only the management, skilled workers, and some office staff were retained. Since then, Liuye established a construction team for each project; each construction team had a manager and some skilled workers from Liuye, while the rest of the workers were all migrant workers. With this regime, Liuye could make full use of the low wages and flexibility of migrant workers, which was impossible before the layoffs took place.8 In fact, the management made use of the massive layoffs in the 1990s to replace the workers who worked in the socialist era with migrant workers who were not only cheaper but also easily disciplined.

These layoffs resulted in not only the transfer of migrant workers, but also the expansion of the service sector. During the period 1996–2003, the share of industry in total employment decreased from 23.5 percent to 21.6 percent. This is the only period in the reform era that witnessed the decrease of industry’s employment share. During the same time, the share of the service sector in total employment increased from 26.0 percent to 29.3 percent.9 These changes were caused by the relocation of the laid-off workers. The China Urban Labor Survey recorded job changes due to layoffs for a sample of 949 people: beforehand, 42.1 percent of the sample worked in manufacturing and 21.5 percent worked in the service sector; after being laid off, only 14.4 percent worked in manufacturing and 44.3 percent worked in the service sector.10

Another example is the development of the service sector in the Tiexi district in Shenyang, Liaoning Province. Before the 2000s, several large-scale industrial SOEs were located in Tiexi, and thousands of workers lived nearby. The massive layoffs triggered continuous conflicts between those enterprises and the laid-off workers. Worried about the social instability caused by the concentration of those conflicts, the local government decided to relocate those enterprises to remote and scattered areas and then introduce commercial and real estate programs into Tiexi, even though some of the land was polluted by previous industrial production and thus unsuitable for non-industrial usage. Only a decade later, one can hardly tell from the appearance of the city that Tiexi was previously an industrial area.11

These examples have shown how sectoral changes intertwined with the dynamics of class conflicts in China. The decline of labor’s share in China was not an automatic result of sectoral changes, since those changes actually disguised the underlying class conflicts. In this perspective, this relationship is similar to that in the history of world capitalism: industrialization in the early period of traditional capitalist countries separated means of production from laborers and forced the proletarianized to work in factories as free labor; financialization in the late period of monopoly capitalist countries strengthened the power of financial capital and dragged the whole economy into the cycles of boom and bust. Along with industrialization and financialization, major changes took place in distribution, but those changes resulted from class struggle, not from the sectoral changes.

How Deep Did Labor’s Share Fall?

Before explaining the fall in labor’s share, it is necessary to know how deep labor’s share fell in China. The raw measure in Chart 1 does not tell us all the facts, since the compensation of employees suffers from several problems under China’s statistical system. First, the agricultural income of rural households is treated as the compensation of employees, which needs to be discussed. Second, the income of the self-employed is also treated as the compensation of employees, but the self-employed sector is quite diversified: a great number of self-employed units are based on household labor, while others may hire workers, and some may hire more than a small enterprise hires. The third problem is the salaries of managers, which should not be treated as labor’s income. However, since we lack macro-level data on the salaries of managers, we will discuss some micro-level evidence at the end of this section.

Chart 2 shows labor’s share in three ways. The dashed line (LS1) treats the self-employed sector as a capitalist sector. Different from the official method that treats all the self-employed income as labor’s income, LS1 only treats an estimated wage part of the self-employed income as labor’s income. The solid gray line (LS2), on the contrary, assumes all the labor in the self-employed sector is household labor, thus the self-employed sector is excluded from both the numerator and the denominator in calculating labor’s share. The actual scenario should lie between LS1 and LS2; fortunately these lines are quite close to each other. Both LS1 and LS2 show a sharply downward trend that began in 1990, whereas the downward trend in Chart 1 began in the mid–1990s, which implies that the development of self-employment has disguised the actual decline of labor’s share.

Chart 2. Labor’s Share in Different Measurements, 1985–2007

Chart 2. Labor’s Share in Different Measurements, 1985–2007

12 In the decollectivization of the rural economy in the early 1980s, collective enterprises were transformed into township and village enterprises (TVEs) that were later controlled or privatized by individuals. In 1990, nearly one-fifth of rural laborers were working in TVEs; in 2010, this number became one-third.13 Moreover, since the early 1990s, more and more rural laborers have migrated to urban areas; in 2011, the number of migrant workers reached 159 million, or 44 percent of total urban employment.14 However, due to the high cost of housing, education, and medical care in the urban areas and relatively low wages that migrant workers can earn, most cannot live with their families in the urban areas.

For a typical rural family, wages from working in TVEs or in the urban areas make up a large portion of the family’s income, while some of the family members (especially aging parents and young children) still need to engage in agricultural production and live in the rural areas, since the living cost in these areas is much lower. In this context, capitalists are not required to pay wages sufficient for the laborers to reproduce the labor power in the urban areas, and the agricultural income and the rural society becomes indispensable for the reproduction of labor power of their families.

Therefore, although LS3 does describe something about distribution, it meets with a theoretical contradiction: the labor’s income implied by LS3 cannot satisfy the need of the working class to reproduce labor power. The distribution process in reality takes the semi-proletarianization of migrant workers and their families as its foundation. In this process, the working class makes use of both wage income and agricultural income to complete the reproduction process, and the capitalists take advantage of the double roles played by the working class to pay fewer wages. Excluding agricultural income from the calculation of labor’s share oversimplifies the distribution process because it ignores the internal relationship between workers and peasants in the reproduction of labor power and the reliance of the working class on the rural society. In contrast, LS1 and LS2 are better measures of labor’s share as they consider agricultural income as an integral part of labor’s income.

The last problem with measuring labor’s share is the salaries of managers. Under the socialist statistical system, China was collecting data on the salaries of cadres in factories, since the state attempted to control the income gap between cadres and workers, while after China replaced the socialist statistical system with the GDP accounting system in the early 1990s, these data were no longer collected. Nevertheless, from the data of the companies listed in China’s domestic stock markets, we can compare the average salary of managers, including board members, supervisors, and executives, with the average wage of urban employees in the formal sector.15 As shown in Chart 3, from 1999 to 2009 the ratio of the managers’ average salary to the urban average wage increased from 4.2 to 6.7, or by 60 percent. This implies that, if managers’ salaries are excluded from labor’s income, it is very likely that labor’s share in fact dropped more quickly in the past decade.

Chart 3. Ratio of Managers’ Average Salary to Urban Average Wage

Chart 3. Ratio of Managers’ Average Salary to Urban Average Wage

Sources: Data of managers’ salaries are from Guotaian Database. The urban average wage is from National Statistical Bureau, China Statistic Yearbook 2012 (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2012) (in Chinese).

Class Power and Labor’s Share

Labor’s share is widely used in Marxian economics as a proxy for the power of the working class. In China, labor’s share as an outcome of distribution is closely associated with the transition to capitalism, and this relationship can be observed in the transition of incentive systems on the shop floor.

In the Maoist era, there was a recurring debate on “material incentives” and “politics in command” during the transformation of incentive systems. Although a Soviet wage system was established in 1956, there was a lack of consensus among the leadership on how to operate this wage system.16 In particular, given that the Soviet Union underscored the role of material incentives, there was a debate on whether material incentives such as bonuses and piece-rate wages should be encouraged in China.

Mao Zedong was critical of this, and he suggested that the emphasis on material incentives was a reflection of the ignorance of political and ideological work. Mao argued these incentives merely underscored distribution according to work, but do not underscore the contribution of individuals to socialism.17 Thus the proponents of “politics in command” proposed an entirely new path to generate work incentives. The key of the new path was to make workers recognize that they themselves were the masters of factories, and the purpose of production was consistent with the long-run interests of the working class.18 To this aim, material incentives that merely relate workers’ contribution with their short-run economic benefits were eliminated, workers were encouraged to participate in the management of factories in various ways, and the income gap between workers and cadres was controlled since significant inequality would be contradictory to workers’ position as the masters of factories.

With the end of the Maoist era, the first attack against the working class was the deprivation of political rights that the workers had gained. The mass organizations established during the Cultural Revolution were dismissed; radical workers were criticized and punished; the four great rights—the right to speak out freely, to air one’s views fully, to write big-character posters, and to hold great debates—as well as the right to launch strikes were all eliminated in the 1982 amendment of China’s Constitution. Now, workers could no longer criticize cadres. Without the participation of workers in management, the Maoist incentive system lost its foundation and the material incentive system eventually took its place.

From the reformers’ point of view, the material incentive system could play important roles. First of all, material incentives, as compensation for workers’ loss of political rights, shifted workers’ attention from political rights to economic benefits. Secondly, through material incentives the reformers attempted to set up an image that they, in contrast to the leadership in the Maoist era, cared more about the living conditions of workers and the fairness in distribution. Thirdly, material incentives strengthened the power of cadres in management since cadres could decide how to distribute bonuses among workers.

From the position of the working class, the material incentive system benefited workers in the short run but sacrificed their long-term interests. Bonuses could grow as quickly as labor productivity did, but this does not imply that workers’ total wages (including bonuses) could catch up with labor productivity. As workers’ income increasingly relied on bonuses, workers had to be more obedient to cadres in production, which in turn meant that workers were in an unfavorable position with respect to distribution.

Chart 4 shows the bonus-wage ratio—the ratio of bonuses to total wages—for the Tonghua Steel Company and the state-owned sector as a whole (including SOEs and non-enterprise units such as government institutions). For the steel company, this ratio reached its peak at 4.2 percent in 1959, while in several years of the 1970s this ratio fell to zero. After the Maoist era, the bonus-wage ratio boomed and reached around 20 percent for the state-owned sector. This high bonus-wage ratio was not able to sustain itself; after 1993, this ratio dropped, and in 1996, it returned to the level of ten years earlier.

Chart 4. Bonus-Wage Ratio in Tonghua Steel Company and in the State-owned Sector, 1958–1996

Chart 4. Bonus-Wage Ratio in Tonghua Steel Company and in the State-owned Sector, 1958–1996

Sources: The bonus-wage ratio of Tonghua Steel Company is from Tonghua Steel Company, Tonggang History 1958–1985(unpublished book; in the Tonghua City Library). The bonus-wage ratio of the state-owned sector is from National Statistical Bureau, China Statistic Yearbook various issues from 1981 to 1997 (Beijing: China Statistics Press) (both in Chinese).

Note: The bonus-wage ratio of the state-owned sector is not available; instead the ratio of the sum of bonuses and piece-rate wages to total wages has been used.

It is not difficult to figure out why the bonus-wage ratio failed to sustain its growth. The viability of material incentives relies on the growth of labor productivity, as the former cannot be generated without the latter. If enterprises are affected by macro fluctuations (as in the mid–1990s), the growth of labor productivity cannot be realized and thus material incentives would not function.19 Under this circumstance, the power of the management was threatened by the problems with the incentive system. For a capitalist enterprise, if the carrot of material incentives does not work, the stick strategy would take its place—capitalists would create unemployment so as to discipline workers. In the early 1990s, however, the management in China’s SOEs did not have the power to fire workers unless workers made serious mistakes such as crimes.

If it were impossible to tame the workers who had socialist experience from the Maoist era, the rational strategy for enterprises was to segregate the labor market in order to explore new sources of labor power, and the state indeed responded to this imperative. The early 1990s witnessed policy changes that reduced barriers for migrant workers to work in the urban areas.20 In the following two decades this new component of the Chinese working class suffered from long working hours and poor working conditions. A 2009 survey from the National Bureau of Statistics has shown that on average migrants work 58.4 hours per week, much more than the 44 hours stipulated in China’s Labor Law. Nearly 60 percent of migrant workers did not sign any labor contract, and 87 percent of them did not have access to health insurance.21 The segregation of the labor market in the early 1990s could provide enterprises with a larger labor force, but without the stick of unemployment the SOEs could never undermine the power of their workers.

In the mid–1990s, China launched a massive privatization of SOEs. Along with this privatization, about 30 million workers were laid off.22 This was a crucial turning point in Chinese capitalism that fundamentally altered the power relations between workers and capitalists. Workers with socialist experience were forced to leave factories, whereas young workers without socialist experience became the majority of the labor force in SOEs. Due to this change, institutions in SOEs began to converge with those in private enterprises: short-term labor contracts, dispatched workers, and overtime work became the routine in both SOEs and private enterprises.23

After the reform, despite the convergence of the institutions on the shop floor, the labor market on the contrary became more segregated. In the center of the labor market was a group of skilled workers in SOEs who enjoyed relatively high wages, benefits, and job security; whereas on the periphery were the laid-off workers and migrant workers who received low wages and benefits with less job security. The segregation of the labor market was clearly observed in the statistics. In 2011, there were 359 million urban employees in total; among them only 19 percent worked in the state-owned sector; another 21 percent worked in the formal sector excluding the state-owned sector; 34 percent worked in the informal sector—either in private enterprises or in the self-employed sector. Ironically, the remaining 26 percent of urban employees (or 97 million employees) turned out to be “invisible” for the National Statistical Bureau because they did not know which sector those employees should belong to.24 In fact, the “invisible” employees were mostly migrant workers working in private enterprises or in the self-employed sector; their jobs were so informal that they were not registered in any way.

To sum up: during the country’s transition to capitalism, as the bonus-centered incentive system could not sustain itself, enterprises needed the existence of a reserve army to discipline workers and a segregated labor market to divide and conquer the working class. A continuous influx of migrant workers and the 30 million laid-off workers from the state-owned sector jointly expanded the reserve army of labor within a few years in the 1990s. The reserve army significantly depressed the power of the working class as a whole, and the segregation of the labor market also weakened the solidarity of the working class. This is why we have witnessed the major decline of labor’s share since the early 1990s.

Conclusion

There is a new turning point for the Chinese working class.25 After the outbreak of the global capitalist crisis, labor’s share in China began to recover. Along with this fact, one can also observe that the nominal wage level has grown faster than nominal GDP since 2008, and in 2012 China’s working-age population decreased for the first time in the reform era, which implies that the reserve army of labor will shrink in the near future.26 More importantly, there is a developing workers’ struggle for a decent living wage that is sufficient to afford the cost of living in the urban areas. The new generation of migrant workers who were mostly born in the 1980s and ‘90s insists on living in the urban areas. This has led to struggles for higher wages. Workers’ struggle for a larger share of the national income will eventually end the high-profit era for capitalists and thus open up a new era for the Chinese economy.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Hao Qi hqi [at] econs.umass.edu is a PhD candidate of the department of economics at University of Massachusetts Amherst. His research interests include Marxian political economy and income distribution.

Notes

  1. See Andong Zhu and David Kotz, “The Dependence of China’s Economic Growth on Exports and Investment,”Review of Radical Political Economics 43, no. 1 (2011): 9–32.
  2. See Chong-en Bai, Chang-Tai Hsieh and Yingyi Qian, “The Return to Capital in China,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 37, no. 2 (2006): 61–102.
  3. On July 24, 2009, workers at the Tonghua Steel Company launched a strike and beat the general manager to death. The Tonghua Steel Company was a state-owned enterprise that was privatized through a local government-led program by introducing a “strategic” private shareholder in 2005. After privatization, the company laid off workers, constrained wage growth, and cut benefits such as the heating subsidy, while the management gained huge bonuses through privatization. This struggle forced the local government (the biggest shareholder) to introduce another state-owned enterprise to replace the private shareholder.
  4. In China’s reform era, agriculture as a percent of GDP has declined from 28.2 percent to 10.0 percent, the service sector as a percent of GDP has increased from 23.9 percent to 43.4 percent, and the share of industry has been roughly stable. Sources: National Statistical Bureau, China Statistic Yearbook 2012 (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2012) (in Chinese).
  5. See National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, “Some Opinions on Deepening the Reform of the System of Income Distribution,“ http://gov.cn (in Chinese).
  6. This example is from my interviews.
  7. Ibid.
  8. National Statistical Bureau, China Statistic Yearbook 2012.
  9. Cai Fang, “The Consistency of China’s Statistics on Employment,” Chinese Economy 37, no. 5 (2004): 74–89.
  10. This example is from my interviews.
  11. Pan Ngai and Lu Linhui, “Unfinished Proletarianization: Self, Anger, and Class Action Among the Second Generation of Peasant-Workers in Present-Day China,” Modern China 36, no. 5 (2010): 493–519. Tu Lv, Chinese New Workers (Beijing: Law Press, 2012) (in Chinese).
  12. National Statistical Bureau, China Statistic Yearbook 2012.
  13. The sample is from Guotaian database, which provides the information about the salaries of about 30,000 board members, supervisors, and executives in the listed companies in China. The formal sector includes state-owned units, collective-owned units, cooperative units, joint-ownership units, limited liability corporations, share-holding corporations, foreign-funded units, and units with funds from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan.
  14. The Soviet wage system in China featured an eight-grade scale for workers and separate scales for cadres and technical staff.
  15. Mao Zedong, Mao’s Notes and Talks on Reading Socialist Political Economy (Beijing: National History Academy, 1998) (in Chinese).
  16. See Stephen Andors, China’s Industrial Revolution: Politics, Planning, and Management, 1949 to the Present (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977).
  17. Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour in 1992 triggered an investment boom which further led to continuous inflation in the following years. In 1994, the government decided to restrain banking credit to deal with inflation. This policy succeeded in controlling inflation but meanwhile depressed the profitability of enterprises.
  18. In the 1980s, the government strictly controlled the migration of labor forces. Migrant workers were called the “blindly floating population.” In the 1990s, most of the constraints on migrant workers were eliminated, whereas workers were still facing the possibility of being repatriated. See Tu Lv, Chinese New Workers (Beijing: Law Press, 2012) (in Chinese).
  19. National Statistical Bureau, “Investigation Report on Migrant Workers 2009,” http://stats.gov.cn (in Chinese).
  20. The number is estimated by the reduction in the employment of the state-owned sector from 1995 to 2000. Data is from National Statistical Bureau, China Statistic Yearbook 2012.
  21. In the interviews with some workers in SOEs, I found that new workers in SOEs mostly signed three-year-long labor contracts, and dispatched workers, who were hired by external labor agencies but worked for SOEs, were quite common in construction and transportation. Many of my interviewees complained about overtime work, and one interviewee who had working experience in both SOEs and private enterprises said that there was no difference with regard to overtime work in both kinds of enterprises.
  22. National Statistical Bureau, China Statistic Yearbook 2012. Philip Huang suggests that the statistical apparatus in China neglects this part of employment because of the misleading influence of mainstream economic and sociological theories. See Philip Huang, “China’s Neglected Informal Economy: Reality and Theory,” Modern China35, no. 4 (2009): 405–38.
  23. Minqi Li, “The Rise of the Working Class and the Future of the Chinese Revolution,” Monthly Review 63, no.2 (2011): 38–51.
  24. Statistical Communiqué of the People’s Republic of China on the 2012 National Economic and Social Development,” http://stats.gov.cn (in Chinese).



New York’s Zionist Mayor

Is it all a mirage once again? Can anyone in American politics be trusted?

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by Stephen Lendman

On January 1, Michael Bloomberg was out. Bill de Blasio replaced him. Zionism remains empowered.  Imagine letting Israel influence NYC policy. Imagine giving AIPAC say.  Imagine Obama doing the same thing. Stanley Fischer is a Zionist zealot. Obama nominated him for Fed vice chairman. 

 

He’s rubber-stamp approval away from assuming his post. He’ll let Israel influence US monetary policy.  On January 24, de Blasio delivered an unannounced address. He spoke in midtown Manhattan. He did so at a closed door AIPAC event.  Capital New York (CNY) calls itself “a publication for and about the people and institutions that shape New York, delivering fast, original, essential analysis and reporting on city and state politics and the media industry.”

CNY reporter Azi Paybarah tried covering de Blasio’s address. Security staff blocked him. Candidate de Blasio pledged more openness, transparency, and inclusiveness than his predecessor.

Mayor de Blasio wants his unswerving fealty to Israel kept secret. Capital New York got an audio recording of some of what he said. It’s not what he wants his constituents to hear.  “Part of my job description is to be a defender of Israel,” he said.

“There is a philosophical grounding to my belief in Israel and it is my belief, it is our obligation, to defend Israel, but it is also something that is elemental to being an American because there is no greater ally on earth, and that’s something we can say proudly.”

“There is no deeper connection across boundaries than this connection we share. We take inspiration from Israel for how it has stared down terrorism and kept moving forward.”

If he delivers on his promise to ban horse-drawn carriages it will be a miracle.

It’s done it through lawless aggression. It’s been through cold-blooded murder. Land theft and ethnic cleaning reflect it.  So do decades of lawless occupation harshness. Palestinian rights don’t matter. They’re systematically denied.

State terrorism is official Israeli policy. So is slow-motion genocide. De Blasio didn’t explain. He visited Israel three times. He expressed solidarity with its people. They’re “on the front line of fighting so many challenges,” he said.  He’s mindless of Palestinian rights. Only Jews matter. Racism resides in Gracie Mansion. Palestinians aren’t welcome. De Blasio is “inspir(ed)” by Israeli ruthlessness. Maybe he intends treating New Yorkers the same way.

Word got out about his AIPAC address. Reporters challenged him. He offered a weak-kneed mea culpa. He said he’ll urge his aides to be more open about his whereabouts.  He said AIPAC wanted journalists excluded from its event. Public officials are supposed to let constituents they serve know what they’re doing.  Gawker.com headlined “Reporter Kicked Out of Bill de Blasio’s Secret Pro-Israel Speech,” saying:

He “wants you to know he shovels his own snow-encrusted sidewalk…” He’s polar opposite when it comes to “wooing the powerful pro-Israeli lobbying group AIPAC…”

Candidate de Blasio denounced BDS activism. He called it “inflammatory, dangerous and utterly out of step with the values of New Yorkers.”  “An economic boycott represents a direct threat to the State of Israel. That’s something we need to oppose in all its forms.”

“No one seriously interested in bringing peace, security and tolerance to the Middle East should be taken in by this” campaign.  Public de Blasio speeches feature demagogic boilerplate. He stresses income inequality, expanding sick-pay leave, taxing the rich, and other social issues.  He’s held office less than one month. Early indications aren’t encouraging. Expect business as usual to continue. He was chosen for that reason. He won’t disappoint.  New Yorkers never had a true populist mayor. They don’t have one now. De Blasio reflects same old, same old.  He’s old wine in new bottles. He differs from Bloomberg in style alone. He represents the same monied interests.

His AIPAC speech omitted social issues. He focused solely on pledging allegiance to Israel.  Two attendees said he never once used the word “progressive.” He features it in public addresses.

He concluded saying: “City Hall will always be open to AIPAC. When you need me to stand by you in Washington or anywhere, I will answer the call, and I’ll answer it happily cause that’s my job.”

His job is serving NYC residents. All of them equitably and fairly. Not Israel.  Not monied interests at the expense of public ones. Not other powerful, privileged ones exclusively.  It’s not hard imagining what’s coming. Expect constituent hopes to be dashed. Early indications suggest it.  Bruce Ratner is Center for Constitutional Rights President Emeritus Michael Ratner’s brother.

Their ideologies are polar opposite. Bruce is a prominent real estate developer. He’s a corporate predator. He’s the NBA Brooklyn Nets’ minority owner. His Brooklyn mega-development project ran roughshod over local community needs. Longtime resident/noted architect Frank Gehry called it “a nightmare for Brooklyn, one that, if built, would cause irreparable damage to the quality of our lives.”

De Blasio’s anti-developer/landlord rhetoric rings hollow. He endorsed Ratner’s project. He did so wholeheartedly.  He’s progressive in name only. He’s a longtime Democrat party hack. He has close ties to Bill and Hillary Clinton.  He was a Clinton administration Housing and Urban Development official. He managed Hillary Clinton’s 2000 Senate campaign.  Bill Clinton administered his swearing-in ceremony. Doing do affixed the Clinton name to his mayoralty.

Both Clintons are unindicted war criminals. They deplore populism. They’re imperial tools. They’re beholden to monied interests. They support unrestrained corporate empowerment. They’re unaccountable. They’ve got blood on their hands. They represent America’s dark side.

Voters never learn. They’re suckers for political deception. No matter how many times before they’ve been fooled, they’re easy marks for more of the same.  They learn the hard way. They discover reality too late to matter. No one holds high office in America without careful advance vetting.

Monied interests run things. They choose winners and losers. Voters have no say. America mocks democracy. None whatever exists.  Government of, by and for wealth, power and privilege defines things. De Blasio’s mayoralty represents the worst of what most voters deplore.

Nation magazine long ago betrayed its readers. It disingenuously calls itself “the flagship of the left.” It never was. It’s not today.  Last August, it endorsed de Blasio, saying:

“His candidacy is an opportunity for New Yorkers to reimagine their city in boldly progressive ways.” He represents “a once-in-a-generation opportunity (for them) to rewrite the narrative of their city.”

One observer compared him to candidate Obama. Promises made were broken. De Blasio sounds like the same broken record. He appointed Anthony Shorris deputy mayor. He’s been active in New York politics for nearly three decades.  He was Ed Koch’s budget director and finance commissioner. He was Bloomberg’s deputy schools chancellor. He was Port Authority of New York and New Jersey executive director.

His current appointment entails cutting New York’s budget deficit. He’ll do it on the backs of city workers.  Expect neoliberal harshness continued. De Blasio is no populist. His rhetoric pays lip service to progressivism and social justice. His record supports wealth and power interests.  Wall Street crooks contributed generously to his campaign. They buy politicians like toothpaste.  They don’t bankroll populists. They back business as usual candidates. They know what’s forthcoming in return. De Blasio’s inaugural address suggested it, saying:

“We do not ask more of the wealthy to punish success. We do it to create more success stories.”  He’s no harbinger of America’s shift left. None whatever exists. Neoliberal harshness remains policy.  Government of, by, and for everyone equitably remains a distant dream. New York is America’s money power capital. It’s the epicenter of plutocratic excess.  Monied interests manipulate things their way. They use money to make more of it. They do it the old-fashioned way. They steal it. They chose de Blasio. He’s their man. He won’t disappoint. Wall Street is safe in his hands.

Big Apple progressivism awaits another day. Make it another era. For sure not now.

 ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Stephen Lendman lives in Chicago. He can be reached at lendmanstephen@sbcglobal.net.  His new book is titled “Banker Occupation: Waging Financial War on Humanity.”  http://www.claritypress.com/LendmanII.html

Visit his blog site at sjlendman.blogspot.com

Listen to cutting-edge discussions with distinguished guests on the Progressive Radio News Hour on the Progressive Radio Network.  It airs Fridays at 10AM US Central time and Saturdays and Sundays at noon. All programs are archived for easy listening.  http://www.progressiveradionetwork.com/the-progressive-news-hour