Americans, War – Slow Learners

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Patrick Armstrong

Nothing short of genius can account for losing so consistently given the enormous resources available to American forces. In light of this very low level of military competence, maybe wars are not our best choice of hobby.

– Fred Reed (who probably learned this in Vietnam)

War in Syria—the American signature. Turn everything to blood-soaked rubble.

According to a popular Internet calculation, the United States of America has not been at war with somebody for only 21 years since 1776. Or maybe it’s only 17 years. Wikipedia attempts a list. It’s a long one. You’d think that a country that had been at war for that much of its existence, would be pretty good at it.

But you’d be wrong. The “greatest military in the history of the world” has doubled the USSR’s time in Afghanistan and apparently it’s unthinkable that it should not hang in for the triple. Should the President want to pull some troops out of somewhere, there will be a chorus shrieking “dangerous precedent” or losing leadership and months later nothing much will have happened.

One cannot avoid asking when did the USA last win a war. You can argue about what “win” looks like but there’s no argument about a surrender ceremony in the enemy’s capital, whether Tokyo Bay or Berlin. That is victory. Helicopters off the Embassy roof is not, pool parties in a U.S. Embassy is not, “Black Hawk down” is not. Doubling the USSR’s record in Afghanistan is not. Restoring the status quo ante in Korea is not defeat exactly, but it’s pretty far from what MacArthur expected when he moved on the Yalu. When did the USA last win a war? And none of the post-1945 wars have been against first-class opponents.

And few of the pre-1941 wars were either. Which brings me to the point of this essay. The USA has spent much of its existence at war, but very seldom against peers. The peer wars are few: the War of Independence against Britain (but with enormous – and at Yorktown probably decisive – help from France). Britain again in 1812-1814 (but British power was mostly directed against Napoleon). Germany in 1917-1918, Germany and Japan 1941-1945.

Most American opponents have been small fry.

Take, for example, the continual wars against what the Declaration of Independence calls “the merciless Indian savages, whose known rule of warfare is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes, and conditions“. (Starting, incidentally, a long American tradition of depicting enemies as outside the law and therefore deserving of extermination.) The Indians were brave and skilful fighters but there were always too few of them. Furthermore, as every Indian warrior was a free individual, Indian forces melted away when individuals concluded that there was nothing in it for them. Because there were so few warriors in a given nation, Indian war bands would not endure the sort of casualties that European soldiers did. And, always in the background, the carnage from European diseases like the smallpox epidemic of 1837 which killed tens of thousands in the Western nations. Thus, whatever Indian resistance survived could usually be divided, bought off, cheated away and, if it came to a fight, the individual Indian nation was generally so small and so isolated, that victory was assured. The one great attempt to unite all the western nations was Tecumseh’s. He understood that the only chance would come if the Indians, one united force, showed the Americans that they had to be taken seriously. He spent years trying to organise the nations but, in the end, the premature action of his brother Tenskwatawa led to defeat of his headquarters base in 1811. Tecumseh himself was killed two years later fighting a rear-guard action in Ontario. It is because defeats of American forces were so rare that Little Big Horn has passed into legend; but the American casualties of about 250 would have been a minor skirmish a decade earlier. And the victory led to nothing for the Indians anyway; they lost the Black Hills and were forced into reservations. Brave and spirited fighters, but, in the end, no match for industrialised numbers.

The USA fought several wars against Spain and Mexico, gaining territory as it did. Despite the occasional “last stand” like The Alamo, these were also one-sided. The Spanish-American War is the outstanding example: for about 4000 casualties (half from disease), the USA drove Spain completely out of the Americas and took the Philippines, obliterating the Spanish Fleet at Manila Bay. More easy victories over greatly outmatched adversaries.

The other group of wars the U.S. was involved in before 1941 were the empire-gathering wars. One of the first was the takeover of the independent and internationally-recognised Kingdom of Hawaii; the sugar barons organised a coup against Queen Liliuokalani with the help of troops from U.S. warships and no shooting was necessary. Not so with the long bloody campaign in the Philippines, forgotten until President Duterte reminded the world of it. And there were many more interventions in small countries; some mentioned by Major General Smedley Butler in his famous book War is a Racket.

Minor opponents indeed.

Andrei Martyanov has argued that the U.S. military simply has no idea what a really big war is. Its peer wars off stage (since 1812) made it stronger; its home wars were profitable thefts. It believes wars are easy, quick, profitable, successful. Self delusion in war is defeat: post 1945 U.S. wars are failure delusionally entered into. To quote Fred Reed again:

The American military’s normal procedure is to overestimate American power, underestimate the enemy, and misunderstand the kind of war it is getting into.

America's postcards from the Middle East

The only exceptions are the Korean War – a draw at best – and trivial successes like Grenada or Panama. As I have argued elsewhere, there is something wrong with American war-fighting doctrine: no one seems to have any idea of what to do after the first few weeks and the wars degenerate into a annual succession of commanders determined not to be the one who lost; each keeping it going until he leaves. The problem is kicked down the road. Resets, three block war fantasies, winning hearts and minds, precision bombing, optimistic pieces saying “this time we’ve got it right“, surges. Imagination replaces the forthright study of warfare. Everybody on the inside knows they’re lost – “Newly released interviews on the U.S. war reveal the coordinated spin effort and dodgy metrics behind a forever war“; that’s Afghanistan, earlier the Pentagon Papers in Vietnam – but further down the road. When they finally end, the excuses begin: “you won every major battle of that war. Every single one”, Obama lost Iraq.

And always bombing. Bombing is the America way in war. Korea received nearly four times as much bomb tonnage as Japan had. On Vietnam the U.S. dropped more than three times the tonnage that it had in the whole of the Second World War. Today’s numbers are staggering: Afghanistan received, between 2013 and 2019, 26 thousand “weapons releases“. 26,171 bombs around the world in 2016 alone. Geological bombing. Precision attacks, they say. But the reality is quite different – not all of the bombs are “smart bombs” and smart bombs are only as smart as the intelligence that directs them. The truth is that, with the enormous amount of bombs and bad intelligence directing the “smart bombs”, the end result is Raqqa – everything destroyed.

If you want a single word to summarize American war-making in this last decade and a half, I would suggest rubble… In addition, to catch the essence of such war in this century, two new words might be useful — rubblize and rubblization.

The U.S. Army once really studied war and produced first-class studies of the Soviet performance in the Second World War. These studies served two purposes: introducing Americans who thought Patton won the war to who and what actually did and showing how the masters of the operational level of war performed. Now it’s just silliness from think tanks. A fine example of fantasy masquerading as serious thought is the “Sulwaki Corridor” industry of which this piece from the “world’s leading experts… cutting-edge research… fresh insight…” may stand as an amusing example. The “corridor” in question is the border between Lithuania and Poland. “Defending Suwalki is therefore important for NATO’s credibility and for Western cohesion” and so on. The authors expect us to believe that, in a war against NATO, Russia would have any concern about the paltry military assets in the Baltics. If Moscow really decided it had to fight NATO, it would strike with everything it had. The war would not start in the “Suwalki Corridor” – there would be salvoes of missiles hitting targets all over Europe, the USA and Canada. The first day would see the destruction of a lot of NATO’s infrastructure: bases, ports, airfields, depots, communications. The second day would see more. (And that’s the “conventional” war.) Far from being the cockpit of war, the “Suwalki Corridor” would be a quiet rest area. As Martyanov loves to say: too much Hollywood, too much Patton, too many academics saying what they’re paid to believe and believe to be paid. The U.S. has no idea.

And today it’s losing its wars against lesser opponents. This essay on how the Houthis are winning – from the Jamestown Foundation, a cheerleader for American wars – could equally well be applied to Vietnam or any of the other “forever wars” of Washington.

The resiliency of the Houthis stems from their leadership’s understanding and consistent application of the algebra of insurgency.

The American way of warfare assumes unchallenged air superiority and reliable communications. What would happen if the complacent U.S. forces meet serious integrated air defence and genuine electronic warfare capabilities? The little they have seen of Russian EW capabilities in Syria and Ukraine has made their “eyes water“; some foresee a “Waterloo” in the South China Sea. Countries on Washington’s target list know its dependence.

The fact is that, over all the years and all its wars the U.S. has rarely had to fight anybody its own size or close to it. This has created an expectation of easy and quick victory. Knowledge of the terrible, full out, stunning destruction and superhuman efforts of a real war against powerful and determined enemies has faded away, if they ever had it. American wars, always somewhere else, have become the easy business of carpet bombing – rubblising – the enemy with little shooting back. Where there is shooting back, on the ground, after the initial quick win, it’s “forever” attrition by IED, ambush, sniping, raids as commanders come and go. The result? Random destruction from the air and forever wars on the ground.

There is of course one other time when the United States fought a first-class opponent and that is when it fought itself. According to these official numbers, the U.S. Civil War killed about 500,000 Americans. Which is about half the deaths from all of the other U.S. wars. Of all the Americans killed in all their wars – Independence, Indians, Mexico, two world wars. Korea, Cold War, GWOT – other Americans killed about a third of them.

Patrick Armstrong was an analyst in the Canadian Department of National Defence specialising in the USSR/Russia from 1984 and a Counsellor in the Canadian Embassy in Moscow in 1993-1996. He retired in 2008 and has been writing on Russia and related subjects on the Net ever since.

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A Peek On The Situation In And Around Syria

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Little by little, Syria is putting her beautiful body back together.

The recent financial turbulence in the oil markets and the global depression will have a large impact on the conflicts in the Middle East.

Iraq:

[dropcap]L[/dropcap]ast night the Iraqi parliament elected a new prime minister. Mustafa al-Kadhimi is seen as a technocrat with a good track record and politically neutral to all sides. His cabinet includes a number of experienced people who are known for effective work.

Astonishingly both, the U.S. and Iran, have supported Kadhimi.

Secretary Pompeo @SecPompeo - 1:09 UTC · May 7, 2020

Great to speak today with new Iraqi PrimeMinister Mustafa al-Kadhimi. Now comes the urgent, hard work of implementing the reforms demanded by the Iraqi people. I pledged to help him deliver on his bold agenda for the sake of the Iraqi people.

Javad Zarif @JZarif - 9:56 AM · May 7, 2020

Congratulations to Prime Minister @MAKadhimi, his Cabinet, the Parliament and most importantly the people of Iraq for success in forming a new Government.

Iran always stands with the Iraqi people and their choice of administration.

Kadhimi has lots of work waiting for him. The low oil price means that Iraq's budget will have a huge deficit. It will have to borrow a lot of money most likely from the IMF. The money may come with U.S. conditions.

There has recently been a wave a small ISIS attacks. The Jihadis were equipped with night vision devises. There is strong suspicion that the U.S. is again using ISIS to pressure the government.

The U.S. wants Iraq to take a position against Iran and the Iraqi militia which Iran sponsors. But Kadhimi can not do that without losing support in the parliament. Iraq also depends on Iranian energy.

Syria:

The military situation in Syria has changed little. The ceasefire in Idleb governorate seems to hold. Russian and Turkish troops patrol on parts of the M4 highway after Turkey had some harsh exchanges with the Jihadis from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham who had tried to prevent the patrols. Turkey will have to get rid of the Jihadis, who have led the war against Syria from its very beginning, one way or another.

Throughout the last months Russian foreign policy grandees and oligarchs had published essays that argued that the Syrian government had to look more at the economic situation in Syria, which is very bad, instead of pushing for military solutions. It was not fully clear what they were aiming at.

Oligarch Rami Makhlouf

Then a conflict between President Assad and Syria's prime oligarch Rami Makhlouf broke into the open. Danni Makki digs into the whole saga. Makhlouf is a maternal cousin of Assad. Whoever wanted to do business in Syria during the war had to go through him. He sponsored his own militia and charity. Makhlouf, the richest man in Syria and owner of Syriatel and lots of other companies, has now been pushed aside. But he is fighting back.

Makhlouf has little chance to win. In 2017 the Jabar brothers, also oligarchs with their own militia, were also getting too interested in their personal profits and power. Riam Dalati tells their story and how they were unceremoniously moved aside.

Assad's position is now stronger then ever and Russian companies will now be happy to do business in Syria without a Mr. Five Percent in between.

Libya:

Turkey, working together with Qatar, has hired some 10,000 Syrian 'rebels' to fight in Libya on the side of the Government of National Accord and its Jihadi militias. The GNA troops have been trounced by the Libyan National Army under General Haftar. Turkey has also sent its own troops with Turkish made drones to attack Haftar's position. But most of the drones were shot down immediately. The UAE, which supports Haftar's LNA, has now sent 6 Mirage fighter jets to Egypt and uses them to bomb GNA and Turkish positions in Tripoli and Misrata.

The 'rebels' Turkey hired have taken a lot of casualties but have not yet received their promised money. That news has reached Idleb were further recruitment efforts by Turkey now fail to gain traction.

Turkey:

The Turkish Lira continues to fall. The Central Bank, under control of wannabe Sultan Erdogan, had spent more than $25 billion to prevent the Lira from breaking the barrier of 7 Lira per U.S. Dollar. It is now at 7.2 Lira/US$ and sinking further. The 44 year old Turkish Finance Minister Berat Albayrak is Erdogan's son in law and unqualified for the job. The Fed has rejected a request from Turkey for a swap agreement that would have provided the country with more U.S. dollar. Those are urgently needed:

S&P Global estimated on Wednesday that Turkey’s economy needs to refinance close to $168 billion over the next 12 months. That equates to 24% of the country’s GDP.

The record-low lira makes it more costly for the country’s government and companies to pay back their dollar-denominated debt. That $168 billion of short-term external debt and only $85 billion in gross FX reserves means the so-called “coverage ratio” is only around 50%, one of the lowest of any emerging- market economy.

Erdogan can (again) ask the Emir of Qatar to step in but the sum he needs is larger than what Qatar might be willing or able to provide. That leaves the IMF as the only way out. But after previous IMF loans to Turkey and the harsh austerity measures that came with them any talk of IMF loans in Turkey is political poison and a sure way to lose elections.

Erdogan will have to cut his losses in Libya and Syria as these conflicts have become economically unsustainable.

Lebanon:

The Ponzi scheme the Central Bank of Lebanon had used for 30 years to bind the Lebanese Pound to the U.S. Dollar has finally fallen apart. Within months the pound fell from 1.500 per US$ to now below 4.000 per US$. Everybody who had money in a Lebanese bank has lost most of it. Lebanon's riches of the last 30 years are gone. The country needs a new business model which will be difficult to find. Ehsani explains how it came to this.

Saudi Arabia:

Today the U.S. announced that it is removing its Patriot missiles from the country. Two fighter squadrons in the area will also leave. The U.S. navy will recall some ships from the Persian Gulf region. In early April Trump had threatened the Saudis with such measures if they failed to reduce their oil output and to thereby raise the global oil price. Some output was reduced but the old price is falling further for a lack of demand.

Without U.S. protection a further Saudi war against the Houthi in Yemen will become untenable.

All the above countries are also massively affected from the current pandemic. This probably less from death in their relatively young populations than from the economic consequences that will lead to more poverty and hunger.

If there is a winner of all these crises in the region it is Iran.

Posted by b on May 7, 2020 at 17:40 UTC | Permalink

Comments Sampler

Thanks b hope you are correct "Makhlouf, the richest man in Syria and owner of Syriatel and lots of other companies" out of the pic... it remind me of Indonesia's Suharto mister 10%

Posted by: JC | May 7 2020 17:53 utc | 1

B, thank you very much for the update! I don't thank you enough -- my excuse is that I don't want to clog up your comment section with thanks every day -- but thank you for being here, for all you do.

Stay safe.
Love,
Pundita

Posted by: Pundita | May 7 2020 18:07 utc | 2

Great update b.. thanks... fascinating the background story on the syrian financial dynamics.. i will look at those links later...

i like the general conclusion turkey will have to back out of syria and libya based on being financially squeezed... i wonder what turkey would be like without erdogan fantasizing about reestablishing a 21st century ottoman empire?? we might find out sooner then later...

all of these tin pot dictatorship oil rich countries are really a sick bunch.... i guess it is the byproduct of having too much money and not enough brains..

Posted by: james | May 7 2020 18:27 utc | 3

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Turkey’s Military Intervention In Libya Might Help Syria

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[dropcap]T[/dropcap]he Turkish intervention in Libya might develop into a major international crisis as each side in the 'civil' war in Libya has several international supporters.

Turkey is now taking serious steps to move troops and equipment to Libya:

Turkey will introduce a bill to send troops to Libya as soon as Parliament resumes, in response to the country's invitation, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced on Thursday.

Speaking at a meeting of provincial heads at the headquarters of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) in the capital Ankara, Erdoğan said the military mandate to send troops to Libya will be on Parliament's agenda when it resumes early January.

He also criticized countries supporting the East Libya-based warlord Khalifa Haftar rather than Fayez al-Sarraj.

Reuters noted that there is no public record of the 'invitation' Erdogan talked about:

It was unclear what specific invitation Erdogan was referring to as the interior minister in the Tripoli-based government, Fathi Bashagha, suggested in comments to reporters in Tunis that no official request had yet been made.

Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Russia and several west European countries support the anti-Muslim Brotherhood forces under Khalifa Haftar who controls most of Libya (red). Qatar and Turkey have taken the Islamists' side. Fayez al-Sarraj controls little more than Tripoli and Misrata (blue). He originally had UN and EU support but the lack of progress since 2015, when Sarraj's Government of National Accord was formed, has weakened his authority and his international support.

More foreign involvement in the war in Libya will be bad for that country but it might be good for Syria. In 2011, after NATO had supported Islamists to destroy the Libyan state, many of those fighters were transferred to Syria to help to destroy that country. Weapons from Libya were transported via Turkey to Syria to support the 'rebels' against the government. Both flows are now reverting:

Turkey-backed rebels from Syria will soon join the internationally-recognized Libyan government's forces in the fight against strongman Khalifa Haftar.

The ethnic Turkmen rebel groups that have fought alongside Turkey in northern Syria are expected to reinforce the government in Tripoli imminently, according to senior officials in Libya and Turkey.

The Libyan government had initially resisted the idea of such a deployment but eventually accepted it as Haftar’s forces began to advance on Tripoli, according to that administration’s official.

The so-called Sultan Murad Brigade has been used by Turkey to ethnically cleanse the Kurdish areas in northwest Syria. Its fighters are known to be undisciplined and brutal. They have been trained and armed by Turkey and their commanders speak Turkish. Some of them are also trained to call in air support. Other groups currently undergo training by Turkish officers to then be send to Libya.

Turkey and Qatar are offering relatively large sums to recruit more of such Syrian 'rebels' for Libya:

Sources confirmed that the Turkish-backed factions attract youth to join war in Libya offering temptations and rewarding salaries range between 1800 and 2000 US dollars for a single fighter per month. In addition to that offering additional services to be guaranteed by the host country.

Other sources confirmed that two fighters were killed in Libya days ago, they are of those who had displaced from Damascus and joined the Turkish-backed factions.

Less 'rebel' fighters in Syria will make it easier for the Syrian army to make progress in its renewed Idleb campaign. Since its launch on December 19 the new operation on areas held by the al-Qaeda affiliated Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) already liberated more than 40 villages.

Map via Al Masdar News

Both, the President of the United States and the Emir of al-Qaeda in Syria, issued quite similar messages of concern about the Syrian government attack. Both pointed to Russia and Iran instead of the terrorists those countries seek to defeat.

Donald J. Trump@realDonaldTrump - 15:25 UTC · Dec 26, 2019

Russia, Syria, and Iran are killing, or on their way to killing, thousands if innocent civilians in Idlib Province. Don’t do it! Turkey is working hard to stop this carnage.

A day before Trump's tweet HTS leader Abu Mohammad al-Julani published a video which one of his fan boys translated:

"Between the two [Russia & Iran], the regime is being used by the two sides as a puppet to take over territories and properties, through demographic change... To achieve their goals, the two have no qualms in committing the ugliest massacres against the Sunni people"

...., through airstrikes, bombardments and leveling to the ground, after they failed to pacify the revolution through political and security means."

Jolani: "Having said that, we are in front of a great battle, on behalf of the whole Islamic Ummah, and on behalf of a hypocrite world that once wanted to destroy the Soviet Union & to confront the Iranian ambitions."

The last part, 'on behalf of the Islamic Ummah', can be understood as a fresh invitation to Islamists and sponsors from everywhere to support al-Qaeda in its fight in Idleb governorate.

Joulani had previously rejected help from the 'rebels' associated with Turkey. He fears that they could endanger his dominant position in Idleb. He is looking for new recruits who are willing to swear personal allegiance to him. It seems unlikely though that his call will receive sufficient response to make up for the losses his current forces have to take.

The U.S. State Department has designated HTS as a terrorist organization. At a 2017 conference (vid) organized by the Middle East Institute, Brett McGurk, the U.S. government’s Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS, called Syria’s Idlib province “the largest Al Qaeda safe haven since 9/11 tied directly to Ayman al-Zawahiri [current leader of Al Qaeda].” He added that the Al Qaeda presence in Idlib was a “huge problem” and had been so “for some time.”

Neither Trump's nor Joulani's protests will have any effect on the Idleb campaign. The Syrian operation to liberate Idleb will continue in several phases.

The Syrian army is currently fighting to control the blue area. It is then likely to proceed further north to gain full control of the M5 highway between Hama and Aleppo. The army will then move to take the western part of south Idleb to reopen the M4 highway which leads from the coast to Aleppo.

Idleb governorate is mostly rural and has few economic assets that are worth a big fight. But the control of those highways is essential for the revival of Syria's economy.

---
PS: Wikileaks just released a fourth batch of OPCW documents about the fake chemical attack in Douma, Syria. The documents do not seem to add to the know facts. They only support the already know manipulations of the OPCW reports as they were reported by Jonathan Steele and Peter Hitchens. We discussed those here and here.

Posted by b on December 27, 2019 at 15:22 UTC | Permalink

Comments Sampler

Odd that these "Syrian Rebels" would see fit to forego overthrowing their government in order to fight elsewhere, unless of course they were never Syrian nor really rebelling in the first place. The cited mainstream news stories inadvertently provide a tacit admission of this longstanding kernel of dishonesty.

Posted by: farm ecologist | Dec 27 2019 15:40 utc | 1

Thank You- *b*.
It's important that every reader here @MoA gets updates.

Personally, I follow 3 twitter accounts for minute-to-minute updates from Syria:.
1- https://twitter.com/Canthama
2- https://twitter.com/ynms79797979
3- https://twitter.com/200_zoka

Regarding your thesis that the turk-libyan 'adventure' will deflect headchoppers & resources from Syria, You are 100% correct.
ErDOGan is a very slimy animal.
IMO, He sold-out his headchoppers earlier this year when he was in Moscow, and Putin bought him an ice cream and promised him he could buy just about anything he saw at the military airport.
Putin sweetened the possible deal with a... turk in space 2023:
https://www.rt.com/news/467410-russia-turkey-astronaut-offer/

The real problem erDOGan has had since Putin 'saved his ass' in 2016 is....what is he gonna do with all of his headchoppers.
And the turk MIT-National Intelligence Organization.
https://duckduckgo.com/?q=erDOGan+coup&t=ffcm&ia=web
https://duckduckgo.com/?q=MIT+turkey&t=ffcm&ia=web
Gotta get rid of them, the cia-loyalists & $$$-loyalists some way.
The guy is an opportunistic career-egomaniac.
"What-to-do. What-to-do" he's been thinkin' since his ice cream in Moscow.
Dah-daaah.
Abracadabra zippideedo ...send'em to Libya.

Anyway, Prayers for the Good People of Syria.
Amen.
X-

Posted by: Veritas X- | Dec 27 2019 16:37 utc | 2

Thanks for the ME update b

What puzzles me is how all these regional cannon fodder are going to be moved to Libya from Syria through Turkey or are they somehow going to go through Jordan and Egypt?

We seem to be playing out the story of the elite paying half of the people to kill the other half. How sick is that?

What a world.....when does the music stop, it seems to be more like a shriek?

Posted by: psychohistorian | Dec 27 2019 16:56 utc | 3

Well, the Trump tweet was ominous because in August-September 2018 the Trump Administration had readied a false-flag and then threatened to bomb if ANY attempt was made to liberate Idlib. The narrative then was the same: a military operation in Idlib threatened the civilian population.

Terrorists readying chemical attack to frame Damascus & provide pretext for US strikes – Russian MoD

Russia postpones Syrian offensive in Idlib as NATO threatens escalation

Posted by: Jackrabbit | Dec 27 2019 17:03 utc | 4

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Iran’s Basij: The reason why land or civil war inside Iran is impossible

HELP ENLIGHTEN YOUR FELLOWS. BE SURE TO PASS THIS ON. SURVIVAL DEPENDS ON IT.

Basij with former president Ahmadinejad

Allow me to give a summary of my conversations with well-meaning Westerners since at least 9/11.

Everyone: "Ramin, I'm so worried about Iran! I expect US troops to land in Tehran every time I turn on the news!"

Me: "The Basij."

Everyone: "Ramin, the US invaded Afghanistan and Iraq - Iran is obviously next!"

Me: "Yawn...the Basij."

Everyone: "Dubya Bush...no, wait - Barry Obama...no, wait - Trump…they are sure to invade and destroy Iran!"

Me: "So bored...I'd make a pun, but nothing in English rhymes with ‘Basij’!"

Everyone: "Ramin, why am I more worried about Iran than you?! You aren't taking this seriously!"

Me: "May I please tell you about a group called the Basij?"

And then I allay everyone's very kind fears for Iran, just like I'm going to do for you….

I'm sure that the few Western capitalist-imperialist analysts who have actually examined the Basij simply shudder when they find out what the Basij's full name translates to: "Organisation for the Mobilisation of the Oppressed”.

“What the heck…? There are 10-25 million people in this group?!”

"Oppressed" has obvious leftist connotations, and I'm sure Western readers will agree that there is absolutely no organisation with such a title and directive in their countries.

Nor one so very popular - the goal has always been to enroll half the country (men and women) in the Basij, in what is reminiscent of the American Revolutionary War ideal of citizen / soldier. Iran has 80 million people, so they have far to go, but I can report that their recruitment efforts are not flagging.

The Basij is a controversial group even inside Iran - there is a sort of love-hate relationship. However, as in all such relationships, the key word there is “love”: if you have just half of that, you have basically already been won over save for a few disputes. Hate-hate relationships - Iran with Zionism, for example - have no chance at reconciliation or compromise.

What’s certain is that during the Iran-Iraq War the Basij were loved for their defense of the country and their sacrifices, and they would be loved again if Iran were invaded tomorrow. Iran won’t be invaded though, because the invading country would lose terribly and overwhelmingly, and this 3-part sub-series on the structure, motivations and tangible realities of the Basij will prove why.

Writing about the Basij for the West is not done without risk on my part: surely there are people in the government who will applaud that I am trying to give an objective account of the Basij - it certainly seems to be the first such account in English. But there may be other Iranians who are not as thrilled that I have chosen such a subject.

This sub-series on the Basij is only to state facts & examine structures, and then to hold up well-known opinions and see how they hold up under such facts. I am not here to defend the Basij - only to explain it.

The Basij is a major force in Iran, but they are no mere “militia”: I will shock many by saying that their military power is dwarfed by their cultural, political and even their economic significance. This group has no parallel in Western society - the previous part in this series compared it with the Chinese Communist Party, another deeply misunderstood institution in another country subject to ignorant propaganda efforts.

Bottom line: If I can help end this misunderstanding, people will perhaps realize the difficulties any warring tribe would encounter upon invading Iran.

As far as I am concerned: The beauty of the Basij is in the eye of the beholder. I will maintain my jaundiced, objective, journalist’s view and keep my personal views to myself in order to reveal the true nature of the Basij in this sub-series, which should be an eye-opener for many.

What the heck is the Basij?

Nobody really knows outside Iran….

At the most fundamental level, the Basij is a mass organization which is dedicated to preserving the principles of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, to defend the Iranian People and to work for the success of Iran.

To say that they are “pro-government” is truly redundant or nonsensical: there is no modern country which has a group dedicated to destroying the government which enrolls 12-30% of the nation thanks to government support…and is still a nation. The only political certainly with the Basij is that they are “pro-Iranian political structure”, as I will soon show how their record is mixed regarding which political camp wins the executive or legislative branches.

Two million Basij fought in the Iran-Iraq War, but they are not a military organisation - this explains why when the war ended they were not disbanded, but expanded. They exist to guard the Revolution, serve the State, and serve the People, so they did not run out of work to do just because there was no more war. We now see that the Basij exists primarily as a domestic cultural institution, not a military one.

This fact means that the most important propaganda to wipe away is that the Basij is a "militia" or “paramilitary”. Only a very small percentage of the Basij are armed and involved in military / security operations, and by that I mean - they literally only serve at guard posts or as bodyguards for major public events.

Furthermore, "militia" and "paramilitary" are propaganda terms because the Basij is a pro-state organisation - militias and paramilitary groups are often not under state control, and often opposed to the state. Thus the Basij should be considered like the National Guard in the US or any other reserve force - totally under control of a democratic government. Yes, the Basij can be mobilised quickly in times of war, but in peacetime the Basij reverts to an active cultural and domestic role, unlike the National Guard.

Blackshirts with Mussolini marching on Rome in 1922. Nope, no similarity with the Basij.

Anyway, the Nazi Brownshirts were disbanded long before WWII, and the Italian Blackshirts melted upon invasion & only proved good for imperialist wars in Africa. [Some also fought in Spain and Russia, with middling to embarrassing results. The"Black Flames" (Fiamme Nere) ⁽¹⁾, one of the "volunteer divisions" sent by Mussolini to help Franco, despite tactical and numerical superiority suffered a bad defeat in Guadalajara at the hands of the largely disorganised Republican army. In the USSR their record was much worse.—Eds] Because all three of these groups are mass organisations there are some similarities…but this is like saying that “the Conservative Timbuktu Party and the Antarctic Anarchist Party are the same” because they are both political parties. As I showed in the previous part, the Chinese Communist Party is the best comparison: both nations have had modern revolutions which deposed their undemocratic fascists, after all.

Again, the Basij cannot be compared to the anti-Semitic, xenophobic groups of Europe: Europe has a many centuries-old problem with racism, the Holocaust being merely the latest manifestation. Indeed, modern European Islamophobia - the idea that Islamic culture is inferior, negative & dangerous - is just the latest domestically-acceptable manifestation of this historical trend and reality. Iran, however, is the OPPOSITE of this because their 1979 revolution was openly anti-racist and anti-sectarian. Combined with the fact that Iran has not invaded a country in 300 years, I simply will not countenance the idea that the ideology in which the Basij are inculcated (described in the next part of this series) is similar to the racist, anti-Jewish, imperialist ideology of the 20th century European fascists. Case closed.

When we deny this fear-mongering, it paves the way for realising that the Basij is something totally new, which I term an "apolitical Islamic socialist union NGO".

An ‘apolitical Islamic socialist union NGO’ seems like a terrible definition

Well, the Basij is a unique (revolutionary) entity - you come up with something that rolls off the tongue!

If the Basij succeeds and its model is copied - like in, say, Venezuela - they will say, “It’s a Venezuelan Basij”, and not, “It’s an apolitical religious socialist union NGO” - I certainly agree there.

This is a novel definition, and while it’s not very catchy it does have the virtue of being accurate:

It is "apolitical" for the simple fact that Basij members have mostly voted for the mainstream Principlist (conservative) Party...and then mostly supported the mainstream Reformist Party...and then mostly supported Principlists again, and back and forth, etc. This is both for president and parliament. Therefore, Basij members do not support just one political party in Iran. One might assume Baisji are all conservative supporters, but their voting record clearly disproves that assumption. Because this is a mass organization whose only criteria is to support the principles and structures created by 1979, members are obviously drawn from all parts of society and all parts of the political spectrum. Above all, and very often openly and loudly, the Basij are devoted to the post of the Supreme Leader and say they follow his orders; this post was created to embody the moral, religious and political ideals of Iran and the 1979 Revolution. The Supreme Leader is not a mere, transitory “president”, and a good description of his primary political role is that of unifier of the different political camps - he also clearly unifies the Basiji, whatever their political camps are as well. This is why I call the Basij “apolitical”.

I think the word “Islamic” could easily be removed from this definition - there are Christians, Zoroastrians and others in the Basij, and not only Muslims. So if one means “Islamic” in the sense that one has to be Muslim to be in the Basij - this word is false. But if one means “Islamic” in the sense that the principles of Islam guide the Basij, then this word is correct. Much like the “Iranian Islamic Socialism” which guides the country, the Basij is expressly “Iranian” first and “Islamic” second.

It is "socialist" due to its obvious goal of empowering the “oppressed” class, for the redistributive & decidedly anti-capitalist policies of the many Basij economic ventures, and for its clear role in uplifting the lower classes via direct political and social aid. I will explain this in detail throughout this sub-series, and the correctness of using this term will certainly not be doubted afterwards.

They are a "union" because they are mass organisation drawn from every class and sector of society, and one which is undeniably working towards political, economic and social ends in union with each other. Some call them a "party", but they do not function like one in the modern sense: most Western political party members are indoctrinated and will vote in almost perfectly predictable ways - as a "political machine" the Basij repeatedly does not vote as stereotypes predict. A "union", however comprises voters of different political persuasions who are united by a common job, interest, experience and needs, with economics playing a key motivation. So a “union” and not a “party” is accurate.

They are an "NGO", which is the official government designation and a popular one as well, because they are overwhelmingly unpaid civilian volunteers. This is a crucial distinction, and why "NGO" cannot be left out - these people are giving their time and energy in large part because they love what they do, like any unpaid supporter of any NGO. Earthquake relief, planting trees, policing the internet, and all that civil service stuff that activists typically do - that’s truly the main role of the Basij.

So it’s not pretty, but “apolitical Islamic socialist union NGO” is accurate. But it has evolved into something huge.

The Basij: Too big (and too revolutionary) to grasp, and way too big to invade

[dropcap]W[/dropcap]hy has nobody studied the Basij when it is such a huge peacetime organization of such voting, political, economic and cultural importance?

My answer is this: It is too intimidating and revolutionary to be grasped, for non-Iranians:

a 17-million person organisation, and growing
mostly joined by the lower class
a 40-year old organisation, meaning it is durable, tested and rooted
embedded in the civil service and political class (President Ahmadinejad was a Basiji)
supported by government laws to create economic and social advantages for members
supported by so-called “privatisation” (explained in Part 3 here) and central planning which have created massive economic networks and jobs for Basiji
only criteria is to be 100% pro-Iranian Islamic Revolution
is primarily a grassroots cultural group drawn from all levels of society
is a group which is half youth and 1/3rd female
all receive basic military training
physically present in every neighbourhood via Basij “resistance bases”, which are deeply involved in community life
60,000-80,000 resistance bases nationwide with roughly 100 members in each base
3-4 million “active” members who spend at least 6 hours per week at their base
members join willingly, proving its enormous appeal

This is obviously a huge, huge, HUGE grassroots phenomenon in Iran, no?

Those figures I have given are the midpoint between government and non-governmental estimates. Beyond the members, how many people are not in the Basij but are supporters of it? I am referring to the spouses, family members and friends of Basij - they are not Basiji, but it’s reasonable to assume a feeling ranging from tolerance to outright encouragement in a large percentage of cases. 25 million Basiji supporters appears to be a low estimate.

It certainly appears to contradict the idea that the support for the 1979 Revolution is flagging. Why are all these people volunteering for it, then? They do get benefits, and I will relate those later, but some 17 million people didn’t join for solely opportunistic reasons.

This is the key point of this article: Any force which seeks to drastically disrupt Iran within Iran will have to contend with the organized, trained, patriotic Basij…and because I know this, and because the most nefarious plotters in the Pentagon, Paris, London & Tel Aviv surely know this…I am totally unconcerned about foreign invasion.

Iran had that - it was in 1980. The aggressive and Western-backed Iraq lost in the War of Sacred Defense (as the war is called in Iran). It can’t happen again - Iran has prepared for that, and their plan is called “the Basij".

Bombs alone simply don’t work - ground forces must always hold key areas, after all. The US bombed and chemically-weaponed North Korea and Vietnam to the Stone Age, but it was no matter in the end because they couldn’t hold the land. War has not changed THAT fundamental reality and never will. What good is nuking a foreign country when you can’t occupy the land and reap its fruits – a war machine makes no profit that way? All the West can do is commit massacres - like in Vietnam and Korea - but they cannot invade and hold: American colonialism is over.In a completely objective view of the Basij: anyone who gets through the Iranian army and the Revolutionary Guards then has to go through the Basij. Street to street, house to house, cave to cave, cactus to cactus - a Basiji will be there, just like the Vietcong. They’ll call him “Ali in the black pyjamas” - take him on and it will certainly be your funeral, imperialist war pigs.

This is not to vaunt Iran as special – the USSR, Vietnam, Korea and other durably-rooted socialist-inspired nations have also repelled invaders.

Therefore: of course the Western media doesn’t want to talk about the Basij - it makes “War on Iran” a suicide mission which nobody would support despite massive Western jingoism.

That is the overview of the Basij and how they affect non-Iranians.

Digging deeper provides fascinating insights. However, not too many people have done this - objectively - outside of Iran.

Replacing 'zero scholarship' on Iran's Basij with 'bad scholarship'

[dropcap]G[/dropcap]iven the near-total lack of information, I want to remain objective about the Basij so that readers can decide for themselves. I don’t want to give my personal thoughts and experiences. I’d like to state that I am not in the Basij (though there is a Basij Journalists Guild).

That is why I am glad there is one (but only one) book on the Basij available in the West. This sub-series will analyse this book’s analysis, and it frees me from having present the Basij all on my own and be subject to accusations of bias.

The book is “Captive Society: The Basij Miltia and Social Control in Iran: ” by Saeid Golkar. Golkar has been raised, educated and even taught in Iran. This book is his PhD thesis for New York City’s Columbia University.

This is what Golkar's book is very good for: He has provided the Western world with the first-ever massive data dump on the Basij. The next two parts of this series will rely heavily on his exhaustive research into the Basij, conversations with Basij members and reading of all types of literature - domestic and foreign - on the Basij.

However, his analysis of said data…

Well, of course it is coloured by his political views, as social data always must be. This is not mathematical or astronomical data - “political science” is not a science at all.

I think the title already makes it abundantly clear: this is the first book about the Basij, but it is also the first book against the Basij.

Just like my recent series this year on China (Old vs. new scholarship on the continent of China: an 8-part series), which exposed the reactionary, anti-socialist views of ”the West's doyen on China" - John King Fairbank, Harvard's first-ever China scholar - both Fairbank and Golkar are only good for providing data. Their research - but not their conclusions - can be used to provide more accurate answers about China and Iran, respectively…when more modern & democratic political ideas are applied. They are both very much like medieval astronomers who carefully watched the stars and logged their data, but insisted on retrofitting their answers to the preconceived notion that the sun moves around the earth, or that the planets must travel in perfect circles instead of oblong ellipses.

Golkar

I don’t want to condemn Golkar because there are people in Iran who do not support the Basij, but few Iranians I know view them in such an unfairly one-sided manner. His reviews in Iran, however, have not been as lenient - Basiji websites call the book “insulting to Basiji” and “Iranophobic”. Considering that they already know much of the data he has provided, and that he refused to include even a single positive trait or anecdote of the Basij, I can certainly understand why they don’t view the book as useful – they already know how the group works, of course.

I’m trying to remain objective: his book provides data, and that is necessary for the West. All I can do is examine the data from my own perspective, and then try to remove that bias as much as possible; but Golkar did not do this, I believe. He routinely omitted any positive views, opinions, analyses and facts regarding the Basij, and that is bad scholarship.

Naturally, I tried to find out a bit more about Golkar to discover his political-ideological tendencies. Golkar retweets Francis Fukuyama, who famously declared the “End of History” upon the fall of the USSR with the capitalist-liberal West European model to reign supreme forever, to the great consternation of leftists and the great delight of right-wingers. Golkar is mostly interviewed in the West by Gareth Smyth, a journalist mostly affiliated with The Financial Times and The Guardian (the only Western review of the book is by Smyth in the Guardian). These media are neoliberal-capitalist and 100% anti-socialist, so Golkar likely has an affinity with these views; or perhaps Golkar is just happy to be interviewed by anybody on his favorite subject (and as a journalist I understand that). However, as a journalist, I know that I will be called to Judgment Day before I get a call from either of those two media, because I am not capitalist or imperialist. Golkar appears to be trying to make a name for himself with that part of the Iranian diaspora which is totally opposed to the Islamic Republic of Iran - he is definitely not trying to get invited to speak at Basiji events, LOL! Considering how big the Basij is in Iran, Golkar is not trying to get invited to many places in Iran, period, it seems….

I'm going to start at the end, with the very final paragraph of the book’s conclusion: the final paragraph should sum up and reveal what Golkar’s true feelings for the Basij are, what his motivation for writing the book was, and what are his personal ideological & political aims.

“With the expansion of the Basij's involvement in Iran's social, political, and economic life, the opportunity for the country’s peaceful transition to democracy will decrease dramatically. Because many Basij commanders and members have been co-opted by the IRI, it is not implausible to think that they will resist any serious attempts at government reform that would jeopardize their positions.”

Undoubtedly, this states that Iran is not a democracy, as Golkar says they need to “transition” to it. I find that to be inaccurate and rather indicative of a negative view of Iran. The final sentence implies that Basij commanders and members are opportunists or dupes, which is also rather negative.

Now perhaps I am reading too much into it, but there appears to be a complete sentence which has been hidden:

“With the expansion of the Basij's involvement in Iran's social, political, and economic life, the opportunity for the country’s peaceful transition to democracy will decrease dramatically. Because many Basij commanders and members have been co-opted by the IRI, it is not implausible to think that they will resist any serious attempts at government reform that would jeopardize their positions.”

In condensed form: With the expansion of the Basij the opportunity for transition will decrease dramatically, because many Basij commanders and members will resist any serious attempts.

This talk of a “peaceful transition to democracy” is very reminiscent of the coded language used for an armed attack to destroy Iran’s political structure, as it was for the Western "humanitarian interventions" like in Yugoslavia or Libya in order to bring “democracy”. Certainly, Golkar seems to begrudge the Basij their ability to “resist” changes of his preference.

Golkar also indicates what I have already stated: the Basij is now a permanent, embedded feature of Iranian society which will certainly “resist” a great many things.

Is my “hidden sentence” paranoia?

Well, his final chapter is titled, "Basij Members - Islamic Warriors or Religious Thugs?” Uhhh…this would be expected in an American imperialist's or Zionist's view of the Basij, as both are stupid stereotypes and not scholarship.

More mildly, but still negatively, half of all chapter & part titles contain the words “control”, “repression” or “suppression” - these are all quite loaded terms, I think we’ll all agree.

I have actually read the entire book, and it is my opinion that such clear bias is why this book is “about” the Basij, but also “against” the Basij…and that is bad scholarship. The Basij have their detractors in Iran, but from start to finish Golkar's book evinces an undisguised and unadulterated antipathy for them.

Very surprisingly, he certainly refuses to admit the possibility of even a drop of possible ideological sincerity on the part of members, which seems extreme. It is as if the Iranian Golkar doesn’t know any devoted Basiji, or that he has never seen a Basiji be helpful? In his insistence to present all Basiji as mere opportunists, he is certainly giving Western readers the false idea that this group will entirely melt away when confronted with domestic or foreign violence. Some will, sure, but some definitely will not because some do have ideological sincerity, to put it objectively.

Also, the book is devoid of even a single reference to the class struggle, Marxist economics & the People-centered ideals of socialist democracy. Iranian Revolutionary Shi’ism, truly the ideology of the revolution, contained ideas, principles, structures and slogans from all these sources. Golkar could have said, “the Basij fails in all of these socialist-inspired areas”, but he does not even broach these concepts as being important alternative lenses to view the Basij through. This makes me think that not only does Golkar not like the Basij, but he does not want to promote the ideals of 1979 in any way, nor does he want to promote socialist ideals either.

Golkar has done plenty of research - in Iran, talking to Basij members, reading Basij literature, finding the obscure Western journal articles on the Basij - and his extensive bibliography is a testament to that. It is the vast bibliography of a top university-level work, which it is.

But a big bibliography should never be enough to satisfy, because a big bibliography cannot make - to give an example - an inherently reactionary & capitalist view not reactionary or anti-democratic. Technocratism can never be allowed to govern, only to advise with data - everyone living in the Eurozone in 2018 should be well aware of the social chaos that results from putting people into power on the basis of their "technical qualifications" instead of their ideological-philosophical-ethical views.

And so I will not be browbeaten into accepting Gokar’s "authority" just because he has provided the trail of his ideological investigation into the Basij. Ideology counts. Fairness counts, too, and this book is so devoid of the Basij’s positives one is left wondering if 10-25 million Iranians are capable of knowing right from wrong, which is an absurdity.

But the book should be read because...well, it's the only game in town. There is NO other book in English or French on the Basij.

I now return to Golkar's very first paragraph in his preface. This paragraph is when the author primes the pump for what the reader is about to receive, setting the tone for the entire book.

"Although the organization has millions of members (known as Basiji) and pervades all aspects of Iranian society, there are only a few scholarly works on the subject and even fewer available in English. With the expansion of the Basij across society and its increasing power inside of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), it has become essential to study the Basij and its role in controlling Iranian society, which have led to the persistence of the IRI in post-revolutionary Iran.” (emphasis added)

I have made the same point and have the same goal: understanding 2018 Iran is impossible without awareness of the Basij.

But Golkar shows his bias / ideology / philosophy / political view when he says we should study the Basij to see "its role in controlling Iranian society" - that is a fundamentally unsympathetic, negative view, and we must realize that this antipathy towards the Basij is the ideological principle he will use to guide his readers. My goal is simply to unveil the Basij for Western readers - you can say if the Basij is beautiful or ugly; this should have been Golkar’s goal, and the goal of Columbia University, which supported this work.

I, too, have pointed and will point to the Basij as a force which has "led to the persistence of the IRI in post-revolutionary Iran" …but I think Golkar's implication is clear - he is not pleased that the Basij has helped in the IRI’s “persistence”. This is his right as a person, but as a scholar…well, I guess it’s also his right to be completely biased - no law against it, after all.

As this article is a book review, I include this judgment about it: this is a book about Iran, but it is not very sympathetic to a huge number of Iranians. I fundamentally dislike books like that - how can my own humanity be increased with such a view? Is my humanity to be increased by learning to fear and hate the Basij? Golkar may not like the Basij, but he should have at least given their point of view for why so many support it - it is not as if we are talking about a handful of outsiders, after all. This was the bare minimum of fairness - it was discarded. That is my impression and that was his choice.

But Golkar does not own data. Therefore, in between his conclusion and his preface Golkar and I certainly battled it out in the fight for accuracy, which has always been my primary journalistic watchword (over “objectivity”).

I’d like to finish by returning to the headline of this part - the reason why the Basij makes foreign invasion and also “civil war” impossible. There are two simple, overwhelming reasons why the Basij prevent civil war:

Second: This lack of clear divisions and the obvious omnipresence of the Basij means the division is not physical, but ideological: The Basij are an idea which is impossible to eradicate, after 40 years. Thus the question will always be one of democratic balance, compromise and negotiation - an unblissful but peaceful coexistence, perhaps.

The next two parts in this series will describe the unique structure of the Basij, its legal & cultural roles, its unique goals, and its exceptional influence on Iranian society.

Armed with all the facts, readers can then judge for themselves the merits, or not, of the Basij.

***********************************

This is the 5th article in an 11-part series which explains the economics, history, religion and culture of Iran’s Revolutionary Shi’ism, which produced modern Iranian Islamic Socialism.

Here is the list of articles slated to be published, and I hope you will find them useful in your leftist struggle!

The WSWS, Iran’s economy, the Basij & Revolutionary Shi’ism: an 11-part series

How Iran Got Economically Socialist, and then Islamic Socialist

What privatisation in Iran? or Definitely not THAT privatisation

Parallels between Iran’s Basij and the Chinese Communist Party

Iran's Basij: The reason why land or civil war inside Iran is impossible

A leftist analysis of Iran's Basij - likely the first ever in the West

Iran's Basij: Restructuring society and/or class warfare

‘Cultural’ & ‘Permanent Revolution' in Revolutionary Shi’ism & Iranian Islamic Socialism

'Martyrdom and Martyrdom' & martyrdom, and the Basij

‘The Death of Yazdgerd’: The greatest political movie ever explains Iran’s revolution (available with English subtitles for free on Youtube here)

Iran détente after Trump's JCPOA pull out? We can wait 2 more years, or 6, or…

⁽¹⁾ The Blackshirts (camicie nere) formal name was Milizia Volontaria per la Sicurezza Nazionale (MVSN, "Voluntary Militia for National Security").

About the author

RAMIN MAZAHERI, Senior Correspondent & Contributing Editor, Dispatch from Paris • Mazaheri is the chief correspondent in Paris for Press TV and has lived in France since 2009. He has been a daily newspaper reporter in the US, and has reported from Iran, Cuba, Egypt, Tunisia, South Korea and elsewhere. His work has appeared in various journals, magazines and websites, as well as on radio and television.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

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Robert Fisk: Struck by Eurocentric fever, or a simple case of reportorial Mr Hyde?

HELP ENLIGHTEN YOUR FELLOWS. BE SURE TO PASS THIS ON. SURVIVAL DEPENDS ON IT.

Patrice Greanville

Douma showing the ugly scars of the anglozionist instigated war.

Robert Fisk, a British journalist technically attached to The Independent ⁽¹⁾, is regarded by many as one of the last remaining authoritative and truthful voices on the Middle East, where the Big Lie is undisputed king. His integrity is legendary. His recent foray to Douma, (The search for truth in the rubble of Douma– and one doctor’s doubts over the chemical attack) where he reported (and thereby virtually certified) the truth about the non-existence of a gas attack, literally staged by the ubiquitous White Helmets (an event the Russians had repeatedly warned about) proved useful in shoring up the credibility of the Russo-Syrian version of events. His testimony was therefore important to the collapse of that Western false flag, although obviously more are constantly being planned. False flags, a form of elaborate lying cum compelling emotional manipulation, is intrinsic to the dynamic of imperialist war, simply another tool in their "hybrid war" arsenal, a field they actually pioneered many years ago and have since perfected into an art.

The intrepid Fisk in the jihadist tunnels under the liberated Douma rubble.

Wrote Robert Fisk:

Before we go any further, readers should be aware that this is not the only story in Douma. There are the many people I talked to amid the ruins of the town who said they had “never believed in” gas stories – which were usually put about, they claimed, by the armed Islamist groups. These particular jihadis survived under a blizzard of shellfire by living in other’s people’s homes and in vast, wide tunnels with underground roads carved through the living rock by prisoners with pick-axes on three levels beneath the town. I walked through three of them yesterday, vast corridors of living rock which still contained Russian – yes, Russian – rockets and burned-out cars..

So the story of Douma is thus not just a story of gas – or no gas, as the case may be. It’s about thousands of people who did not opt for evacuation from Douma on buses that left last week, alongside the gunmen with whom they had to live like troglodytes for months in order to survive. I walked across this town quite freely yesterday without soldier, policeman or minder to haunt my footsteps, just two Syrian friends, a camera and a notebook. I sometimes had to clamber across 20-foot-high ramparts, up and down almost sheer walls of earth. Happy to see foreigners among them, happier still that the siege is finally over, they are mostly smiling; those whose faces you can see, of course, because a surprising number of Douma’s women wear full-length black hijab.

[dropcap]F[/dropcap]isk is one of the best we can find in the mainstream these days, almost a relic from a more honorable past, but obviously he's not perfect, he's not 100% and probably does not care to be. If he were, his job would be finished even with The Independent, which brags about not applying "proprietorial influence on the writers". Still, Fisk still routinely uses the loaded trope "regime" so favored by imperialist disinformers to signify the Assad government, and he goes to great lengths to seem balanced by giving the spurious Western "version" of events a fair shake. The old objectivity compulsion, no doubt, now reduced to a mechanistic ritual empty of real conviction.

I give these details because I was disappointed to see a piece by Fisk (on Counterpunch) in which he displays more than a generous portion of Eurocentric venom and condescension toward some Middle Eastern leaders—the late Gaddafi and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad—to make his points. Can this be the same man? The main target of Fisk's tirade appears to be Trump, which is perfectly fine, and objectively supportable by tons of evidence which grows by the day. The man is vile and repellent, by any standard we choose. But Fisk uses Gaddafi for his semi-satirical comparison, a man who, for all his real or imagined flaws, led a nation that stood out in citizens' well being and who was a clear victim of Western savagery and betrayal (particularly by the repellent and utterly corrupt French Zionist Sarkozy), and who, not very smartly perhaps, tried to stand up against the anglozionist empire.

Here's a sample. It seems to me that there's a lot of eurocentric—especially British cultural taste in this assessment—and that some of the accusations are plainly unfair, and contextually hard to document. Were Libyans really subjected to the "vengeful wrath of Gaddafi" in the style accorded dissidents in many of Washington's client states, like Guatemala or El Salvador, for example, to name just a couple, where sadistic death squads take care of anyone shaking or dissing the established plutocratic order? When you read Fisk's lines more closely what jumps out is that he is not so much evoking Gaddafi's autocratic style than grafting Trump's malevolent idiosyncrasies on the late leader, retroactively.

The political leader who most resembles Trump is the late Colonel Gaddafi of Libya.

The parallels are quite creepy. Gaddafi was crackers, he was a vain, capricious peacock of a man, he was obsessed with women, he even had a ghost writer invent a ‘Green Book’ of his personal philosophy, just as Trump had his business manual written for him. Gaddafi was vengeful towards his opponents but his views on the Middle East were odd, to say the least. He once advocated a one-state solution to Israel and Palestine which – in all seriousness – he suggested should be called ‘Israel-tine’. A bit like moving the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

Trump’s White House is now like Gaddafi’s tent, which the Libyan leader took with him everywhere. Trump’s late-night television viewing was not unlike Gaddafi’s insistence that business must be done in his tent. Gaddafi’s handshake was legendary – so was his kiss from Tony Blair, who was as obsequious to Gaddafi in Libya as Theresa May was to Trump in Washington. Much good did it do Blair or May.

Gaddafi ran his business dealings through his family – now there’s a thought – and even maintained good relations with Russia. His speeches were interminable – he liked the sound of his own voice – and although he constantly lied, his audience was forced to listen and to fear his wrath. Above all, Gaddafi was completely divorced from reality. If he lied, he believed his own lies. He believed that he kept his promises. He believed in the world he wanted to believe in, even if this was non-existent. His Great Man Made River Project was supposed to Make Libya Great Again.

^{I said earlier that I was disappointed in Fisk because I like and respect the man; his iconoclastic spirit and fierce dedication to reporting exactly what he sees, and not some predigested propaganda crud required by the supervising editors back home, remain admirable and increasingly unique on this beat (the void has been providentially filled by brave citizen journalists like Vanessa Beeley, Eva Bartlett and others of that ilk). So why the gratuitous invective against leaders of the beaten down, repeatedly assaulted Third World? Hard to explain, frankly, so we won't go there as that is psychobabble's domain.}

Still, Fisk is Fisk, and he knows his priorities, one of the first apparently being to report and underscore the truth with a view to putting out the numerous fuses lit by the compulsive arsonists in the region, the chief creep in this regard, by a wide margin, Benjamin Netanyahu, a man who clearly has no real respect for life, or else would not be such a pathological and, at this point—tedious warmonger.

Fisk concludes his essay with some worthy thoughts, again, they do not quite wash away the sheer capriciousness of the attack on Gaddafi, and the slights on the embattled Syrians, but they do have healing power. His slap that US foreign policy (via I suppose the tunneling Neocons) has become Israel's bitch is well worth quoting:

Of course, we know what Trump’s breaking of the Iranian nuclear deal means – quite apart from his lies and fraudulent arguments about the original agreement: the United States is now a part of Israel’s foreign policy. The Arabs used to say that Israel was an American state. Now the US has become part of the Israel state. That infamous speech contained seven references to “terror” in relation to Iran – “state sponsor of terror”, “supports terrorist proxies”, “reign…of terror”, “a regime of great terror”, “funds…terrorism”, “support for terrorism”, “the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism” – and so on and so forth. This is almost as good as Benjamin Netanyahu’s speeches at the UN.

And we are supposed to believe, like children, that Shiite Iran is supporting Sunni Muslim al-Qaeda – when it’s been fighting al-Qaeda in Iraq and Syria. We are supposed to believe that Iran’s long-outdated “intelligence documents” provide “definitive proof” that Iran’s promise of not pursuing nuclear weapons is a lie. But what is America worth now – in the Middle East or anywhere else (North Korea comes to mind) – when it can so blatantly tear up an international treaty agreed by the US government itself. That used to be what some European leaders – one in particular – did in the first part of the 20th century.

I'll leave you with that.

—PG

(1) Click on orange button below for a summary description of The Independent.

[bg_collapse view="button-orange" color="#4a4949" expand_text="About the Independent" collapse_text="Show Less" ]

The Independent is a British online newspaper.^[2] Established in 1986 as an independent national morning newspaper published in London, it was controlled by Tony O'Reilly's Independent News & Media from 1997 until it was sold to Russian oligarch Alexander Lebedev in 2010.^[3] The last printed edition of The Independent was published on Saturday 26 March 2016, leaving only its digital editions.^[2]

Nicknamed the Indy, it began as a broadsheet, but changed to tabloid (compact) format in 2003.^[4] Until September 2011, the paper described itself on the banner at the top of every newspaper as "free from party political bias, free from proprietorial influence".^[5] It tends to take a pro-market stance on economic issues.^[6]

The daily edition was named National Newspaper of the Year at the 2004 British Press Awards.

In June 2015, it had an average daily circulation of just below 58,000, 85 per cent down from its 1990 peak, while the Sunday edition had a circulation of just over 97,000.^[7]^[2]

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About the Author

Patrice Greanville is this site's editor in chief.

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