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This is the main point: with or without Russian weapons, Iran is a competent and canny weapons producer.
Arms Technology describes this system thusly:
“Bavar-373 is an indigenous surface-to-air missile defence system developed by the Iranian Defence Ministry. It can intercept aircraft and drones as well as destroy high-speed ballistic missiles.
The air defence system was launched on the country’s National Day of Defence Industry in August 2019. It is in service with the Iranian Armed Forces. The stimulator of the Bavar-373 missile system was unveiled in September 2021.
The Bavar-373 missile system is claimed to be more advanced than its Russian counterpart S-300 long-range surface-to-air missile system. Several studies and tests conducted by the Iranian military showed that the system is superior to the American Patriot PAC-3 air defence system.
Bavar-373 was first employed in a joint air defence exercise of the Iranian Army and Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) in October 2020. It successfully destroyed stand-off targets during the exercise, which was codenamed ‘Guardians of Velayat Sky-9
Bavar-373 is an impenetrable, anti-hacking surface-to-air missile defence system comprising a vertical launching system, two acquisition and engagement radars, Sayyad-4 missiles, and a command-and-control centre.
The design minimises the need for additional support equipment and systems. The vertical launching system features square launchers that are identical to the launchers utilised by naval warships for air defence.
The Bavar-373 missile system can be prepared for launch easily. It features anti-stealth capability that allows it to detect hidden targets with a very low radar cross-section.
The weapon system provides high operational speed, as well as enhanced shelf life and operator safety. The spare parts of the system can be easily replaced.
The air defence system incorporates an advanced radio detector and secure protocols between targets, missiles and radars.
Bavar-373 can be armed with three different types of missiles designed to neutralise different targets at varying altitudes. It can detect up to 100 targets, track 60, and engage six of them simultaneously.
The air defence missile system has a maximum detection range of 320km and a tracking range of 260km. It can engage targets up to 200km away and at a maximum altitude of 27km”.
The fly in the ointment in 2007 was Russian deference to the US and Israel, a time when Russia was still valiantly but foolishly trying to establish its credentials as a promising member of Western civilization. In 2015, a year after the Western instigated coup d’etat in the Maidan in Kiev, the Kremlin formally lifted its own ban on the delivery of S-300 missiles to Iran, setting the legal groundwork for the possible Russian sale of a powerful air-defense system to Tehran. Iran purchased S-300 systems from Russia in a a deal worth $800 million in 2016. Moscow completed the delivery of the S-300s to Iran in late 2016, according to Russia's state-run news agency, Tass.
Alterman: “But more so, the one broad dynamic is just more confrontation. The logic of confrontation with the West is really dictating Russia's approach to the region. And the best example of that is how Russia has navigated the post-October 7th Middle East and the war in Gaza and we'll talk about that later. Now, a second dynamic and that is very much related, is that I would say we see a growing Russian tilt towards anti-Western forces in the region. Meaning Iran, but also Iran's partners and proxies in the Axis of Resistance. And we can talk about how that has manifested. Now, I think Russia still cares about pursuing certain balancing acts in the region that have been characteristic of its approach to the region for a long time.
And Russia still cares about, for example, its relations with the Gulf Arab states, in particular with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, because that is important to Russia economically. But I think Russia has been willing to somewhat sacrifice its relations with Israel since October 7th. We've seen this quite stark pro-Palestinian posturing over the war in Gaza. So, I think there is this pro-Iran, pro-Axis of Resistance tilt. And one way in which that manifests very much, and we can talk about this more, is in a growing Russian-Iranian military defense relationship, which goes far beyond the drones that Russia has procured from Iran for its military campaign against Ukraine.
And I think we should be looking at how that relationship is going to evolve into the future.
Mr. Bergmann: Maybe, if I could just follow up on that last point. Because it strikes me that in Russia's role in the Middle East prior to the war there was a large military component of Russia being an arms provider of S-400s to Iran. Support for Assad in Syria, but also potential arms sales, or arms sales to the Gulf States. But now Russia needs to absorb arms, it's not exporting as much. It needs countries to provide it with aid. It's getting that from North Korea in particular, but also Chinese support. But Iran has been really helpful here and maybe you could outline what is the nature of this military relationship now. And also, what is Russia providing back to Iranians?
Dr. Notte: Sure, happy to. I would say that the Russia-Iran military relationship was one, I mean, it's long-standing, it goes back decades. But until 2022 there was what one could call a patron-client dynamic in that relationship where, really Iran was on the receiving end hoping for certain systems from the Russians, which were not always forthcoming. If I think back to 2010 when the Russians, under President Medvedev did not provide the S-300 system to Iran. But we didn't really see Iranian support to Russia in any sort of a meaningful scale. What have we seen since? Since 2022 of course, the UAVs, the Shahed drones, I mean different types of Shahed drones.
But not just complete systems, importantly also Iran sharing production technology for those kinds of systems, enabling the Russians to effectively indigenize the production of those drones in Russia, in Yelabuga and in Tatarstan. The Iranians providing training on how to operate those UAVs and that training has happened in various countries based on what we know from reporting. Actually, including in Syria, where according to Ukrainian military intelligence, Hezbollah have trained Russian officers on the use of Iranian drones on Syrian soil. So, quite a sort of convoluted situation there.
But the Iranians have also given support to Russia for their ground war with ammunition, with shells. I think that's sometimes less talked about because we pay so much attention to the drones. So, that's what Russia has gotten from Iran. We can also have a separate conversation about learning on techniques how to overcome the effect of sanctions and sanctions evasion. There might be a lot of knowledge diffusion going on between those two partners in that area that's obviously harder to study from the open source. But certainly, they have come to agreements in that domain that they're going to work together on countering or mitigating the effects of Western sanctions.
If we now look at what the Russians have given the Iranians in return, you know, there's certain things that the Iranians have wanted for quite a long time that they haven't gotten yet. For example, the Sukhoi 35 fighter aircraft, even though there's been sort of intermittent talk about deals and delivery forthcoming, but we haven't seen those systems delivered. We've seen trainer aircraft, we've seen increased collaboration on electronic warfare, which is having the Israelis very worried in terms of what the Russians give the Iranians in terms of support in that area. We have seen Bill Burns, head of the CIA, state on multiple occasions this concern of Russian engineers supporting Iran's missile and space launched vehicle program.
So there's different areas in which the two sides are probably working together. And then one final point, I think that's important to mention here is that we've also seen indications of Russia passing captured Western origin technology captured on the battlefield in Ukraine to Iran. Which is probably studying those systems, and possibly using them for the purpose of reverse engineering or sort of looking into those systems. And of course, the Iranians are probably getting a lot of operational insights and sort of learning from how their own systems fair against Western air defenses or other technologies on the battlefield in Ukraine.
So, I think we need to not just look at hard systems and hard technology that is passing past both, in both directions but also the area of knowledge diffusion and intangible assistance.”
Distrust with Russia and Europe will never have been more intense than during the collapse at then President Trump’s insistence, of the JCPOA agreement on Iran’s nuclear energy program, at a time when Russia, on the other hand, was pioneering the construction of Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant in southern Iran (a project, by the way, with a very long history).
In 2022 Iran was reported to be seeking Russia’s help to bolster its nuclear program, in the form of some kind of backup plan should a lasting nuclear deal with world powers fail to materialize. It was said that Iran asked Russia for help acquiring additional nuclear materials and with nuclear fuel fabrication, resources that could help Iran power its nuclear reactors and could potentially further shorten Iran’s so-called “breakout time” to create a nuclear weapon.
To this day, the CIA continues to insist - contrary to claims from Netanyahu and US neocons notwithstanding - that there is no evidence, even on the brink of a war between Iran (which has no nuclear warhead) and Israel (which likely has over 200), that Iran has made a decision to produce a nuclear weapon.
Russia’s relations with the US today are, of course, very different to how they were in 2007 and one might not expect to find continuing hesitation by Russia in consolidating an agreement with Iran that includes military cooperation. Russia signalled its readiness to sign such an agreement back in June this year, and more recently it was expected that the treaty or the “strategic partnership” would be signed in Kazan during the BRICS summit. Iranian President Pezeshkian in his most recent statement on this matter said simply that he “hoped” the agreement would be signed. Commentator Pepe Escobar, talking with Judge Napolitano earlier today expressed full confidence that the agreement would be signed, but that it might not be signed until sometime towards the end of the year.
Given the current state of crisis, this dilatory approach to the treaty seems quite strange. Some commentators, including Ray McGovern, Gilbert Doctorow and myself, have been inclined to suspect a Russian coolness, following the possible murder of former Iranian President Raisi in May. Raisi was a close friend to Moscow whereas his successor, following a popular election, Pezeshkian, is a known advocate for improved Iranian relations with the West, and seems to have been duped by the US and Israel into a posture of restraint in the face of Israeli assassinations of Hezbollah leaders in return for a ceasefire in Gaza which never materialized. Yet following Pezeshkian’s recent meeting with Putin at the East Asian Economic summit, Pezeshkian told media outlets in Tehran that Russia could be doing more to bring an end to Israel’s genocide in Gaza. Yes, indeed it could. Furthermore, Iran did indeed launch a surprisingly impactful barrage of ballistic missiles on Israel on October 1st.
If there is help that Russia could be giving Iran that it has not already provided, then the arrival of any such help is now well past its due date. Iran’s apparent refusal to consider any form of preemptive attack on Israel amidst an international chatter that appears to take Israel at its word that it will retaliate for October 1st can be read as a dangerously naive belief in the game of calibrated escalation, or as a strategic delay while Iran absorbs new Russian arms shipments, or as a quiet despair in the knowledge that it lacks the means to sustain an escalatory relationship, or as a very prudent, nuanced handling of an aggressive maniac in a manner calculated to yield as little damage as possible.
I am inclined to think that even if Russia has not provided S-400 air defense systems, as I and others have recently intimated, Iran has nonetheless benefitted from other kinds of state-of-the-art Russian help, including, very likely, hypersonic kinzhal missiles, and that Iran has a very sizable stock of more missiles, many likely developed by Iran itself, and that if Israel does strike Iran the Iranian response will be very considerable.
I do think we should worry, by the way, that Israel will conduct a strike on Iran during the BRICS summit in an Israeli show of disdain for BRICS every bit as arrogant and nauseous and stupid as the disdain it has shown the UN. UNIFIL positions remain in place in Southern Lebanon, by the way, even if their soldiers have not yet fired back on the IDF.
The speech by a now unelected Zelenskiy to his equally unelected RADA two days ago, and to the European Council a day ago, boils down to demands for instant membership of NATO, integration of Ukrainian military into that of NATO so that Ukraine benefits from NATO’s nuclear umbrella, as well as from protection under the cover of a US nuclear umbrella, with US/NATO nukes positioned on Ukrainian soil along with a NATO army, all in return for the laughable if not preposterous notion that after the war Ukrainian troops can take over the role up until now fulfilled by US forces of protection of Europe.
Europe, be afraid, very afraid. With “protectors” like these…..
If Zelenskiy cannot get these things, and there is very little objective reason to think he will, then he threatens that Ukraine will build its own nuclear bomb. This would require him to obtain the materials without Russian detection and then to build a bomb, a process that would very likely take at least a year, by which time there would be every good reason to expect Russia to have crushed Kiev, forced regime change, assassinated or otherwise have disposed, once and for all, of the insatiably manipulative Zelenskiy (if his own Banderite colleagues or the Ukrainian people have not done the job before the Russians get there), or allowed Zelenskiy safe passage to one of his Mediterranean palaces and let him set up just another risible, hopelessly expectant “government in exile.”
Perhaps Zelenskiy could get his bomb through Amazon from Israel, which never signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty anyway (if it had, it would have had to admit to its possession of nukes. The US would not have legally been allowed to funnel aid to Israel had its illegal acquisition of nukes been confessed. I expect there are all kinds of mischief that the two maniacs could get up to with the joint development of nuclear forces.
Zelenskiy’s recent comments demonstrate that Russia was entirely right to launch the SMO when it did. Zelenskiy is as much a maniac, even more of a maniac, than Netanyahu, if the numbers of deaths that a maniac causes is any measure of maniacness. That 20% of recent Ukrainian conscripts are beaten to death by the Polish-staffed Territorial Recruitment Office kind of says it all. Zelenskiy’s nuclear blackmail will have frightened the wretched poodles of Europe and of the UK that threw the maniac their wealth, their kisses, their credibility and the credibiity of Western civilization and “rule of law.”
The US can look forward to saving itself the $1.5 billion that Zelenskiy says the US currently sends to Kiev each month just to keep the Administration afloat. Perhaps the might of the US, still the strongest economy on the planet (at least in terms of nominal GDP), and fast making clear blue economic water between itself and the newly poor countries of Europe and Japan and the G7 that trusted the US to look after their interests and whose competition the US has done its best to suppress, could do something vaguely useful, like introduce free healthcare.
But beware of the kick from left side, this time in the form of some kind of NATO assault through Finland on Saint Petersburg, or some new NATO push into Belarus or Russia, that will serve not to prevent a Russian win, but to delay it at the cost of a few hundreds of thousands more lives than have already been sacrificed.
Oliver Boyd-Barrett
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