How Trump could liberate Europe. His isolationism is an opportunity.

But with Trump back in charge, and his administration likely to pursue an isolationist bent, all these sacrifices risk being pointless. Though the president-elect is unlikely to withdraw from Nato altogether, he has expressed scepticism towards the alliance during his campaign. Among other things, that has involved criticising European countries for failing to meet defence spending targets, even suggesting that the US might not protect Nato members if they don’t pull their weight.

Trump has even suggested he might unilaterally impose a ceasefire and peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine. This is unlikely to happen: Russia, which is winning on the battlefield, will push for such a hard bargain that even Trump may struggle to accept. A more likely outcome, then, is that the incoming Republican administration will continue to deliver weapons to Kyiv but ask Europe to foot the bill — a situation that would allow the conflict to smoulder on, even as Europe gets poorer. That’s despite the fact that even Western media outlets are now conceding that the war in Ukraine is lost.

“A more likely outcome is that the incoming Republican administration will continue to deliver weapons to Kyiv but ask Europe to foot the bill.”

This outcome could, perhaps, be avoided: if European leaders understood that putting an end to the war in Ukraine, and normalising relations with Russia, are in the continent’s ultimate economic and security interests. If they were clever, they might even seize upon Trump’s instinctive isolationism and push for a settlement themselves.

But given this would oblige Europe’s elite to totally reverse their policy on Ukraine — thereby admitting their own failure — that is an unlikely outcome. This is doubly true when you consider that such a volte-face would oblige the Europeans to finally take Russian security concerns seriously, a shift that would instantly undermine the anti-Moscow narrative they’ve been honing for years. Given, moreover, the vast economic pain the EU’s pro-Kyiv stance has caused regular Europeans, the resulting political backlash would obviously be devastating for ruling parties.

Beyond these short-term concerns, though, there are deeper geopolitical considerations. For one thing, making peace with Russia would force European leaders to finally acknowledge the multipolar order that now exists right across the globe, a reality whereby a free and independent Europe could act as a bridge between the West and the emerging Eurasian powers of the young century. For another, it would force them to realise that their future lies in breaking free from Washington’s grip, rejecting the latter’s desperate attempts to preserve its authority.

Yet if Trump’s burgeoning isolationism should be seen as an opportunity, not a threat, such a dramatic realignment isn’t going to happen: at least not for a while. Most EU leaders are just too wedded to transatlanticism — ideologically, psychologically and materially — to fully escape, regardless of who occupies the Oval Office. That’s why I don’t share the optimism of those who claim that Trump’s focus on “America First” policies will push the EU to pursue greater strategic autonomy. In any case, for as long as people like Ursula von der Leyen control the levers of power in Brussels, a “European Nato” would probably be even more aggressive towards Russia than the Biden Administration.

At the same time, and notwithstanding his isolationist noises, it’s ultimately naïve to assume that Trump would happily “let go” of Europe. Put it like this: that Trump wants Europe to pay for its own defence doesn’t mean he supports a more geopolitically assertive continent. Just consider the efforts his administration put into stopping the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline. Any move towards greater European strategic autonomy would, therefore, inevitably mean managing an American backlash. It goes without saying that such a programme would require backbone, strategic vision and intellectual finesse — none of which is exactly plentiful among Europe’s political class.

In the short term, then, the most likely outcome is that EU leaders will attempt to adjust to a Trump presidency and avoid awkward clashes. The tone may be different, but expect the Europeans to continue tolerating subordination to US interests.

The longer-term impact of Trump’s victory on the European political landscape is harder to predict. His victory will surely embolden Right-populist leaders across the continent, from Viktor Orbán in Hungary to Giorgia Meloni in Italy. That, in turn, has the potential to further weaken mainstream parties, and ultimately accelerate the continent’s hurdling realignment. To be clear: this won’t have an immediate political impact, especially given European populists differ in their policies towards Ukraine and other foreign policy issues.

Over the longer term, though, the strengthening of national conservatism in the West could have serious geopolitical implications. To start with, Russia’s rejection of the excesses of liberalism make it something of a “natural” ally of Western conservatives, particularly in a world where ideologies are increasingly framed as “national-patriotism” versus “cosmopolitan-globalism”. Moreover, to the extent that conservatives reject progressive universalism at home, embracing the cultural distinctiveness in their own countries, they should also be opposed to the same ideas internationally. It would surely be wise, then, to support the attempts of China, Russia and other Brics to foment respect for the civilisational specificity and traditional values of all nations, along the way dumping the EU and the liberal-universalist claims it stands for. In this sense, Trump may yet prove to be a crucial if unwitting ally in the Brics’ attempt to build a more “conservative” world order. That, in the end, is probably what the EU’s techno-globalist establishment should fear more than anything.
SOURCE FOR THIS ESSAY: UNHERD