A Fleeting Triumph?
CROSSPOST W. COUNTERPUNCH

Kagarlitsky (Click to enlarge)

[N]o, that’s not a mistake. On March 18, Crimea annexed Russia. There were no insidious schemes or imperial ambitions involved. There was, however, a spontaneously developing situation, together with the usual, everyday willingness of the Crimean bosses, who saw a unique chance in the Russian-Ukrainian crisis.

With the Ukrainian state on the brink of collapse after the flight of President Yanukovich from Kiev, the Kremlin authorities were understandably concerned to protect their interests and strengthen their position, but the most they counted on was turning Crimea into a second Trans-Dniestr enclave or Republic of Northern Cyprus – that is, into a de-facto Russian protectorate with formal independence. The presence in Crimea of “polite people” in green camouflage uniforms in no way prevented this scenario from playing out, any more than did the presence of NATO soldiers on the territory of the former Yugoslavia or of Turkish troops in Cyprus.

In Sevastopol and Simferopol, however, the authorities decided differently. Taking advantage of the confusion and disarray in Moscow and Kiev, the Crimean leaders drew up their own agenda. In the course of a few days they took several irreversible steps. The period before the referendum was cut to a minimum, so as to prevent both the Ukrainian and Russian authorities from getting their bearings. The Kremlin was presented with a gift it could not refuse. After having set the propaganda pendulum swinging, and amid a patriotic upsurge within Russia, our rulers were simply unable to say “no” when Crimea officially demanded unification with Russia. And so it happened.

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THE RUSSIA DESK TRUTH PROTECT RUSSIA AND THE WORLD
Patrice Greanville Director
Gaither Stewart  Managing Editor
AlevtIna Rea Deputy Editor • Paul Carline Deputy Editor
SPECIAL ADVISOR
BORIS KAGARLITSKY Institute of Globalization Studies

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The main difference between informal control over the territory and official unification lay in the fact that Moscow thereafter would bear responsibility for everything that occurred on the peninsula, especially on the material level. The Russian authorities are now obliged to take care of pensions, roads and the wages of state employees, assigning money directly to Crimea from the federal budget.

Not surprisingly, the internet began immediately to feature joking appeals from other Russian provinces, whose residents also wanted to be annexed to Russia on the same conditions as Crimea. The budget deficits of these provinces are constantly increasing, and the federal treasury takes far more money from them than it doles out. The liberal press in turn is predicting general ruin as a result of the costs of fitting out the new territory.

Valuable acquisition

CLICK TO ENLARGE.

The truth is that Crimea is an extremely valuable acquisition both strategically and economically. For any country, territorial expansion opens up new opportunities – for an expansion of its internal market, of its tax base, skills base and natural resources. It is no accident that so many wars have been fought over this peninsula, and it was not by chance that the ancient Greeks, Byzantines, Genoese and Turks established outposts there. Provided matters are handled competently, there is potential in Crimea for the development of tourism, agriculture, viticulture and many other sectors. But the qualifier is all-important: “provided matters are handled competently”. There are no guarantees that the Russian administration, in essence merely a cover for corrupt self-rule by local bureaucrats, will prove more effective than Ukrainian rule. Meanwhile, a key condition for realising Crimea’s potential within the Russian Federation is precisely that relations of solidarity and neighbourly goodwill are maintained with Ukraine.

The Ukrainian state stands to profit from this as well, since it is now able to supply electricity, water and other resources to Crimea at international prices; Ukraine thus has a negotiating lever to compensate for its dependence on Russian raw materials and gas. But for these aces to be employed, there needs to be a stable and flexible government in Kiev – and the wait for this, more than likely, will be very long indeed.

When Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev annexed Crimea to Ukraine, he was motivated not in the least by personal “caprice”, but by completely practical economic considerations. From the point of view of transport logistics, energy supplies and even the sale of its products, Crimea was strongly connected to Ukraine. These economic considerations were in contradiction to historico-cultural and ethnic realities, but this did not make them less telling. Further, it was no accident that with all these problems and contradictions Crimea got on fine within the independent Ukraine for more than two decades. The peninsula fell out with Ukraine not so much because Crimeans found life within the framework of the Ukrainian state particularly bad, as because of the progressive collapse of the Ukrainian state itself.

In perfectly rational fashion, the population of the peninsula reasoned that Russian rule, with all its shortcomings – which Crimean residents knew intimately – was nevertheless better than the chaos and collapse that were afflicting Ukraine.

This was especially true since Moscow was now compelled to make the peninsula a sort of shop window for the national economy. It was because they understood this that the Crimean leaders rejected the “Trans-Dniestrian” variant that Moscow was offering them, and confronting the Kremlin with an accomplished fact, forced the leadership of the Russian Federation to adopt the solution the Crimean chiefs wanted. Aksenov and Chaly should be given full credit for their guile; they scored a brilliant victory over both Kiev and Moscow. Now resources will start flowing into Crimea.

Economic methods

Russia has enough money not only for Crimea, but also for many other provinces that are now short of finances. The problem is not one of money, but lies in the economic model and methods of rule that our country has adopted. The annexation of Crimea should remind us once again that all this needs to change. Meanwhile, the sense of triumph that has seized not only the common people in our society, but to a significant degree those on top as well, is making any changes extremely difficult. The authorities view the present situation as the outcome of their own wisdom and as proof of their effectiveness. Why should they make changes, when everything in our country is going fine?

Russia will not be rescued from its crisis by free-market policies, or by unsystematic attempts at state intervention that end in massively redistributing public funds to the benefit of the same large firms that dominate the market. The answer to the crisis can only lie in national and regional planning that can make it possible to optimise the resources of the state sector and orient them directly toward dealing with social challenges, above all on the local level.

The centre, however, will not permit either a redistribution of funds to the regions, or the creation by the regions of their own independent financial base. As a result, the money allotted to the regions will be insufficient. This will have nothing to do with Crimea (the money was also inadequate before), but will result from the fact the system as a whole is dysfunctional. In such a situation, however, decorating the Crimean “shop window” may turn out to have unpleasant psychological consequences for the rest of the country.

Sanctions?

The liberal press is now setting out to frighten the public with the threat of economic sanctions on the part of the West, but the main danger to our economy stems precisely from the fact that there will be no such sanctions. If the West were in fact to impose serious sanctions, this would open up enormous opportunities, creating the preconditions for a growth of employment, for wage increases and for creating new jobs. Suspending Russia’s membership in the World Trade Organization would be a gift to our industry. Placing a blockade on technology transfers would make it necessary to revive Russian enterprises.

We are in acute need of sanctions, since they would provide a chance for us to restore our industry, to diversify production, to wage a struggle against capital flight and to conquer our own internal market. But the ruling layers in the US and European Union have no intention of aiding Russia, so there will be no serious sanctions, merely symbolic acts aimed at calming public opinion in the USA and Europe and at giving moral support to the “patriotic” pretensions of the Russian elite.

The Central Bank will, of course, press ahead with the policy of lowering the ruble exchange rate that it has already been pursuing since last year. On this level, the Ukrainian crisis and Crimea have proved extremely opportune, since they have allowed the bank to accelerate the process. Whether the bank’s hopes of raising the competitiveness of the Russian economy solely through devaluation will prove justified is, of course, a separate question.

Contrary to the ideas of liberals and conservatives (who suffer, surprisingly enough, from the same hallucinations), the policies of the Russian authorities do not stem from any conscious decision to enter into confrontation with the West, but from an attempt to keep this confrontation – which is objectively inevitable, and does not depend on the will of the Kremlin – to a minimum.

Nevertheless, an intensification of the conflict is predetermined by the overall logic of the economic crisis, which inevitably is sharpening the struggle for markets, destabilising international relations and strengthening the rivalry between the West and the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). Meanwhile it is obvious that Russia, as well as being central to the BRICS chain, is also its weakest link. While lagging in its economic and especially industrial growth rates, and lacking a functional national elite, Russia nevertheless remains the only European country in this potential bloc, and retains a scientific, diplomatic and military potential that other societies will need decades if not centuries to accumulate. As a result, the policies of the Western elites toward our country are marked by a fundamental duality: while taking every opportunity to weaken Russia, the Western powers simultaneously do not allow Russia to take its distance from them, and in the process, to undergo a definitive rapprochement with the non-Western world.

The Russian elites are themselves allies and hostages of these policies; the whole policy course of our ruling circles can in essence be reduced to a mirror image of the same formula.

Russia’s opposition

But while the situation confronting our elites in this respect is more or less straightforward (they cannot enter actively into confrontation with the West without dealing crushing blows to their own interests, to their own capital holdings and to their own networks, methods of rule and way of life), the position of the Russian opposition is truly catastrophic.

When our oppositionists (including a significant number of people on the left) denounce the policies of the government, they speak and act not in the name of Russian society, but effectively in the name of the West, to which they attach all their hopes. Worse still is the fact that in orienting to the West, our oppositionists disdainfully ignore Western society and the peoples who make it up, just as they ignore and treat with contempt the society and people of Russia itself.

The Russian opposition raises on high the same stars-and-blue European Union flag to which, on countless city squares within Europe itself, people are setting fire. By virtue of their consistent, fundamental, ingrained anti-democratism, our oppositionists are just as hostile to the values of the European Enlightenment as are Putin, Yatsenyuk and Merkel.

A hundred years after the First World War, there is no point in alluding to Lenin, to the Zimmerwald conference or to anti-imperialist “defeatism”. First of all, this is for the reason that, unlike the case in 1914, there is no war, will not be and cannot be. Second, the “defeatism” of the early 20th century was anti-systemic and anti-bourgeois, while we are confronted now with an ideology that is bourgeois to the core, and that is oriented toward advancing the same neoliberal politics that every honest socialist is obliged to combat.

However we now assess the positions of Lenin or Martov in 1914, they did not march in demonstrations beneath German and Austrian flags, and did not write pamphlets appealing to these empires to step up their pressure on the Russian army.

The chauvinist hysteria that has taken hold of Russian society within the context of the Ukrainian events will soon pass. Annulling it will be the everyday trials of the crisis and of a disorderly world, the commonplace social problems from which virtual wars cannot distract people. The lustre of the Crimean triumph will fade, and today’s triumphant leaders will again be seen by society for what they really are – small-time political intriguers who have happened to hold a winning hand. But even after all this, society’s attitude to the liberal oppositionists will not have changed and will not have improved. That is because a more rational view of events will simply allow the population to see more clearly: there is no point in expecting help from those who wish ill to their own country and its people.

Boris Kagarlitsky is the director of the Institute of Globalization Studies (Moscow).

Translated by Renfrey Clarke.

RUSSIA DESK: The Saker Reports

Dateline: FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 2014

[T]he Strelkov press conference on Sept. 11 (2014) is, I believe, a historical moment because it marks the move of Strelkov from the Novorussian military struggle into the much larger, and far more dangerous struggle, the struggle for the political future of Russia.  This in itself is no necessarily unexpected, but the way he did it was a surprise, at least for me.  But before I zoom out to the bigger picture, I think that it would be helpful to try to summarize some of the key points of his presentation (thanks to Marina, you can download the full English transcript by clicking here and the Q&A is here). 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c0-jtNKlpWU

Here is how I summarized what I saw as the key elements of his presentation:

External factors (staging) – symbolic message:

• He is clearly alive and well
• The reason for his departure was infighting inside the Novorussian leadership and the fact that he was told that supplies would only be delivered if he left.
• The photo of Putin in the back on the wall
• He is sitting behind a Russian monarchist flag on the table (and a Russian and Novorussian flag in the back (no Soviet or Communists symbols)

His view about the ceasefire agreement:

• This ceasefire has now created military situation is now worse than this spring
• What is disgraceful is not the ceasefire by itself but “the conditions which are now being discussed in Minks”
• There is plan to blame the betrayal of Novorussia on Putin
• There are powerful interests which want a never ending war which would create a bleeding ulcer for Russia

His description of the 5th column: 

• The roots of this 5th column go back to the Eltsin years
• The liberation of Crimea took the 5th column by surprise
• The 5th column is around President
• There is a local 5th column in Donbass which has been and still is negotiating with Ukie oligarchs
• The 5th column is composed of “liberals”
• Putin is a moral threat to them because he has massive popular support
• They want to overthrow Putin
• They want to dismember Russia
• This will be a long war on Russia
• We are dealing with another 1905 and 1917 like situation
• By saving Novorussia Russia can save itself
• Western sanctions will hurt Russia and they will use them to discredit Putin

Strelkov’s plans

• Strelkov wants to fight inside Russia in support of Putin (only option)
• Strelkov’s main objective is to denounce the real traitors inside Russia

Comdr. Strelkov. (Click to enlarge)

This is my personal rendition of the key elements of Strelkov’s presentation, and I might have missed or misunderstood something, so I therefore encourage everybody to watch the video again and read the transcript.

ZOOMING OUT TO THE GREATER CONTEXT

Before going further into my analysis of Strelkov’s statements, I think that it is crucial to keep the bigger context in mind.  His words are not just the words of a man speaking for the Novorussian Armed Forces (NAF) or a Novorussia hero, this time Strelkov is diving straight into the big and dangerous world of Russian “deep state” politics (though the term “deep state” does not really apply to Russia).  So I will now return to a topic I have been covering for many years now.

Long-time readers will probably recall that I often spoke of a behind-the-scenes struggle between what I called the “Eurasian Sovereignists” (ES) and the “Atlantic Integrationists” (AI).  I will not repeat it all here, but I do encourage you to read the following articles:

• http://vineyardsaker.blogspot.com/2013/02/russia-and-islam-part-three-internal.html
• http://vineyardsaker.blogspot.com/2013/03/russia-and-islam-part-six-kremlin.html
• http://vineyardsaker.blogspot.com/2013/04/the-power-struggle-inside-kremlin-is.html
• http://vineyardsaker.blogspot.com/2013/10/1993-2013-is-twenty-years-long-pas-de.html
• http://vineyardsaker.blogspot.com/2014/04/a-new-cold-war-has-begun-let-us-embrace.html

The two first articles are part of a much longer seven-part series on Islam, but they introduce the historical context of the development of the ES and AI factions.  The next two I would consider mandatory reading if you are not familiar with the topic and the last one is just a more recent discussion of the role of these two factions in the current Cold War v2.  Having said that, my key thesis is this:

The “5th column” Strelkov refers to are the very same people I call Atlantic Integrationists.

Strelkov names no names, but he describes them very accurately (see above) and he adds that they only value “money and other material resources”.  They are the Russian equivalent of the AngloZionist 1%ers.  Their main political goal is to fully integrate Russia into the AngloZionist international system on a financial, political, economic and cultural levels.  They see Russia as “European” and they believe that “the West” (i.e. the AngloZionist Empire) and Russia need to stand together against Islam, China and any other non-imperial ideology, religion, nation or alliance.  They believe in capitalism and they are opposed to a “social state” (to use Putin’s description of modern Russia) and they are systematically contemptuous of the “masses” though they try hard not to show this aspect of their worldview.  These are the folks who gradually took power during the 1980s and who had the predatory instincts to seize the moment in the early 1990s to rapidly and ruthlessly acquire an absolutely unimaginable amount of wealth, stolen from the Russian people.

Now, it is true that due to an absolutely brilliant move by the Russian security services during the late 1990s and thanks to the chaos in which Russia was plunged, these AI (aka 5th columnists) did make a fatal mistake.  Their plan was to put forward a rather uninspiring and dull bureaucrat into power and surround him by men coming from their own circles.  What they did not foresee is that this rather uninspiring and dull bureaucrat would turn into one of the most formidable statesmen in Russian history – Putin – and that he would immediately set out to decapitate the top layers of the AI  – the so-called “oligarchs” and the thugs who enforced their rule – and their armed branch- the Chechen Wahabi insurgency.  Putin acted so fast that he rapidly ended up in full control of the so-called “power ministries” (state security, presidential security, internal affairs, armed forces, emergency services) and, which is crucial, an immense popular support.  In a way, this combination of state power and popular support made Putin untouchable, but that also limited his power.

While the top and most notorious AI columnists either left Russia (Berezovsky) or were put in jail (Khodorkovsky) or died, the system they had created was still very much in place.  Banking, the natural resources industry, the weapons trade, financial services and, of course, the media were still very much in their hands.  So when the most arrogant one of them, Khodorkovsky, was jailed the two factions (ES and AI) achieved something of a compromise, a temporary ceasefire if you wish.  The deal was this: first, as long as they don’t try to take over the Kremlin and generally stay out of politics, the AI would be allowed to keep their wealth and continue to make huge profits; second, the top power would be shared between the ES (Putin, Rogozin, Patrushev, etc.) and the AI (Medvedev, Kudrin, Surkov, etc.).

The first big blow which Putin delivered against the AI was the firing of Serdiukov and, even “worse”, his replacement with Shoigu.  The second massive blow was, according to Strelkov (and I agree), the operation to liberate Crimea.  According to Strelkov, this operation was a huge blow to the interests of these 5th columnist because they immediately realized that it would set Russia and the AngloZionists on a collision course.  They therefore gathered all their forces to a) prevent a Russian military intervention in the Donbass and b) make a deal with the oligarchs now in power in Kiev.  I fully share this analysis.

Russian vs Novorussian strategic interests

Here comes the tricky part.  There are a few assumption made by many bloggers which are the result of a fundamental flaws in logic:

• Russian and Novorussian interests are one and the same
• Anything supported by the AI is bad for Russia
• Putin is in full control and can do whatever he wants
• Novorussian leaders are always right by virtue of their heroic struggle
• Disagreeing with Novorussian leader is a sign of stupidity, betrayal or dishonesty (including for Putin himself)

Reality is not quite that simple.  For one thing, Russian and Novorussian interests are not only one and the same, they are in direct opposition on a crucial matter: Novorussia wants full independence from Kiev(whoever is in power) while Russia wants regime change in Kiev and maintain a unitary Ukraine.  Second, while the fact that Russian and Ukrainian oligarchs are trying to hammer out a deal to stop the war and maintain a unitary Ukraine this might or might not be bad for Russia.  Now, before I get accused of God only knows what, let me explain:

During the late 1980s and the 1990s a bizarre kind of “partial fusion” took place between the Russian mob and the KGB.   I know, sounds crazy, but it is nonetheless true and yours truly has personally seen it and personally met ex-KGB officers working in the Russian mob.  However, as some say, there is no such thing as an “ex-KGB” officer.  Well, in reality there is, but in most cases, at least informal contacts are maintained.  So here is how I would very roughly summarize this bizarre association:

In the 1980s: corrupt KGB officers realize that a lot of money can be made in the underworld and some official of the internal security branch of the KGB (2nd Main Directorate) found ways to profit from tight contacts with the mob.

In the early 1990: a lot of young and smart KGB officers realize that their skills are useless in the KGB, they resign and immediately find very good positions in the “New Russian” world (at that time 100% mobsters) and use their skills (language, education, work capability, courage) to make loads of money

These were terrible years for the KGB/FSB, but they also had one positive impact: the more corrupt and less patriotic officers left leaving many idealists behind them, idealists which would, with time, climb up the ranks.

Now here comes the really interesting part:

In the mid 1990s-2000: the successor to the KGB, the SVR and FSB came to realize that they had a fantastic network of potential collaborators in the newly created world of Russian business, finance, commerce, tourism, etc.  They act on this and begin use this mostly “ex-mob now turned legit” worldwide network for state security purposes and industrial/commercial espionage.  Even the military intelligence service, the GRU, begins to do the same with ex-officers now working in aerospace, electronics, communications, etc.

[Off-topic but interesting sidebar: there is another most valuable network which the SVR/FSB/GRU also began to use during this period: the huge number of Jews from Russia who emigrated to the USA and Israel.  Keep that in mind when you think about Russian-Israeli relations]

2000-today: Putin and his backers begin their behind the scenes secret but ruthless war on the Atlantic Integrationists who are fundamentally oppose to the Eurasian Sovereignists who are now firmly behind Putin.  Most importantly the security services who are controlled by Putin allies develop a network of potential supporters inside the basis of power of the Atlantic Integrationists.  See how complex that becomes?

So while some superficial analysts are correct when they say that the Russian oligarchs are generally 5th columnists and dangerous enemies of Putin, what they are missing is that a) not all oligarchs fall into this category and b) that Putin has the means to influence or even coerce some anti-Putin oligarchs thanks to his control of the security services and their network inside the oligarchs power base.

So here is the crucial point: the relationship between the Kremlin and  the Russian oligarchy is a verycomplex one.  Yes, by and large, it is correct to say that we have Putin, the security services, the military,  the common Russian people on one side and the oligarchs, the liberal intelligentsia, big business, banking, finance and CIA agents on the other.  But in reality, this is a primitive model, the reality is infinitely more complex.  I know I am going to get even more hate coming my way for saying that, but some oligarchs are (for whatever reason) Putin allies or Putin controlled-individuals.  I have met some personally in the late 1990s and I am quite sure that they are still there.  Why?

Because there is a lot of money to be made in Russia by being on Putin’s side.  For one thing, if you are in good terms with the Kremlin, you become untouchable for the rest of the more-or-less legal “business” world.  You also get juicy contracts.  And the tax authorities might not be as meticulous when you file for taxes.  Again, the black-and-white Putin vs oligarchs image is generally true, but only as a primitive model.

ZOOMING BACK IN TO STRELKOV’S PRESS CONFERENCE

Let’s remember where Strelkov came from.  While little is certain about him, he appears to be an ex-FSB Colonel (in anti-terrorism), who fought as a volunteer in Yugoslavia, Transnistria and Chechnia.  He is also a historian, a columnist and he likes to participate in military recreations.  He is a monarchist, an Orthodox Christian and and admirer of the White movement during the civil war.  In Novorussia, however, he entered a totally different level jumping in one rapid, gigantic most successful leap from anti-terrorism Colonel to what could be roughly described as an divisional or even army corp commander who turned a volunteer militia force into a more or less regular army.  That is a huge feat:  From almost nobody he became the #1 hero and commander of the entire Novorussian resistance.  And yet, Novorussia is tiny compared to Russia and big Novorussian politics are tiny compared to big Russian politics.  And yet, in yesterday’s press conference Strelkov made yet another huge leap – he jumped from Novorussian military issues straight into the single most complex and dangerous struggle I can imagine: the secret behind-the-scenes struggle for power in the Kremlin.  It is far too early to tell if this move will be as successful as his previous one, Strelkov went from swimming with Piranhas to swimming with Great White sharks, but I am cautiously optimistic.  Here is why:

Strelkov’s potential in the Russian struggle for power

Putin is acutely aware of the fact that his official power base (the state apparatus) is chock-full of 5th columnists. The best proof for that is that he did two very interesting things:

a) He created the All-Russia People’s Front (ARPF) which unlike the official party in power, United Russia, was not created with a strong Medvedev/Atlantic Integrationist component, but was created by Putinalone.  Officially, the ARPF is not a party but a “political-social movement” which is supposed to bring together a large segment of generally pro-Kremlin organizations and individuals and to provide a way for the common people to convey their concerns to Putin.  In reality, however, it is also a “political party in waiting”, very large, very well connected and which Putin can “turn on” at any time, especially if challenged from inside United Russia.

b) Putin’s security services have contributed to the creation of a plethora of “near-Kremlin entities” (околокремлевские круги) which officially have no subordination to the Kremlin, but which can get a lot of things done without the government involved or, even, informed.  These near-Kremlin entities include some news outlets, some commercial entities, a number of clubs, some youth organizations, news agencies, etc.  There is no formal list, no admission procedure, no one leader.  But somehow, there are always people with contacts to the security agencies near or in these circles.

This is were Strelkov fits in.

Strelkov will first and foremost represent the interests of the people of Novorussia, but since he correctly identified the Russian 5th column as the main threat to Novorussia, he also is objectively becoming an ally of Putin in a common struggle against the Atlantic Integrationists.  Now, let us be clear here.  Strelkov and Putin will not agree on a number of issues.  Strelkov clearly indicated that when he said

“No matter how critical I am about certain internal or external policy decision of president in conditions of war started against us, I consider it necessary to support him as the only legitimate superior commander the main guarantor of freedom and independence of the state”

• Putin’s Address to the Federal Assembly (March 18th)
• The press conference by by Alexander V. Zakharchenko (August 26th)
• Yesterday’s Strelkov’s press conference (September 11th)

Putin, Zakharchenko and Strelkov all three fully realize that what is going on is nothing shot of a war on Russia, but waged, at least for the time being, by non-military means.  All three know that the biggest threat to Russia is an internal one.  But all three can claim that the other two do not speak for him.  After all, one is the President of Russia, the second one is a top representative of Donetsk and Novorussia, while the third one is, technically speaking, a retired officer and a private individual.  Yet all three together are politically encircling the Russian 5th column into a “political cauldron” in which they either support Putin or look like traitors.  A potentially very effective technique.

The second role of Strelkov is to denounce and discredit the Putin-bashers who are constantly declaring that “Putin is backstabbing or betraying Novorussia”.  I predict that in a near future the very same circles who until now had taken the position that Putin is a villain and Strelkov a hero will declare that Strelkov is a villain and a traitor too.  Some of these guys are manipulated by western PSYOP specialists, others are simply paid by them, but their goal is to convince the world that Putin is the bad guy and that a “real” patriot needs to replace him.  In other words, that Russia can only be saved by making the AngloZionist dream of a regime change in Russia come true.  But then, these are the very same people who wanted to save Novorussia by making the other AngloZionist dream, of having an overt Russian military intervention in the Donbass, also come true.  My advice in regards to such “sorrow-patriots” as they are called in Russia is simple: beware of those who want to save Russia by making an AngloZionist dream come true.  If you keep that in mind, the enemies of Russia will be fairly easy to spot 🙂

CONCLUSION

I was amazed and tremendously encouraged by Strelkov’s very sophisticated presentation of his position yesterday.  Though this might be too early to conclude, and I might be uncharacteristically optimistic about this, I believe that Strelkov has the potential to become the Novorussian leader I was hoping would emerge.  If that is so, then I will gladly plead guilty of having underestimated him.  Still, I will also admit that I am very concerned for him.  The fact that apparently the Russia media has given his press conference little or no attention combined with the rumor that he had killed himself is a powerful message sent to him by the 5th column who is showing how powerful it still is.  In particular, I consider the rumor about his suicide as a very serious death threat.  Even worse, and maybe these are my paranoid inclination speaking here, there are a lot of people on both sides who might be interested in seeing Strelkov killed.  The Atlantic Integrationists and their 5th column would want him dead because he is so openly denouncing them, but make no mistake, there could also be Eurasian Sovereignists who might want him dead to have him as a martyr and symbol of Russian heroism.  Is that cynical and ugly?  Yes. And so is the struggle for power in Russia.  Most people in the West have no idea how ruthless this struggle can be.  Unlike Putin, Strelkov is not protected by an extremely powerful state security apparatus and, considering that he can be hit from either side.  He better be very *very* careful.

Just for accepting to play the role he is playing now (and he, being an ex-FSB colonel, fully knows the risks)  I consider him a hero and he has my sincere admiration.  “They” will try to use him, threaten him, manipulate him, discredit him and use every dirty trick possible to either control him or crush him.  Truly, his fate is already a tragic one and his courage remarkable.  Fighting the Ukie Nazis, the Chechen Wahabis or the Croat Ustashe was a relaxing vacation compared to the kind of “warfare” going on in the struggle for the control of Russia.  Since Russia is the de-facto leader of both the BRICS and the SCO the struggle for Russia is really a struggle for the future of the planet.  I believe that Strelkov understands that.

—The Saker