The paradox of the current global crisis is that for the last five years, all relatively responsible and independent nations have made tremendous efforts to save the United States from the financial, economic, military, and political disaster that looms ahead. And this is all despite Washington’s equally systematic moves to destabilize the world order, rightly known as the Pax Americana (“American peace”).

Since policy is not a zero-sum game, i.e., one participant’s loss does not necessarily entail a gain for another, this paradox has a logical explanation. A crisis erupts within any system when there is a discrepancy between its internal structure and the sum total of available resources (that is, those resources will eventually prove inadequate for the system to function normally and in the usual way).

There are at least three basic options for addressing this situation:

1. Through reform, in which the system’s internal structure evolves in such a way as to better correspond to the available resources [and goals].
2. Through the system’s collapse, in which case the same result is achieved via revolution.
3. Through preservation, in which the inputs threatening the system are eliminated by force, and the relationships within the system are carefully preserved on an inequitable relationship basis (whether between classes, social strata, castes, or nations).

The preservation method was attempted by the Ming and Qing dynasties in China, as well as the Tokugawa Shogunate in Japan. It was utilized successfully (in the 19th century) prior to the era of capitalist globalization. But neither of those Eastern civilizations (although fairly robust internally) survived their collision with the technologically more advanced (and hence more militarily and politically powerful) European civilization. Japan found its answer on the path of modernization (reform) back in the second half of the 19th century, China spent a century immersed in the quagmire of semi-colonial dependence and bloody civil wars, until the new leadership of [Mao] and later Deng Xiaoping was able to articulate its own vision of modernizing reforms.

This point leads us to the conclusion that a system can be preserved only if it is safeguarded from any unwanted external influences, i.e., if it controls the globalized world.

The contradiction between the concept of escaping the crisis, which has been adopted by the US elite, and the alternative concept – proposed by Russia and backed by China, then by the BRICS nations and now a large part of the world – lay in the fact that the politicians in Washington were working from the premise that they are able to fully control the globalized world and guide its development in the direction they wish. Therefore, faced with dwindling resources to sustain the mechanisms that perpetuate their global hegemony, they tried to resolve the problem by forcefully suppressing potential opponents in order to reallocate global resources in their favor.

If successful, the United States would be able to reenact the events of the late 1980s – early 1990s, when the collapse of the Soviet Union and the global socialist system under its control allowed the West to escape its crisis. At this new stage, it has become a question of no longer simply reallocating resources in favor of the West as a collective whole, but solely in favor of the United States. This move offered the system a respite that could be used to create a regime for preserving inequitable relationships, during which the American elite’s definitive control over the resources of power, raw materials, finance, and industrial resources safeguarded them from the danger of the system’s internal implosion, while the elimination of alternative power centers shielded the system from external breaches, rendering it eternal (at least for a historically foreseeable period of time).

The alternative approach postulated that the system’s total resources might be depleted before the United States can manage to generate the mechanisms to perpetuate its global hegemony. In turn, this will lead to strain (and overstrain) on the forces that ensure the imperial suppression of those nations existing on the global periphery, all in the interests of the Washington-based center, which will later bring about the inevitable collapse of the system.

Two hundred, or even one hundred years ago, politicians would have acted on the principle of “what is falling, that one should also push” and prepared to divvy up the legacy of yet another crumbling empire. However, the globalization of not only the world’s industry and trade (that was achieved by the end of the 19th century), but also global finance, caused the collapse of the American empire through a policy that was extremely dangerous and costly for the whole world. To put it bluntly, the United States could bury civilization under its own wreckage.

Consequently, the Russian-Chinese approach has made a point of offering Washington a compromise option that endorses the gradual, evolutionary erosion of American hegemony, plus the incremental reform of international financial, economic, military, and political relations on the basis of the existing system of international law.

America’s elite have been offered a “soft landing” that would preserve much of their influence and assets, while gradually adapting the system to better correspond to the present facts of life (bringing it into line with the available reserve of resources), taking into account the interests of humanity, and not only of its “top echelon” as exemplified by the “300 families” who are actually dwindling to no more than thirty.

In the end, it is always better to negotiate than to build a new world upon the ashes of the old. Especially since there has been a global precedent for similar agreements.

The global plutocracy’s shield: at US taxpayers expense.

Up until 2015, America’s elite (or at least the ones who determine US policy) had been assured that they possessed sufficient financial, economic, military, and political strength to cripple the rest of the world, while still preserving Washington’s hegemony by depriving everyone, including (at the final stage) even the American people of any real political sovereignty or economic rights.

European bureaucrats were important allies for that elite – i.e., the cosmopolitan, comprador-bourgeoisie sector of the EU elite, whose welfare hinged on the further integration of transatlantic (i.e., under US control) EU entities (in which the premise of Atlantic solidarity has become geopolitical dogma) and NATO, although this is in conflict with the interests of the EU member states.

However, the crisis in Ukraine, which has dragged on much longer than originally planned, Russia’s impressive surge of military and political energy as it moved to resolve the Syrian crisis (something for which the US did not have an appropriate response) and, most important, the progressive creation of alternative financial and economic entities that call into question the dollar’s position as the de facto world currency, have forced a sector of America’s elite that is amenable to compromise to rouse itself (over the last 15 years that sector has been effectively excluded from participation in any strategic decisions).

The latest statements by Kerry  and Obama which seesaw from a willingness to consider a mutually acceptable compromise on all contentious issues (even Kiev was given instructions “to implement Minsk “) to a determination to continue the policy of confrontation – are evidence of the escalating battle being fought within the Washington establishment.

It is impossible to predict the outcome of this struggle – too many high-status politicians and influential families have tied their futures to an agenda that preserves imperial domination for that to be renounced painlessly. In reality, multibillion-dollar positions and entire political dynasties are at stake.

However, we can say with absolute certainty that there is a certain window of opportunity during which any decision can be made. And a window of opportunity is closing that would allow the US to make a soft landing with a few trade-offs. The Washington elite cannot escape the fact that they are up against far more serious problems than those of 10-15 years ago. Right now the big question is about how they are going to land, and although that landing will already be harder than it would have been and will come with costs, the situation is not yet a disaster.

But the US needs to think fast. Their resources are shrinking much faster than the authors of the plan for imperial preservation had expected. To their loss of control over the BRICS countries can be added the incipient, but still fairly rapid loss of control over EU policy as well as the onset of geopolitical maneuvering among the monarchies of the Middle East. The financial and economic entities created and set in motion by the BRICS nations are developing in accordance with their own logic, and Moscow and Beijing are not able to delay their development overlong while waiting for the US to suddenly discover a capacity to negotiate.

The point of no return will pass once and for all sometime in 2016, and America’s elite will no longer be able to choose between the provisions of compromise and collapse. The only thing that they will then be able to do is to slam the door loudly, trying to drag the rest of the world after them into the abyss.

Rostislav Ischenko is the President of the Centre for System Analysis and Forecasting (Kiev) currently living in Moscow.

Source in Russian: Politexpert

Adapted and translated by ORIENTAL REVIEW.

The US’ Pivot to Asia (P2A) is obviously aimed against China, and Washington’s ultimate plan has always been to assemble a coalition of countries that can contain the global supergiant. As the Pivot enters its fourth year soon, the contours of the Chinese Containment Coalition (CCC) are beginning to take shape, and it’s become evident that it’s going to be centered on the Philippines.
..
The island chain’s geopolitical connectivity potential can easily be harnessed to link together the CCC’s various players, and it’s also subservient enough to the US to the degree that it has ignored the exceptionally dangerous consequences of potentially hosting multilateral forward operating bases against China. As apocalyptic as the US’ end game scenario may be for regional multipolarity, it’s not at all assured to succeed, as there are quite a few contingencies that could develop between all of its assorted partners in preventing them from linking up in the Philippines and actualizing the Asian NATO. The article is thus divided into two parts; the first one describes the forecasted composition of the Asian NATO and explains the bilateral relationships that make it possible, while the second one investigates the multitude of factors that could impede its formation and/or lead to its eventual unravelling.

The Asian NATO

Prior to commencing the study, one must first understand exactly what is meant by the “Asian NATO”. The author explored the genesis of this concept in his earlier work on how The US Is Juggling Chaos And Coordination To Contain China, and it boils down to formalizing the CCC in order to simultaneously split ASEAN between anti-Chinese states (like the Philippines) and those that behave pragmatically towards it (like Cambodia), and create a formalized mechanism for the US to coordinate further anti-Chinese moves in the region. The Philippines are the logical staging ground for this endeavor owing to its de-facto mutual defense guarantee with the US and the overlapping strategic partnerships that it has with Japan and soon Vietnam (which are its first and second respectively, not counting the ‘special relationship’ with its former American colonizer).

Baits and Lures

The overall idea is for the island chain to act as a geographic facilitator in linking together both of its strategic partners under American guidance in order to enhance their combined ability to coordinate anti-Chinese actions in the East and South China island disputes. Additionally, because of the Philippines own spat with China, it could also be used as a ‘sacrificial lamb’ in provoking a small-scale military engagement with China (one in which the US would purposely refrain from participating in) in order to test the People’s Liberation Army-Navy’s responses and assist with the crafting of more effective anti-Chinese tactical maneuvers by the Asian NATO. Or, in a variation of this scenario, it could become the Asian application of the Reverse Brzezinski policy of luring China into a strategic military trap by using its small and provocative neighboring maritime state as bait. Unlike Ukraine, which has no formalized mutual defense relationship with the US, the Philippines could call upon the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement in order to turn even the tiniest exchange of fire into a global hot spot of brinksmanship between the US and China, thus giving it a freakishly disproportionate weight in international affairs.

The ‘Backwards L’

Japan:

Shinzo Abe, chauvinistic and militaristic leader of Japan, and eager player in the American maneuver to encircle China and rearm Japan. Abe stands out among the corrupt, pathetically servile politicians of postwar Japan, which is something of an accomplishment.

The function of a Japan-Philippines-Vietnam axis is to create a ‘backwards L’ of military containment in order to ‘box’ China inside mainland Asia, with the Philippines being the fulcrum of this entity. Japan is the most active Lead From Behind proponent of this policy, taking the initiative (under American instruction) to authorize both the sales of weapons and the deployment of troops abroad. Considering the strategic partnership between them and how each has their own island disputes with China, it’s logical to conclude that Japan will seek to make the Philippines the central focus of both anti-Chinese policy manifestations. The Diplomat reported at the end of June that this certainly seems to be in the cards, with Tokyo preparing to sell Manilla a slew of naval and air units in exchange for a “Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)” that could allow it to deploy its first foreign forces since World War II. One should also be reminded that both sides held their second-ever naval drills this summer together with the US, showing that there’s actual substance to their strategic partnership and that it’s not just rhetorically based.

Vietnam:

The other end of the ‘backwards L’, Vietnam, is also increasing its interactions with the Philippines, as the slated strategic partnership attests. Last May, military units from the two sides symbolicallyenjoyed a game of football together on one of the South China Sea’s disputed islands (the second time they have done so), showing that each of them is serious about working together to confront China in this region. The aforecited article also details some of the bilateral military cooperation between both sides, with each country’s navy calling port at the other and even holding informal discussions on setting up joint patrols in the area. It’s highly predicted that the signing of a strategic partnership between them will lead to an acceleration of military cooperation, and furthermore, will even put Vietnam and Japan’s militaries into direct contact with the other via the Philippines’ geographic intermediary function, which also accomplishes a contingent goal of the US’ P2A by having both CCC anchors enhance their full spectrum bilateral relations (especially in the military field).

Incorporating South Korea

In essence, there are actually two CCC axes that the US is building and wants to unite, and these are the ones between Vietnam-The Philippines (already discussed) and Japan-South Korea. To say a few words about the latter, it’s still not entirely certain that Seoul will commit to joining the CCC. For example, even though it’s part of a trilateral information sharing mechanism between it, Japan, and the US ostensibly against North Korea (which could realistically be turned against China in the future), it’s also being wooed by China through the recently inked Free Trade Agreement and has been ambivalent about hosting the US’ THAAD “missile defense” units (potentially even going it alone to produce its own domestic version instead).

Still, this hasn’t halted the country’s interest in cooperating with the Philippines, the magnetic center of geopolitical attraction to all members of the CCC community. The country’s Defense Minister visitedthe island nation earlier this month to discuss future military collaboration (as of now, just weapons sales and technical assistance), but such a big step could also help further last year’s proposal for the two countries to enter into a strategic partnership with one another. While South Korea doesn’t have any island disputes with China and behaves moderately friendly towards it in a military sense (not counting the anti-Chinese agenda of the thousands of US troops that are based there), if it got caught up in the CCC’s intrigue inside the Philippines, bilateral relations could certainly suffer as a result of the heightened and warranted suspicions that China would inevitably have towards its maritime neighbor.

With or without South Korea’s incorporation (which is still questionable), however, the central axis of Japan-Philippines-Vietnam still represents a formidable threat to China, but the auxiliary participation of the peninsular state would definitely contribute to its enhanced effectiveness, and it’s worthy to monitor any forthcoming decisions that its leadership takes in this regard.

The Greater CCC

India:

On the topic of auxiliary members in the CCC, one must inevitably consider India’s inclusion and the anticipated role that Australia will also play. Looking at the first, New Delhi under Prime Minister Modi has been increasingly assertive of its foreign interests, and this includes the evolution of its “Look East” policy to one of “Act East”. One of the highlights of the US’ new National Security Strategy is to assist India in the application of this new policy, with the understood overtone that it’ll be directed against China in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea. As India finally grows out of its South Asian neighborhood and begins exploring its role in the global context, it’s entirely possible that it could take on the role of anti-Chinese vanguard if certain American-hoped-for conditions are met, specifically the intensification of Indian-Filipino military relations that seem to be directed against China. If the Philippines go as far as establishing a strategic partnership with India that draws the country into contact with the nascent Asian NATO that’s forming there, then it would confirm Beijing’s suspicions that India does in fact intend to challenge it in the region, likely on the US’ Lead From Behind behalf.

Australia:

The second auxiliary anchor, Australia, has an entirely self-interested reason to get involved, and this is to counter its regional Indonesian rival and open up a second front of pressure that could possibly be applied against it in the future. The two countries have been competing with one another for some time, and Australia bases all of its regional policies around the issue of how they relate to this rivalry. Thus, the twin military exercises that it plans to hold with the Philippines this year (built on the basis of a 1995 defense cooperation memorandum) aren’t so much directed against China as they are against Indonesia, at least in Australia’s strategic calculations. The island-continent just signed a free trade agreement with China earlier this summer, so it would be entirely schizophrenic for it to totally turn against its largest economic partner at this moment. Rather, it’s paying superficial homage to the US’ CCC in order to please its ‘big brother’ while simultaneously maneuvering itself into a more beneficial position vis-à-vis Indonesia, which incidentally, also satisfies another American goal pertaining to the P2A.

To explain, the US wants to ensure that Indonesia does not become too pragmatically friendly in its relations with China, preferring instead for the country to remain the ‘Asian Yugoslavia’ as long as possible in the context of this New Cold War. To prevent Indonesia from acting out of line with American grand strategic interests, the US is using Australia to ‘box’ the country in, following the ‘backwards L’ template that it’s directed against China. Australian-Filipino military cooperation is the northern point of this construction, with the fulcrum being Australia’s political influence over former colony and LNG-rich Papua New Guinea and the de-facto protectorate that it’ll likely form over Bougainville Island after the mineral-rich province predictably votes for independence sometime before the referendum scheduled by 2020. Pertaining to Papua New Guinea’s LNG potential, between Total and Exxon’s investments, it has the capability of producing 13 million tons of LNG per year, or about 1/6 the output of Qatar, and about Bougainville, if it restarts operation of the world’s largest copper mine in Panguna and returnsoperating rights to Australian mining giant Rio Tinto, then Canberra would inevitably gain a strategic foothold over its government. Concurrent to its influence on the eastern part of the New Guinea island and its surroundings, Australia could also become a de-facto state sponsor of the West Papua independence movement (“Indonesia’s Katanga” in terms of its mineral wealth), which while havingstrong arguments in its favor and a lengthy list of documented and legitimate grievances, could see its cause hijacked by abroad for geopolitical ends and marketed as an “Asian Darfur”.
…

Rounding out the ‘backwards L’ of Indonesian containment, over 1,000 US Marines are now routinely rotated out of the North Australian city of Darwin, thus adding a third lever of external pressure against the archipelago’s authorities. If one adds in the US’ regime change attempt in Malaysia (meticulouslyexposed by Tony Cartalucci), then an actual containment square emerges, whereby the country is faced with potentially hostile elements in its northwest (a Color Revolution government in Malaysia), northeast (the CCC/Asian NATO that could also turn against Indonesia), southeast (foreign influence over the Papuas), and southwest (American Marines in Darwin, Australian control over Christmas and Cocos Islands and American military interest there). Therefore, it’s becoming apparent that the containment of Indonesia is inseparable from the containment of China, as the former is entering into effect via moves euphemistically made in advancement of the latter, and this underreported element of the P2A certainly deserves further analytical attention from other researchers.

To be continued…

[dropcap]T[/dropcap]he EU and Russia have begun speaking about the concept of democratic security, an idea which means absolutely different things to each side. 

At the most recent meeting of the Council of Europe, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Secretary General Thorbjorn Jagland discussed the need for democratic security, with Russia emphasizing that this is especially relevant for Macedonia at the moment. While no further public comments were released on the matter, it’s clear that Brussels and Moscow have two completely different conceptualizations of this idea in mind. As can be seen by the case of Macedonia, the EU views pragmatic, independently minded leaders as ‘threats’ to the unipolar (supposedly ‘democratic’) world order, but Russia sees Color Revolutions and externally plotted coups against national leaders as constituting the true danger to democracy.

Same Word, Different Worlds Of Meaning

Let’s take a look at how the EU and Russia differ in their implicit understanding of democratic security:

Definition:

EU

Judging by Brussels’ behavior towards Macedonia, it can be surmised that it understands ‘democratic security’ as being the retention of personal pawns and Western-dependent countries. In the EU’s understanding, Bulgaria under obedient Prime Minister Boyko Borissov is ‘democratically secure’, whereas Macedonia under pragmatically assertive Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski is ‘democratically insecure’. It’s also no coincidence that Borissov is embraced for stonewalling South Stream but Gruevski is shunned for supporting Balkan Stream.

Russia

Moscow feels differently, of course. It holds the view that the West shouldn’t consider multipolar and independent leaders as threats to democracy (either domestically or internationally), and that the polls are the only acceptable ‘regime change’ option for a country. Thus in Russia’s view, democratic security is about safeguarding the administration of elected leaders. Accordingly, Gruevski is lauded for his democratic credentials and anti-Color Revolution stance, but post-Color Revolution Ukrainian leader Aleksander Turchinov was decried as being anti-democratic.

Focus:

EU

Democratic motions such as regular voting and subjectively defined ‘free media’ are important to Europe, and if a party or candidate emphasizes their commitment to ‘Euro-Atlantic values’, then it does wonders for their ‘democratic’ credentials. This all changes, however, if they don’t agree to walk in lockstep with Brussels’ foreign policy (as ‘official’ Euro-Atlantic aspirant Macedonia has refused to do), which then apparently invalidates all previously acknowledged democratic progress.

Russia

Europe judges democracy based on its surface presentation, but Russia looks at the actual substance involved. Key to its assessment is whether the leader in question was elected and represents the general mood, sentiment, and interests of the country. Gruevski undoubtedly satisfied these requirements by rallying nearly 100,000 people to the streets of Skopje to defend against the anti-democratic aggression being waged against Macedonia, while the Color Revolutionaries could only procure a fraction of that.

Cause For Concern:

EU

Nikola Gruevski

The Europeans become alarmed whenever a strong, determined, and pragmatic leader (a.k.a. not a technocrat) is elected and engages in multipolar policies and independent rhetoric. As it stands, Gruevski fits these characteristics more fully than any other European leader today, ergo the Color Revolution attempt.

Russia

Russia raises extreme concern whenever a radical political minority (particularly one that’s outside-supported) tries to (violently) overthrow a democratically elected and legitimate government, as is currently underway in Macedonia.

Solution:

EU

When faced with what it views to be a ‘democratic security crisis’, the EU (as guided by its American supervisors) assists with a Color Revolution and/or public shaming attempts in an effort to lasso the wayward leaders and the countries they represent back into the unipolar corral. This explains why some European politicians (notably Bulgaria’s Sergey Stanishev) publicly threw their weight behind Sunday’s destabilization inauguration, since they clearly felt compelled to interfere in Macedonia’s domestic affairs in order to ‘correct’ its ‘wayward’ geopolitical tract.

Russia

Russia’s response to democratic security threats against its partners is to engage in supportive information campaigns that aid them in exposing the intelligence-guided regime change plot. Strategic guidance, political cooperation, and diplomatic support are also ways that Russia helps defend democracies that are under attack.

The Conundrum

The insurmountable obstacle between these two views of democratic security is Brussels and its American partner’s response to strong, determined, and pragmatic leaders. Instead of waiting for democracy to run its course, they actively try to sabotage the system by staging a Color Revolution. The most ironic thing about this whole dichotomy is that the West partakes in anti-democratic measures ostensibly to ‘protect democracy’, yet it accuses Russia of ‘supporting despots’ whenever Moscow voices support for legitimate governments like Syria’s, for example. The core of the contradiction between the EU and Russia (at root really a matter of Western hypocrisy—Eds) can actually be traced down to the emergence of independent leaders in the first place, as this is what upsets the West to the point that they try to deploy a Color Revolution against the targeted government.

First things first, such individuals are elected by their people in free, fair, and internationally recognized elections, meaning that it’s the people themselves who are responsible for placing these leaders into power. It may possibly be the case that the Prime Minister or President in question hadn’t focused much on foreign policy during the electoral season, thereby signifying that they reached a certain understanding of international affairs (or publicly began expressing their existing standpoint) only after they entered office, but even in this case, the country’s leader is still the legitimate representative of his country’s interests abroad.

Saving The Multipolar Choice

The very fact that foreign leaders have the choice to pursue unipolar or multipolar policies is because of these 5 very important characteristics of the post-Cold War order:

* Russian nuclear parity with the US and Putin’s Great Power revival of the country enabled it to retain its position as a solid military counterweight to the unipolar world.

* The US helped build up China in order to counter the USSR, but, eventually, Beijing became ‘uncontrollable’ and now has a sense of destiny in rising as an independent global actor.

* The popularly recognized period of unipolarity stretching from 1991 until at most 2013 (when the US backtracked from conventionally attacking Syria amid Russian counter-pressure) brought with it a slew of military mistakes (Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, etc.) that discredited (at last!) the Western foreign policy model and made the global audience more receptive to the multipolar alternative.

* The shift of economic gravity from the West to the Asia-Pacific changed the global focal point from the solidly unipolar world to the frontier of multipolarity.

* Democratic double standards in preaching about ‘human rights’ and ‘democracy’ but buddying up with the Gulf Kingdoms (some of the most anti-democratic and least humane states in the world) dealt irreparable soft power damage to the Western message and planted fruitful seeds of unipolar suspicion in the global consciousness.

Concluding Thoughts

[dropcap]D[/dropcap]emocratic security is the most important emerging strategic field in the world today, as it forms the crucible of conflict between the unipolar and multipolar camps. Unipolar states and their proxies will continually seek to overthrow disobedient or independent leaders, while the multipolar world does what it reasonably can to support the people’s choice of government. At the end of the day, however, democratic security comes down to the targeted people’s will to resist the regime change attempt being thrust upon them (assuming they understand what is going on, not always easy given the West’s strong ability to disseminate false consciousness—Eds), and as Italian journalist and Balkan specialist Umberto Pascali remarked, Macedonia’s resistance may signify a strategic Stalingrad in the fight against Color Revolutions worldwide.

[box] Andrew Korybko is a political analyst and journalist for Sputnik who currently lives and studies in Moscow. [/box]

(Please refer to Part I in acquiring the necessary background information in understanding the Central Balkans concept). 

3 Key Characteristics Of The Central Balkans

[dropcap]S[/dropcap]ince the general idea and genesis behind the Central Balkans have been discussed, it’s now time to turn towards their three most important strategic characteristics:

Lead From Behind Agitators:

Like it was mentioned earlier, newly crowned NATO members Albania and Croatia continue to pose the greatest threat to the Central Balkans. Croatia used to be the primary vehicle for unipolar military activity in the region during the 1990s, but this role was ultimately transferred to Albania for dual deployment against both Serbia and Macedonia. As it stands, Croatia appears to be suitably prepared for returning to its Lead From Behind anti-Serbian role, which one can clearly see by its election of a former high-level NATO information officer as President. Although a largely ceremonial post, it’s symbolic in underscoring the affiliation that the country’s political elite have with Euro-Atlanticism (unipolarity), and with the US’ current support of ultra-nationalist governments and neo-fascist movements, it shouldn’t really stun anyone that Croatia’s new leader is now openly paying tribute to pro-Nazi World War II collaborators. The nightmare scenario for Serbia’s international security is for Albania and Croatia to coordinate any forthcoming destabilizations against the country, and unrest in Serbia or along its borders could also impede the construction of Balkan Stream, at the very least of its consequences.

Triggers:

There are two triggers that can most strongly undermine the stability of Serbia and Macedonia:

* Bosnia

Per the earlier explanation of Republika Srpska’s security significance to Serbia, any provocations inside or along its borders would tangentially also present a threat to Serbia itself. A constitutional crisis over internal power arrangements and federative sovereignty inside of Bosnia could be the catalyst for drawing Repubilka Srpska, and by extension (whether direct or indirect), Serbia, into a larger conflict (the ‘Reverse Brzezinski’ as applied to Belgrade). Not only that, but an externally directed terrorist war could be cooked up (just like in Macedonia) to inflame identity tension between Bosnia’s constituent members, which would then usher in the national crisis purposefully constructed to temptingly invite some form of Serbian response and/or involvement, thereby sucking it into an American-planned trap.

* Greater Albania

The most pressing threat to Serbia and Macedonia’s security and the issue with the greatest potential to destabilize the entire region is the looming specter of Greater Albania. Serbia fell victim to having the most emotionally integral part of its country stolen from it, occupied, and turned into a weapon against the rest of the rump state the last time this was attempted, and it remains a distinct possibility that something similar can happen to Macedonia as regards its entire western and most of its northern periphery.

Additionally, Serbia also faces a new threat from Greater Albania, and that’s ethnic violence in the Albanian-populated Presevo Valley and Sandzak regions, with the first-mentioned being intentionally stoked by a ‘spill over’ from northern Macedonia. Kumanovo just so happens to be close to this region, hence why the terrorists selected it as their base in the event that the order was given to split their forces north and simultaneously attack Serbia on 17 May (the day the Macedonia Color Revolutionaries and Unconventional Warriors were to symbolically unite in their regime change aggression).

Taking it further, even the Greek region of Northern Epirus could potentially be brought into the tumult of Greater Albania, thereby destabilizing all three Central Balkan countries, but potentially providing an urgent impetus to expedite their multipolar integration with one another in standing united against this threat.

Balkan Stream:

[dropcap]P[/dropcap]erhaps the most critical characteristic strategically uniting the Central Balkan states is the Balkan Stream project, which implicitly aims at promoting multipolarity in the region and potentially even taking it as deep as the heart of the EU itself. Should the project reach fruition and the US’ current destabilization plans fail (the Color Revolution attempt in Macedonia and the provocations to incite a regional war around the idea of Greater Albania [just as Greater Kurdistan is being primed for deployment in the Mideast]), then the logical consequence would be that the Central Balkan countries serve as the springboard for multipolarity’s expansion into the European continent.

Balkan Stream is thus more than just a pipeline – it’s a strategic concept of sub-regional integration that’s meant to defy the unipolar dictates of the US’ EU proxy and achieve the long-term goal of liberating Europe from unipolar hegemony. Due to the fact that the Central Balkan countries are the physical vanguard of this far-reaching and profound vision, the US is prioritizing its latest destabilization attempts against each and every one of them, hoping that at least one of its plots takes root after having desperately sowed so many seeds of chaos in the past couple of months (capitalizing off of existing factors) to offset this relatively unexpected multipolar counter-offensive.

Multipolar Solutions

The Central Balkans are currently the latest front in the New Cold War between the US and Russia, or better put, between the unipolar and multipolar world visions. Washington has recently redirected its external meddling activities in order to focus on destabilizing this particular sub-region and sabotaging its march to multipolarity, owing to the previously overlooked vulnerability that the Balkan Stream provides in countering unipolar control all throughout the continent. It is thus of the utmost importance that appropriate defensive policies be implemented in order to reinforce the Central Balkans’ resistance to the US’ aggression and secure the multiopolar counter-offensive currently taking place in the region.

The following are the proposed solutions for solidifying the multipolar vision of Balkan Stream:

Clearly Elucidate Multipolar Aims:

The Central Balkans and their strategic Russian and Chinese partners must publicly articulate their multipolar vision for the region, as such a strong and unified voice would send a global message about the intentions of the non-West. It’s not to suggest that the actors must openly call for overthrowing American control over Europe, but rather to highlight that there are non-EU development trajectories and partnerships that can be just as, if not more, beneficial than working with Brussels. It may even come to pass that the Central Balkans becomes the first flank in a wider European revolt against unipolarity, but in order for this to happen and for the region to serve as a rallying point for the rest of the continent, its anti-hegemony message must be clearly expressed. Political pragmatism and multipolar partnership, not unipolar partisanship and chaotic division, are central themes in conveying this concept.

Institutionalize And Intensify The Balkan Corridor:

The complementary Russian and Chinese infrastructure projects running through the region form the basis around which the Balkan Corridor can be constructed, and the first step towards its formalization is to unveil a multilateral framework between its members. This would serve as an organizational mechanism for coordinating integrational policies between Russia and China on one hand, and Serbia, Macedonia, and Greece on the other, and it could possibly be expanded to include Hungary and Turkey as observer members, if not full-fledged participants. The key purpose is to bring together policy and decision makers, security specialists, and economic actors in hammering out joint details for further cooperation and the intensification of their multilateral partnerships.

Unite The Central Balkans Against Greater Albania:

As much of a threat that Greater Albania is, it also provides an historic opportunity to unite the Central Balkan countries in opposing its terroristic actualization. The existential danger that this US-supported irredentism poses for Macedonia rightfully incites fear in both Belgrade and Athens, as neither of them want a partitioned and failed state along their borders, to say nothing of their own domestic vulnerabilities to the ethnic terrorism directed by Tirana. The US and Albania have clearly demonstrated that they’re taking concrete action in agitating for Greater Albania, so it’s appropriate for the targeted states to tighten their military and strategic ties in defending against it. While Greece’s NATO membership may pose an obstacle in this regard, Serbia and Macedonia aren’t constrained by this limitation and can thus work as closely as they deem necessary in countering this threat. Not only that, but they can also expand their de-facto military alliance to include Russia, which could then provide military, political, and technical support to their countries’ anti-terror and counter-Color Revolution operations in the same manner as it’s been proudly doing for Syria over the past four years.

Emphasize Russia’s Connections To The Region:

Russia has deep cultural, linguistic, religious, and historical connections to the Balkans that it can capitalize upon in promoting Balkan Stream and gaining soft power inroads in Serbia, Macedonia, and Greece. These unique asymmetrical factors perpetually tether the Central Balkans to Russia, but more work must be done in order to strengthen these bonds and make the ‘Russia factor’ a significant part of those countries’ national identity and psyche. The deepening of emotional ties can enhance the effectiveness of multilateral soft power expressions between Russia and its Central Balkan partners, thereby providing a stable foundation for the future expansion of their relations and increasing their larger strategic cohesion.

Concluding Thoughts

Great Power competition over the Balkans has historically served as one of the engines of European politics and has been among its most widely recognized features for centuries. Back then, multiple empires were jostling for influence and counter-balancing one another, but the situation has remarkably simplified in the current day. Nowadays only one empire remains and that’s the United States and its unipolar allies, which have been doing all they can to completely swallow the region over the past two and a half decades. Serbia and Macedonia are the only two regional holdouts remaining, and they form the core of a reconceptualized Balkan region, the Central Balkans, that’s partnering with Russia in staging a multipolar counter-offensive against this aggression. The geopolitical liberation that Balkan Stream would bring to the region, and quite possibly all of Europe, makes it one of the most globally impactful projects currently under construction, and it’s arguably central to Russia’s grand strategy in dismantling unipolarity.

The conceptualized creation of the Central Balkans assists one in more easily understanding the regional geopolitical arrangement in the context of the latest round of the New Cold War. Additionally, it holds the exciting possibility of evolving from an intangible concept to a concrete reality by serving as an organizational platform for energizing closer integration between its members. The institutionalization of the Balkan Corridor and its accelerated strategic unification in resisting the threat of Greater Albania is expected to facilitate the creation of a critical mass of multipolarity that can flip the regional initiative against the destabilizing unipolar forces. Thus, because it signifies the first step in a larger counter-offensive against the American occupation of Europe, Russia’s support of the Central Balkans and their strategic convergence into an integrated entity is arguably one of the most pivotal multipolar processes in the world today, and it could potentially transform into a battering ram for breaching the US’ unipolar citadel in Western Eurasia.

[box] Andrew Korybko is the political analyst and journalist for Sputnik who currently lives and studies in Moscow, primarily for ORIENTAL REVIEW. [/box]

[dropcap]The Balkans[/dropcap] have returned to the forefront of European geopolitics as a result of the New Cold War, started by Washington, with the US and Russia facing off in a proxy war over the planned Balkan Stream pipeline through the region.

…
The geopolitical circumstances have evolved since the 1990s, when all of the former Yugoslavia was lumped together as the Western Balkans. In order to accommodate for the changing strategic reality in the region, it’s necessary to carve the Central Balkans out of the idea of the former, and the new division of the Balkans into Western, Central, and Eastern regions which simplifies the analysis of contemporary developments and provides a strategic trajectory to follow in monitoring their future development.

The research will focus on the Western and Central Balkans, since the latter is now the object of geopolitical competition between the unipolar and multipolar worlds. The Eastern Balkans are already integrated into NATO and do not play as much of a part over the Central Balkans as the Western portion does, although their evolving role in NATO’s newly unveiled umbrella of regional blocs will certainly be expounded upon in a forthcoming piece. Additionally, Greece occupies a special role because it abuts the Western, Central, and Eastern Balkans and has a unique identity and history separate from the other Balkan countries, although due to its larger geopolitical disposition, it’s grouped together with the Central Balkans in the context of this piece. Nonetheless, it does deserve its own separate article in the future, although the author did touch upon this topic in an earlier interview.

Shifting back to the current piece, Part I begins with an explanation for the reconceptualization of the Balkans and then chronicles how this change in thinking came about. Afterwards, Part II examines the key characteristics of the Central Balkans before offering some proposed solutions for their security and expedited integration into the multipolar world.

The Reconceptualization 
(Click on the images for maximum resolution)

The Balkans have moved past their traditional division into Western and Eastern parts with the creation of the Central Balkans strategic concept. Here is what’s meant by the proposed idea:

Traditional:

The customary categorization of the Balkans lumps all of the former Yugoslavia into the Western half and Romania and Bulgaria into its Eastern one, leaving Albania and Greece largely undefined and understood simply as “the Balkans”. The justification for this delineation is that most of the former Yugoslavia was undergoing the same process of violent fragmentation during the 1990s, while Romania and Bulgaria escaped these events relatively unscathed (but not without their own unique domestic challenges). At the time, there was no need to draw a geographic distinction between the former Yugoslav Republics, but NATO’s formal and de-facto encroachment into most of the geographic span of the former Yugoslavia, as well as the diametrically divergent foreign policy tracts of some of its former members, formed the impetus in adapting to the new reality and revising the former Western Balkans notion.

Reconceived:

For the reasons previously stated, the concept of the Western Balkans has to be reconceived and updated to accommodate for the changing geopolitical and strategic nature of the region. Here’s what the author suggests:

* Western Balkans

This encompasses the NATO states of Slovenia, Croatia, and Albania, as well as the NATO protectorate of Bosnia and de-facto NATO member Montenegro. Looking at a map, one can see that it literally compasses the western edge of the Balkan Peninsula. When compared to its central counterpart, the Western Balkans are the bastion of unipolarity in the region and directly conflict with their ‘prodigal’ multipolar siblings. This was the case during World War II, the 1990s, and into the present day, with Croatia and Albania continuing to behave as the North-South Lead From Behind agitators on behalf of their patrons.

* Central Balkans

Serbia, Macedonia, and Greece comprise the newest category of Balkan strategic thinking, and this new bloc runs through the geographic center of the region along a critical North-South route. Due to its amenable geopolitical positioning as compared to its Western and Eastern counterparts, it holds the promising possibility of forming a North-South corridor (the Balkan Silk Road) that can connect the Eastern Mediterranean with Central Europe and beyond. Russia’s Balkan Stream project forms the critical spine of this new entity (henceforth referred to as the Balkan Corridor) around which further integrational development is expected to gravitate, and accordingly, Moscow is encouraging its partners’ multipolar pursuits and deepening its support for their policies.

Anomalies:

The West-Central division of the Balkans carries with it two very important geopolitical anomalies that must be addressed:

* Republika Srpska

This entity appeared as a legacy of the early 1990s dissolution of Yugoslavia and the 1994 Dayton Agreement, and it provides Serbia with strategic depth, but also strategic vulnerability vis-à-vis a potential Bosnian breakdown and/or Croatian or Bosnian Croatian provocation. The existence of Republika Srpska can thus be understood as a double-edged sword, however, its emotional significance means that it will never be abandoned by Serbia and must accordingly be considered as a de-facto extension of the Central Balkans into conventional Western Balkan territory (Bosnia).

* Kosovo

The Serbian Province of Kosovo is currently occupied by Western forces (the US’ Camp Bondsteel is one of the largest American military bases in Europe) and illegally seceded from Serbia in 2008 with Western support. It functions as a Western outpost smack dab in the middle of the Central Balkans, of which it’s geographically (but no longer de-facto politically) a part. Of the two, the occupied Serbian Province of Kosovo is more directly under the control of the West and a more heavily fortified forward-operating post for unipolar aggression than Republika Srpska is for Serbia and the Central Balkans’ multipolar defense.

Chronological Progression Of The West-Central Balkan Division

[dropcap]T[/dropcap]he strategic concept of the Central Balkans wasn’t formed overnight, and it’s informative to highlight the key events that led to its logical conceptualization. The catalyst for its creation was the unipolar world’s efforts to shrink Serbia and politically shackle it and Macedonia to the EU as backwater political and economic appendages (‘New Bulgarias’), while Greece has always found itself outside the European ‘mainstream’ and has historically behaved as a bridge between East and West. The coupling of Serbian and Macedonian resistance with the Greek identity’s incompatibility to enforced ‘Europeanization’ (nowadays manifested as severe austerity) provided the perfect mix for these states’ secession from the unipolar Western Balkans and strategic incorporation into their own multipolar Central Balkans category arranged around Balkan Stream.

The following timeline focuses on the geopolitical violence related to Serbia and Macedonia, since the dramatic events that occurred there set in motion the foreign policy decisions that would eventually lead to their partnership with Russia and alignment towards the multipolar world:

Pre-1991:

Serbia constituted the center of gravity for Yugoslavia, and thus, the entire Western Balkans.

1991-1994:

Yugoslavia began to formally disintegrate this year, with Croatia serving as the Lead from Behind proxy for accelerating this process. The ethnic cleansing and genocide of Serbians in Croatia and Bosnia led to the diminishment of Serbian-populated territory, and subsequently, such lands were retained by their associated former Yugoslav Republics and not incorporated into Serbia proper. Areas that could have become conceptually incorporated into the Central Balkans (from the sense of being Serbian-populated) remained in their geographic Western Balkan zones for later formal or de-facto incorporation into NATO, thus setting the stage for part of the West-Central Balkan split.

1994:

The Dayton Accords represented a temporary cessation of the campaign to split Serbia, but in the meanwhile, its leadership was demonized and plans were made for the next step of the destabilization; the formal redrawing of its internationally recognized borders and the testing of a new regime change technology, Color Revolutions.

1999:

NATO launched its formal aggression against Serbia (then still known as Yugoslavia) in order to steal Kosovo, the cradle of its civilization, and set up a strategic base in the heart of the Central Balkans. It’s around this time that Croatia passed the torch of anti-Serbian destabilization to its Albanian partner and Tirana became the US’ primary Lead From Behind regional ally. The US also demonstrated for the first time that it would use force in order to create Greater Albania, a politically convenient client state and an anticipated anchor of unipolarity in the Balkans.

2000:

The US overthrew Slobodan Milosevic by successfully testing the first Color Revolution (the “Bulldozer Revolution”), a political technology that would later be perfected in various other theaters and boomeranged back to the Balkans 15 years later for deployment in Macedonia.

2001:

Albanian destabilization in Macedonia culminated in a ‘soft’ NATO intervention and the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement, which while guaranteeing the Albanian minority the world’s most generous minority privileges, also made them susceptible to being manipulated by Western political forces. The Western expectation at the time was that this would create a lever of deep indefinite influence that they could use to hijack Macedonia’s independence and steer it towards unipolar submission.

2006:

Montenegro votes for independence from Serbia (then still called Yugoslavia) and becomes the last constituent member of the Western Balkans pro-American constellation.

2008:

The occupied Serbian Province of Kosovo unilaterally declares independence as directed to do so by its Western occupiers, in a move that was meant to ‘legitimize’ their presence in the region and perpetually keep Serbia and Macedonia in check. It also represented the formalization of the unipolar Western Balkans’ penetration into the heart of the Central Balkans.

2009: 

The US’ two most prominent Lead From Behind partners in the Balkans, Albania and Croatia, both join NATO in what is the military bloc’s most recent formal expansion and certainly not a coincidence. The US was rewarding both of its allies for their destabilization of Serbia, the former core of the Western Balkans, and protecting them with mutual defense guarantees for any future provocative actions they take against Serbia (or in the Albania’s case, also against Macedonia).

2000s-2010s:

Belgrade and Skopje stated their formal wish to be integrated into the EU and NATO, however, Serbia and Macedonia’s respective proud refusals in refusing to recognize the illegally enacted ‘independence’ of Kosovo and in changing its constitutional name kept them on the periphery of these processes and stalled their Euro-Atlantic ambitions. This in turn caused them to reconsider their strategic trajectories and eventually made them susceptible to the multipolar pivot that they enacted when they agreed to partner with Russia in building Balkan Stream. The lesson to be learned is that the West’s disrespect for both countries’ domestic legislation, sovereignty, and independence led to what may in hindsight be considered the first ‘revolt’ against the EU. These two countries are the only ones to stand by their identity in refusing to be bullied by Brussels, as all current EU members (including the ‘revolting’ ones such as Greece) had to at one time sacrifice their self-conception in order to become part of the larger European ‘whole’.

2015:

After being charged with a coup attempt in January, Zaev reacted by initiating his Color Revolution attempt in Macedonia. Later on in April, Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama formally declared his intention to create a Greater Albania, and by the end of the month, the small Macedonian town of Gosince was the scene of a test-run terrorist attack by the Kosovo Liberation Army separatist terrorist group. A few days later, a terrorist attack surprised the Republika Srpska city of Zvornik, likely staged as a means of sending an indirect threatening signal to Serbia. A little over a week later, the northern Macedonian town of Kumanovo was the scene of deadly terrorist violence by the KLA that represented the first strike in an American-directed Greater Albania campaign against the country’s pragmatic government and Russia’s Balkan Stream pipeline plans.

To be continued…

[box] Andrew Korybko is the political analyst and journalist for Sputnik who currently lives and studies in Moscow, exclusively for ORIENTAL REVIEW. [/box]