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By Gilbert Doctorow on November 24, 2024 (Doctorow)

The first and most important thing that one can say about Russia’s new doctrine on nuclear deterrence and the circumstances under which Russia foresees use of its nuclear arsenal against adversaries is the following:  it has been tailor-made to fit the situation in which Russia finds itself today with respect to the United States and its NATO allies.

The doctrine is couched in abstract language without naming names, but behind every clause you can identify a specific threat to Russia that the United States and its allies have been implementing these past few years. The logic flowing from this is that if and when the strategy and/or tactics of the adversary changes, then there will be appropriate modifications to the doctrine.

The doctrine itself has two parts to it.

‘The field of nuclear deterrence’ is what we read as the title of the Decree and ‘the essence of nuclear deterrence’ is the most lengthy and detailed part of the document, laid out in paragraphs 9 to 17,

The second part, entitled ‘conditions for the Russian Federation to shift to use of nuclear weapons’ is set out in paragraphs 18 to 21. This is much more concise.  

Let us look at each of these parts in turn.

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Deterrence

The single biggest change in Russia’s nuclear doctrine is found in the very first article (9) which describes the ‘potential adversary’ to be deterred as

‘states and military coalitions (blocs, alliances) that are viewed by the Russian Federation as a potential adversary and which possess nuclear and/or other forms of weapons of mass destruction or significant fighting potential in conventional forces.’

Nuclear deterrence will also be applied with respect to

‘states which make available their territory, air and/or marine space and resources to prepare for and execute aggression against the Russian Federation.’

This is directly complemented by article 10 which explains that

‘Aggression of any state within a military coalition (bloc, alliance) against the Russian Federation and/or its allies is viewed as aggression of this coalition as a whole.’

The foregoing is absolutely new and binds the United States and NATO countries more closely together in a common fate than the famous Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. Article 5 of that treaty provides for the common defense of the signatory countries.  Articles 9 and 10 of the Russian doctrine provide, as we see in part two of the doctrine, for Russian attack on any of them it chooses should one or more of them attack the Russian Federation and/or its allies directly or indirectly.

The Oreshnik missile system whose existence Putin disclosed on Thursday has Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs).

Article 11 sets out what Vladimir Putin had said to a reporter first on 12 September and then repeated when he addressed Russia’s Security Council on 25 September:

‘Aggression against the Russian Federation and/or its allies coming from any non-nuclear state with the participation or support of a nuclear state is viewed as their combined attack.’

This is explicitly directed against the policy of the United States to wage proxy wars so as to inflict damage and possibly defeat a perceived adversary while expecting to avoid being identified as a co- belligerent. It is, of course, drawn from Russia’s experience in the current war in and about Ukraine.

Note the mention of Russia’s allies as also being covered with its nuclear umbrella. Until recently this sounded like an empty piece of rhetoric. ‘What allies?’ one might ask. But the conclusion of a mutual defense treaty with North Korea leaves no doubt that Russia’s nuclear umbrella is part of their deal. Separate statements coming from both Minsk and Moscow tell us that the nuclear umbrella now covers Belarus. De facto we may suppose that the same goes for Iran, though properly speaking no mutual defense treaty has yet been signed with Teheran.

Article 12 says the purpose of nuclear deterrence is to ensure that potential adversaries ‘understand the unavoidability of retaliation in case they commit aggression against the Russian Federation and/or its allies.’

The next article worthy of our attention is 15, which sets out in subclauses a list of military dangers which, depending on changing military-political and strategic circumstances, can grow into military threats to / aggression against the Russian Federation. These are all explicitly cases where ‘neutralization’ requires nuclear deterrence to be applied.

Note as you review the list below that there is something akin here to the formulation of the Wolfowitz doctrine in the USA wherein the potential of an adversary is equated with malicious intent that must be stymied.

1. The potential adversary’s having nuclear and/or other forms of weapons of mass destruction which could be applied against the Russian Federation and/or its allies, as well as the means to deliver these kinds of arms

2. The potential adversary’s having and deploying air defenses including ABMs, medium and lesser range cruise and ballistic missiles, high precision conventional and hypersonic weapons, offensive drones variously based, directed energy weapons that could be used against the Russian Federation.

3. The buildup by a potential adversary along territory bordering the Russian Federation and its allies or in nearby waters of groups of general-purpose military forces which possess the means to deliver a nuclear strike and/or the military infrastructure enabling such an attack.

• The creation by a potential adversary of anti-missile defense equipment, attack weapons and satellite-killer equipment and his positioning this in outer space

• Positioning of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery on the territory of non-nuclear states

• The creation of new or expansion of existing military coalitions (blocs, alliances) resulting in their military infrastructure drawing closer to the borders of the Russian Federation

• Actions by a potential adversary directed at isolating part of the territory of the Russian Federation, including blocking access to vitally important transport communications

• Actions by a potential adversary directed at defeating (destroying) environmentally dangerous infrastructure of the Russian Federation which might lead to manmade, ecological or social catastrophes.

• The potential adversary’s planning and carrying out large-scale military training exercises near the borders of the Russian Federation.

• The uncontrolled spread of weapons of mass destruction, means of their delivery, technologies and equipment for their preparation.

• The potential adversary’s having and deploying air defense including ABMs, medium and lesser range cruise and ballistic missiles, high precision conventional and hypersonic weapons, offensive drones variously based, directed energy weapons that could be used against the Russian Federation.

It is worth remarking that many of the items in the list reflect directly what the United States and its NATO allies have done already or are talking about.  Among them are a blockade of Kaliningrad, the positioning of NATO infrastructures close to the Russian border, holding war games close to Russia’s borders. The remarks in point h above surely refers to attacks on nuclear power stations, which Ukraine has done using drones and Soviet era missiles.    Other items, particularly those that one might call a restoration of Reagan’s Star Wars plans are among the stated intentions of Donald Trump once he takes office and their inclusion in the list may be interpreted as a clear message to Trump to rethink this strategy if he wants to make peace with Russia.

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Conditions under which the Russian Federation moves from deterrence to nuclear strikes

Here some of the conditions were taken over from previous iterations of the nuclear doctrine, in particular what we read in article 18: a retaliatory attack for use of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction against Russia and its allies, Here we also read that conventional weapons attack on Russia and/or Belarus can trigger a nuclear response if there is a ‘critical threat to their sovereignty and/or territorial integrity.’  The mention of ‘territorial integrity’ is a new condition.

Article 19 lists other conditions that could allow for Russia to use its nuclear arsenal:

1. Reliable information about the launch of ballistic rockets attacking the territory of the Russian Federation and/or its allies

2. The use by an adversary of nuclear or other forms of weapons of mass destruction on the territory of the Russian Federation and/or its allies against troop formations and/or infrastructure located outside its territory.

[note: this is new]

• Action by an adversary against critically important state or military infrastructure of the Russian Federation which, if knocked out, will disrupt retaliatory moves of the nuclear forces

• Aggression against the Russian Federation and/or the Republic of Belarus using conventional weapons that create a critical threat to their sovereignty and/or territorial integrity

[here, too, ‘territorial integrity’ is a concept introduced in this iteration of the doctrine]

• Receipt of reliable information about a massive launch (take-off) in an air and space attack (strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, drones, hypersonic and other aircraft and their crossing the borders of the Russian Federation

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Klarenberg) 

On November 15th, The Times published a remarkable report, revealing serious “questions” are being asked about the viability of Britain’s two flagship aircraft carriers, at the highest levels of London’s defence establishment. Such perspectives would have been unmentionable mere months ago. Yet, subsequent reportingseemingly confirms the vessels are for the chop. Should that come to pass, it will represent an absolutely crushing, historic defeat for the Royal Navy - and the US Empire in turn - without a single shot fired.

A THING OF BEAUTY, PERHAPS, BUT D.O.A. The Royal Navy's new aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth is essentially a "vanity job" doomed to be sunk in any modern conflict within hours or even minutes. The new age of hypersonic missiles has rendered all surface fleets highly vulnerable to attack by even "lesser powers" (i.e., the Houthis, Iran, etc.) and eventually obsolete as reliable tools of war.

Fast forward to today however, and British ministers and military chiefs are, per The Times, “under immense pressure to make billions of pounds’ worth of savings,” with major “casualties” certain. Resultantly, senior Ministry of Defence and Treasury officials are considering scrapping at least one of the carriers, if not both. The reason is simple - “in most war games, the carriers get sunk,” and are “particularly vulnerable to missiles.” As such, the pair are now widely perceived as the “Royal Navy’s weak link.”