The 1980s mujahideen, the Taliban and the shifting idea of jihad

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For a variety of reasons, including the fact the author seems currently comfortably ensconced in the academic/national security apparatus of the West, we can't vouch for the independence of her testimony. However, there is not much reason to doubt her clear and precise description of what separated the mujaheddin from the Taliban, the former so successfully used by Washington to cynically defeat the Soviets and Afghanistan's first serious attempt at the construction of some form of socialism or progressive nation favorable to the fate of women in a hitherto deeply conservative culture.
—The Editor
—The Editor
 
This article is more than 10 years old
Nineteen years ago, [actually in 2021, three decades ago] Afghanistan's mujahideen defeated the Red Army. How do they compare with the Taliban who followed?

April 1985, Bagram, Afghanistan : Warlord Ahmed Shah Massoud discusses a chart with his commanders. Massoud was assassinated by Muslim radicals two days before 9/11. (Photo: Reza/Webistan/Corbis)

Dateline: Thu 28 Apr 2011 

28 April marks the 19th anniversary of the mujahideen's victory over the Red Army forces in Afghanistan (actually the 30th). The original mujahideen of the 1980s and today's Taliban may use the same language of holy war, but their understanding of jihad is worlds apart. The key difference between the original mujahideen and the Taliban is that the former waged a traditional type of jihad. In a traditional jihad, if waged locally, a contest over control of resources takes place between rival strongmen who each run their own private armies. In this scenario, the ultimate legitimacy to rule draws upon military strength, but the contest itself is called jihad simply because Islam is the sole language of political legitimacy.

Crucially, in a traditional jihad, the victorious party has an unspoken right to pillage, rape and loot the conquered population. This is because militia fighters are not paid soldiers in a regular army and hence looting is the material reward they receive for fighting. The original mujahideen followed this traditional pattern of jihad upon coming to power in 1992. Since competition over resources rather than ideology is key to traditional jihad, the mujahideen's war focused on Kabul where the nation's wealth and the foreign embassies, another potential source of funding, were to be found.


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